Estimating the Value of Connections to Vice-President Cheney

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Abstract

We estimate the market valuation of personal ties to Richard Cheney. Our proxies for personal ties are based on corporate board linkages that are prevalent in the network sociology literature. We consider a number of distinct political and personal events that either affected Cheney’s political fortunes or his ability to hand out political favors. Specifically, we consider: (a) market reaction of connected companies to news of Cheney’s heart attacks; (b) market reaction of connected companies to Cheney’s being placed in charge of the vice-presidential search process and his surprise self-appointment; (c) correlation of the value of connected companies with the probability of a Bush victory in 2000; and (d) correlation of the value of connected companies with the probability of war in Iraq. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that in all cases, the value of ties to Cheney is precisely estimated as zero. We interpret this as evidence that U.S. institutions are effective in controlling rent-seeking through personal ties with high-level government officials.

KEYWORDS: political connections, rent-seeking, United States

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1. Introduction

In the two years following the Iraq War, the value of Halliburton, the oil services company, more than doubled. The company had been headed by then Vice-President Richard Cheney immediately prior to his taking office, leading to many allegations of corporate favoritism by Cheney. Both conventional wisdom and a vast body of research in political science have long held that business-government relations play an important role in corporate America. Following on the classic study of Bauer et al. (1972), much of this literature has modeled corporate America as a collection of special interest groups that lobby and otherwise curry favor with government (see, for example, Hart, 2004). A more recent set of studies analyzes business-politics relations at the level of the individual firm, looking at the correlation between various measures of firm-level connections to government, such as lobbying, PAC expenditures, and politically affiliated board members, and measures of firm success (for example, Ansolabehere et al., 2004; Jayachandran, 2006; Blanes i Vidal et al., 2012; Igan and Mishra, 2012).

The case of Cheney differs in a crucial way from the corporate rent-seeking analyzed in these papers however. Allegations against the Vice-President focused on the importance of his personal ties in generating firm value, rather than on connections operating through formal lobbying or political finance institutions, or through employees who are effective in navigating government bureaucracies.\(^1\) In this realm, evidence is limited to anecdote and accusation. This is an important and surprising gap in the literature, given the strongly held views on the favor-giving by Cheney and others, and the mounting evidence with regard to the value of personal political ties around the world.\(^2\)

In this paper, we estimate the market valuation of personal connections to former U.S. Vice-President Richard Cheney, utilizing methods from the emerging literature that uses financial markets to study political phenomena.\(^3\) Specifically, we look at the stock market returns of companies with personal connections to

\(^1\) Goldman et al. (2009) examine the political ties of board members in predicting abnormal returns during the 2000 Presidential election. This paper provides convincing evidence that the board member affiliations are important in generating firm value, but this is distinct from the question that we analyze here: First, Goldman et al. cannot easily distinguish personal-favor exchange from the provision of expertise in navigating (sometimes partisan) government bureaucracies; second, we focus here on the personal favor-giving of politicians while in office, rather than on their activities after they leave public service.

\(^2\) For example, Faccio (2006) finds that the market values of firms with political ties are affected by unexpected electoral outcomes in a broad cross-section of countries, and Fisman (2001) finds that the value of companies with personal ties to President Suharto are negatively affected by sudden adverse health events.

\(^3\) See Zitzewitz (2012) for a broader overview of this literature in the context of forensic economics.
Cheney following the news of his personal and political fortunes, which, we argue, provides a market-based measure of investors’ beliefs about the value provided by Cheney to well-connected companies.

Overall, our narrow purpose in this exercise is to evaluate the frequent media allegations of corporate favoritism by Vice-President Cheney – that is, has Cheney been pronounced guilty based on past associations, or do companies actually benefit from their relations with him? While Halliburton’s stock price appreciated considerably in the years following the Iraq invasion, so did those of every other firm in Halliburton’s industry. More broadly, we view this as a case study of the larger question of whether personal ties to high-level government officials play an important role in business-government relations in the U.S.

Our findings are as follows: In all events we study, there is a zero effect (often precisely estimated) on the stock prices of connected firms. That is, connected companies’ returns are unaffected by events that would likely have affected Cheney’s ability to provide favors. While prior evidence suggests that business-government relations are an important part of U.S. commerce, our results imply that these connections are more institutional than personal. That is, there are well-organized institutions, such as political action committees and other lobbying entities, for facilitating these relations that differ from the deeply personalized-favor exchange that characterizes business-politics relations in much of the world.

A couple of caveats are in order in interpreting our results. First, the measure of connection based on corporate board associations (“board ties”) we utilize, may not be a sufficiently strong proxy for connectedness. Further, connections such as Cheney’s may operate at the industry-level rather than benefiting companies individually. This may be, for example, because Cheney is effectively tied to the entire oil and gas sector or because favors aimed at helping individual companies provide a boost to entire sectors. We discuss that while we believe that these concerns are important, they are unlikely to account fully for the lack of a “Cheney effect.”

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe our data, including a detailed discussion of our board-based measure of Cheney’s connections and an overview of the events we study. Section 3 presents our event study results, and Section 4 concludes.

2. Data

2.1 Cheney’s Board Connections
Following the network sociology literature, we define personal connections to Vice-President Cheney based on board linkages (see, for example, Mizruchi,
We examine three types of connected firms: (a) Halliburton, the company where Cheney served as CEO during 1995-1999; (b) companies where Vice-President Cheney sat on the board during 1995-1999; and (c) companies where at least one board member was appointed to Halliburton’s board during 1995-1999.

Because our analysis hinges on the credibility of our measure of Cheney’s personal business ties, in the remainder of this section we discuss why corporate board ties, particularly as they pertain to Vice-President Cheney, are the appropriate measure of personal networks. The social and economic meaning of relations among board members has been the source of extensive research as well as public concern in the United States ever since the Pujo Committee identified certain overlapping board memberships as harmful to the public and market early in the 20th century. Board ties have been shown to affect the process of information flow and the diffusion of practices among large corporations, including the adoption of poison pills (Davis, 1991), corporate acquisition activity (Haunschild, 1993), and CEO compensation (Khurana, 2002).

Central to our study, sociologists and organizational scholars have also found board ties to be the most effective means of operationalizing personal ties among the business elite (see Mizruchi, 1996, for a review). The cliché that relationships among board members are better characterized as intense, affect-laden, social relations – more a social club than an arms-length economic partnership – is, in fact, surprisingly true. Mace (1971) found that directors often describe their relations with fellow directors not in professional terms, but in terms more commonly used to describe friends, confidantes and close colleagues.

One possible contributing factor to the sociable atmosphere is the reality that most board nominations do not emanate from shareholders, but from the existing board itself, with the CEO significantly influencing the process. That is, most boards are entities in which the sitting CEO has significant influence on choosing new board members (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005). Thus, researchers have found that most directors have some prior social connection to, or are even close friends with, the existing CEO. Useem (1984) found that among the largest U.S. corporations, boards of directors, including the CEO of the firm, usually have a prior history of personal contact and professional relationships with newly appointed directors, often sharing membership in elite social clubs and educational backgrounds with a corporation’s top executives. These friendship ties are further reinforced by the general boardroom culture where not only are collegiality and friendship emphasized, but a direct avoidance of conflict and confrontation is the norm (Khurana, 2002).

Thus, to summarize, board membership more broadly creates a context for a kind of reciprocal attraction and friendship among a fraternity of individuals.
its strongest form, it creates a sense of deep and shared obligations among a group of similar individuals.

This broad theme of reciprocal relations among board members is directly applicable to Vice-President Cheney’s selection of board members. Further bolstering this view is the role that the Vice-President played in transforming Halliburton’s board after becoming CEO. According to our data, his tenure was marked by a near-complete turnover of the board, with many of the new appointments going to those with pre-existing ties to Cheney. These included quail-hunting partners Roger Staubach and William Bradford, and former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who served with Cheney in the administration of George H.W. Bush. Thus, the Halliburton board under Cheney was distinguished by a set of board members with both strong prior personal associations with Cheney, and by a deep sense of reciprocal relations, given that they owed their board positions to his influence.

Based on the above motivation, we define an individual to be Cheney-connected if he was appointed to Halliburton’s board of directors during 1995-1999, the period during which Cheney served as CEO. We then define Cheney-connected companies to be those with Cheney-connected individuals on their boards during the period 2000-2003, or those where Cheney himself was a board member during 1995-1999. In theory, we might further distinguish between companies where the connected individual was a board member of the company, and those where the connected individual served as CEO. The latter group of companies is plausibly more strongly connected, since the relevant individual has stronger incentive to use any connections to benefit the company. In practice, however, we do not find that our results are affected when we limit the sample to companies where the Halliburton board member served as CEO.

To summarize, we have three types of connected companies: (a) Cheney-connected individual is on the company’s board of directors; (b) Cheney as board member 1995-1999; and (c) Cheney as CEO during 1995-1999 (i.e., Halliburton). In all that follows, we will report results based on Halliburton separately from the full-sample results, since Halliburton is a particularly salient case.

We use data from Compustat’s Execucomp database. We begin by creating a list of all Halliburton board members whose tenure began during 1995-1999, which generates a list of Execucomp identifiers for all Cheney-connected individuals. To generate the list of companies connected to these individuals, we search for all company-year observations where the connected individual served on the board of directors during 2000-2003. In a number of cases, firms had multiple Cheney connections. For example, Cheney sat on the board of EDS, and a board member of EDS during 2000-2003 was also appointed to Halliburton’s board during Cheney’s tenure as CEO.
The full set of companies is listed in Table 1, along with basic measures of firm size and profitability in 2000. For comparison, we also list the median characteristics of the S&P 500 sample of firms. Our connected sample is notably smaller (lower sales) and more profitable (higher return on assets and Tobin’s Q) than the S&P 500 overall. We also list each firm’s industry classification. Not surprisingly, the list is concentrated in oil and gas as well as heavy manufacturing.4

2.2 Events affecting the value of Cheney connections
Paralleling the earlier literature that uses the health status of leaders (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006) as shocks to connections, we examine unexpected changes in Cheney’s health as a shock to the value of connections. We first identified all relevant dates through an open-ended search of the New York Times and Wall Street Journal during 2000-2004 with the keywords CHENEY and HEALTH. This yielded a number of stories, including health check-ups, the Vice-President’s two heart attacks and the occasion on which doctors implanted a pacemaker in the chest of the Vice-President to correct an irregular heartbeat. We exclude the health check-ups as relatively minor events, which generally stated that the Vice-President was in reasonable health; we also exclude the pacemaker installation, because it was announced on a late Friday afternoon (likely timed by the White House to minimize public attention) and because information about the procedure may have been leaked prior to the announcement (see Della Vigna and Pollet, 2009 for an extended analysis about the timing of release of bad news).

Not surprisingly, the White House played down the seriousness of both heart attacks. However, media reports surrounding these events reflected genuine concern. After Cheney’s third heart attack, on November 22, 2000, the New York Daily News noted that his “‘very slight heart attack’ prompted speculation yesterday about his ability to withstand the rigors of the vice presidency,”5 and after his fourth heart attack, on March 5, 2001, USA Today worried that “In a worst-case scenario, Cheney himself could die… In Cheney’s case, that’s not a far-fetched consideration.”6,7 We date each cardiac episode to the day when the event was announced by the White House.

4 We avoid trying to classify firms according to their need for government connections. When we limit the sample to oil, gas, and heavy manufacturing, industries that are perhaps more subject to government oversight, our point estimates are not substantially affected.
7 It is difficult to give a precise assessment of the mortality risk associated with each announcement. The term “heart attack” may be presumed to be synonymous with the medical term “myocardial infarction,” signifying ischemic injury to heart muscle that actually results in the death of tissue. We presume that the pacemaker insertion that followed Cheney’s fourth heart
Second, we consider shocks to Cheney’s political fortunes. This generates two additional surprise events that augment the cardiac episodes described above: Cheney’s appointment to head the vice-presidential search for Bush in 2000, and his subsequent self-appointment to this position. In both cases, we date the event to the first media mention of the event. In the first instance, the *Washington Post* reported on April 19 that, “GOP sources said Bush ... may put [Cheney] in charge of the vice presidential selection process.” The self-appointment as vice-presidential candidate was a genuine surprise to the market. The short-list of candidates did not include Cheney until the *Associated Press* revealed on Friday, July 21 that Cheney had changed his voter registration from Texas to Wyoming to make him eligible to run, and quoted a source as saying that “Bush is very, very close to settling on Cheney.” Throughout the weekend, Cheney emerged as a clear front-runner, with an unofficial announcement on Monday, July 24. We use the two-day returns (July 21, 24) for this event.

These nomination events, particularly Cheney’s nomination for vice-president, are much less clean than the heart attacks, since they involve many simultaneous events that affect valuation. For example, both events may have drawn Cheney’s attention away from the task of running Halliburton, and hence could result in negative returns. Further, given Cheney’s close pre-existing ties to the Bush administration, it is not clear that he could lobby more effectively for the company as vice-president relative to his influence if he worked full-time as Halliburton’s CEO to promote the company’s interests.

An additional, and in some sense broader, test of the value of Cheney’s connections is to examine the effect of the fortunes of the Bush Administration in general on the value of Cheney-connected companies. This may be a more rigorous test, since it may be expected that a company with personal ties to Cheney may have cultivated personal ties throughout the Republican attack was necessitated by a disorder of cardiac rhythm. However, the situation is complicated by the bidirectional nature of cardiac disease: ischemia (reduction in flow of blood to cardiac muscle) may result in arrhythmia, while arrhythmia may cause ischemia as well. This makes it difficult to map the Vice President’s risk of death to precise actuarial estimates. The repeated nature of these events may have further elevated the Vice President’s risk of death. It is clear that repeated myocardial infarction in individuals with at least one initial myocardial infarction is associated with increased risk of mortality, relative to myocardial infarction without recurrence (See, Thune et al.,2011, and Marmor et al.,1982). However, the magnitude of mortality risk after recurrent events, relative to first events, has received limited study (Thune et al., 2011; Gullickson et al., 2009). Available data suggest that case-fatality for recurrent events is similar to that seen for first events; a recent large, population-based Swedish study suggested that both first events and subsequent recurrent myocardial infarctions were associated with case-fatality of approximately 20 percent (Brunner et al.,2004). An additional possibility would be to look at the differential insurance premia or actuarial tables for an individual with Cheney’s pre- and post-heart attack health profile. Unfortunately, someone with Cheney’s health profile was not insurable at the time of his heart attacks.
administration. We use data from the political futures contracts for the Bush victory in 2000 from the Iowa Electronic Market (IEM). In this online “betting pool,” participants traded futures contracts on the candidates; those purchasing the Republican contract, for example, were paid one dollar in the event of a Bush victory in the popular vote. Given the structure of this contract, the market price can be interpreted as the probability of a Bush victory.8

Finally, we consider an event that may have impacted Cheney’s ability to provide favors. Specifically, there have been many allegations, including those quoted in the introduction, that companies with ties to Cheney were disproportionately awarded contracts for the Iraqi reconstruction. To examine whether government contracting was expected to favor Cheney’s friends, we examine the relationship between the probability of war in Iraq and the value of companies with Cheney connections in affected industries (military, oil, oil and gas services, and construction). Following Leigh et al. (2009), we proxy for the probability of war using the futures contract that paid one dollar in the event that Saddam Hussein was captured by June 2003. Similar to the IEM, the price of the Saddam contract can be interpreted as the probability of capture by 2003, which would only have occurred if the U.S. invaded Iraq (see, Leigh et al., 2009, for further details on the use of the Saddam contract to proxy for probability of war).

2.3 Company Data
Data on the daily returns for each company were extracted from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. We use risk-adjusted excess returns, which nets out overall market returns, and also takes into account a stock’s volatility.9 We do this primarily to deal with the concern that the overall market may be affected by Cheney’s well-being. Since we wish to focus on personal connections (as distinct from industry-wide effects), we also calculate returns for all firms listed in CRSP in a company’s 4-digit SIC code. We additionally obtained basic firm characteristics (specifically, sales and assets) through the COMPUSTAT database, which provides balance-sheet data on publicly traded companies.

2.4 The Vice-Presidency and the scope for influence
Before proceeding to our analysis, we briefly discuss the issue of whether, allegations notwithstanding, it may be possible for Cheney to influence the fortunes of favored companies. Vice-President Cheney has often been called the most influential vice-president in U.S. history, and he has had an active hand in

8 We thank Brian Knight for providing these data. Please see Knight (2006) for details.
9 This risk-adjustment is standard in asset pricing. See Brealey and Myers (1999) for details. Because of our very small sample size, we did not pursue alternative approaches to risk adjustment, such as a three-factor model.
formulating policy in many domains, both foreign and domestic. Further, Cheney’s reputation for involvement in ground-level decisions has made it possible for him to take actions that have influenced the fortunes of individual firms (as distinct from broad policies that affect entire industries). More specifically, in the case of the awarding of contracts for work in Iraq, the potential for Cheney to intervene on behalf of his connected firms was arguably high – especially because the contracts were awarded by a political appointee, rather than a civil servant.

3. Results

In each set of results reported below, we provide estimates for the full sample of connected companies, as well as separate results for Halliburton specifically.

3.1 Effect of Cheney’s Health and Political Fortunes

As outlined in the preceding section, Richard Cheney has a history of heart trouble that may be the source of plausible exogenous shocks to the value of Cheney connections. This parallels the approaches of Fisman (2001), Roberts (1990), and Faccio and Parsley (2009).

In our analysis, we proceed as follows: for the full sample of thirteen Cheney-connected companies, we generate both equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios, and estimate industry-adjusted returns over the period January 3, 2000 to April 30, 2001, using a standard market model for each portfolio. We also generate industry-adjusted returns over the same period for Halliburton only. We then regress these returns including indicator variables for each of the two events that affected Cheney’s political fortunes as well as the two heart attacks.

Table 2 lists the results. While the sample size limits statistical power, we note that none of the event dummies are statistically significant at conventional levels in any specification. The coefficients on the two political events – which represent positive shocks to Cheney’s political career – are all negative. In the case of Halliburton specifically, the estimates approach statistical significance, perhaps suggesting concern over the company’s fortunes without Cheney.


11 For example, it is alleged that Cheney interceded personally with the Indian government on behalf of Enron in order to rescue the company’s natural gas operation from generating losses. See “White House Aided Enron In Dispute; Cheney, Others Intervened Over Indian Power Plant,” The Washington Post, January 19, 2002.

The coefficients on the heart attack event dummies are generally very close to zero, and in all but one instance actually positive. They generally indicate an impact of, at most, a few percent. Focusing on Halliburton specifically, the point estimate of 0.00 and standard error of 0.011 for Cheney’s third heart attack, imply that we can reject that the company’s share price would fall more than a few percent in response to the news at the 5 percent level of significance. As a point of comparison – albeit an extreme one – Bimantara Citra, a company headed by one of Suharto’s children, fell by about 13 percent on the announcement on July 4, 1996 that President Suharto would fly to Germany for a health checkup.13

3.2 Cheney’s Political Fortunes and the 2000 election

Turning now to the election-based evidence, under the hypothesis that companies with Cheney connections are affected by the political fortunes of the Bush administration more broadly, returns of connected companies should be correlated with the probability of Bush’s electoral victory. Broadly, we follow the approach of Knight (2006), who studies the correlation of the returns of firms favored by Bush or Gore policies with the Iowa Electronics Market (IEM) probability of a Bush victory. In our case, we consider regressions of the following form:

\[ R_{it} = \alpha + \beta \Delta \text{Bush}_t + \epsilon_{it} \]

where \( \Delta \text{Bush}_t \) is the change in the IEM probability of a Bush victory on date \( t \), and \( R_{it} \) is the excess returns of company \( i \) on date \( t \). Standard errors are clustered by date.14 Paralleling the presentation in Knight (2006), we report results based on daily, as well as weekly, returns. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 3, we present results based on daily returns, both risk-adjusted and relative to industry median, including company fixed-effects. While the point estimates are positive, they imply a very low level of sensitivity, albeit imprecisely estimated, and in neither case is the estimate significant at conventional levels. For example, a ten percentage-point increase in the probability of a Bush victory implies a return of less than 0.2 percent for connected companies. Further, when we limit our analysis to Halliburton (column (3)), where one might expect a greater effect of connections, we obtain a similarly small magnitude. The weekly returns (columns (4) – (6)) generate similarly insignificant effects.

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13 Note that this does not necessarily imply a lower dollar value of Cheney connections versus Suharto connections, since the market value of Halliburton in 2000 was about ten times that of Bimantara Citra in 1996.

14 The results are virtually identical with company-level clustering, or two-way clustering on company and date.
3.3 Probability of War in Iraq

One of the primary allegations against Vice-President Cheney, as alluded to in the introduction, was the preferential treatment of contractors in the wake of the invasion of Iraq. As noted above, the potential for Cheney to intervene on behalf of his connected firms in this context was particularly high since the contracts were awarded by a political appointee. As Leigh et al. (2009) carefully document, there were strong industry-level responses to the Iraq War; below, we assess whether firms experienced particularly strong returns by virtue of their personal connections to Cheney relative to industry returns. For this section, we limit the analysis to the set of connected firms that were in oil, oil and gas services, military, or construction. The rationale for each is relatively straightforward. While oil companies would uniformly benefit from the higher oil prices generated by risk of war, connected oil firms might have preferential access to Iraqi oil fields. Construction and services firms could be favored in providing goods and services to the reconstruction process. Finally, military firms and their suppliers might differentially benefit from access to military contracts (although Leigh et al., 2009, do not find any industry-wide impact on military firms).

In column (1) of Table 4, we provide results showing the relationship between connected firms’ excess returns and the change in probability of Saddam’s capture in June 2003 (ΔSaddamJ03t), for the full sample of connected firms. We use the following specification that precisely parallels (1) above:

\[ R_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta^* \Delta \text{SaddamJ03}_t + \epsilon_{it} \]

We find that the coefficient on ΔSaddamJ03 is positive, though with a t-statistic of only about 0.6. Further, since there were strong industry-level responses to the probability of war in Iraq, it is crucial to net out industry effects to the extent that connections operate at the company- rather than industry-level. In column (2), we report returns relative to the industry median. The coefficient drops by more than 80 percent, implying that unadjusted returns were picking up an industry-wide shock. The point estimate, 0.005, is small in magnitude and is insignificant. Columns (4) – (5) report weekly returns, and generate qualitatively similar results, though more precisely estimated as zero effects. For the specifications that include Halliburton alone, we obtain a positive point estimate in column (3), although it is very imprecisely measured. When we use weekly returns, the coefficient becomes slightly negative and very small in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable from zero.
4. Conclusion

In this paper, we document that the returns of firms with political ties to Richard Cheney were unaffected by events that would credibly impact the value of any such connections. This is in contrast to the public perception, reinforced by the media, that Cheney gave preferential treatment to Halliburton and perhaps other well-connected firms. Interestingly, it may be exactly this type of media scrutiny that prevents highly placed public officials in the United States from favoring those with whom they have personal connections. In that vein, our study’s negative finding on the effect of connections is entirely consistent with other recent scandals, from Jack Abramoff to Rod Blagojevich, and even Enron. The lesson of such scandals may, in fact, be that blatant corruption that is discovered by an active law-enforcement regiment and is widely reported in the media, serves to temper politicians’ willingness to engage in favor-giving. Since Cheney’s every decision was scrutinized by numerous watchdog organizations and media outlets that span the ideological spectrum, their frequent reports of potential conflicts may have, in fact, helped to prevent Cheney’s personal favor-giving, rather than reveal it.

We recognize that there are potential alternative explanations for our zero result. For example, the board ties measure emphasized by the network sociology literature may not be a sufficiently strong proxy for connectedness. However, nearly identical critiques apply to the work of Fisman (2001), Faccio (2006), and others, who do report strong effects in other contexts. We thus interpret our results as evidence that business-politics relations are not governed by the same type of personal ties that characterize many other economies.

We feel that our case-study approach is a useful starting point, as it allows us to focus carefully on the specifics of a particular individual where allegations of providing favors were rife. Further research will be useful in understanding the factors that limit value extraction through personal connections in general. This is one part of the broader agenda of understanding the factors that lead firms to interface with government through personal relations versus more formal institutionalized mechanisms.
Table 1. Sales, return on assets, and Tobin’s Q in year 2000 for all companies in sample. (Data from COMPUSTAT.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Sales (in millions)</th>
<th>Return on Assets</th>
<th>Tobin’s Q</th>
<th>Industry Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BRINKER INTL INC</td>
<td>2,160</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>EATING PLACES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS CORP</td>
<td>19,227</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>CMP PROGRAMMING,DATA PROCESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALLIBURTON CO</td>
<td>11,856</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>HEAVY CONSTR-NOT BLDG CONSTR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KERR-MCGEE CORP</td>
<td>4,121</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>CRUDE PETROLEUM &amp; NATURAL GS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MITCHELL ENERGY &amp; DEV</td>
<td>1,667</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>CRUDE PETROLEUM &amp; NATURAL GS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL INDUSTRIES</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>INDL INORGANIC CHEMICALS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOBLE ENERGY INC</td>
<td>1,381</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>CRUDE PETROLEUM &amp; NATURAL GS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEPICO INC</td>
<td>20,438</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>BEVERAGES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOCOPHILLIPS</td>
<td>20,835</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>PETROLEUM REFINING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROCTER &amp; GAMBLE CO</td>
<td>39,951</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>SOAP, DETERGENT, TOILET PREPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIMKEN CO</td>
<td>2,643</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>BALL AND ROLLER BEARINGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNION PACIFIC CORP</td>
<td>11,878</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>RAILROADS, LINE-HAUL OPERATING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>READERS DIGEST ASSN</td>
<td>2,554</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>BOOKS: PUBG, PUBG &amp; PRINTING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULTRAMAR DIAMOND SHAMROCK</td>
<td>14,397</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>PETROLEUM REFINING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TITANIUM METALS CORP</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>ROLLING &amp; DRAW NONFER METAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median of connected companies</td>
<td>4,121</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median of S&amp;P 500 companies</td>
<td>5,659</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Return on Assets represents profits before extraordinary items divided by book value of assets; Tobin’s Q represents the sum of market value of equity and book value of liabilities, divided by book value of assets.
Table 2: The effect of Cheney's political fortunes on event returns: Time-series regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Industry-adjusted equal-weighted portfolio abnormal</th>
<th>Industry-adjusted value-weighted portfolio abnormal</th>
<th>Industry-adjusted Halliburton abnormal returns:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4/19/2000 dummy</td>
<td>-0.002 (-0.005)</td>
<td>-0.011 (0.008)</td>
<td>-0.008 (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/21/2000 dummy</td>
<td>0.000 (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.006 (0.004)</td>
<td>-0.013 (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/22/2000 dummy</td>
<td>0.001 (0.001)</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.004)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/5/2001 dummy</td>
<td>0.003 (0.005)</td>
<td>0.012 (0.009)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR_IndAdjusted (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.238 (0.122)</td>
<td>-0.238* (0.098)</td>
<td>-0.351*** (0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR_IndAdjusted (t-2)</td>
<td>-0.237* (0.109)</td>
<td>-0.240*** (0.050)</td>
<td>-0.256*** (0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR_IndAdjusted (t-3)</td>
<td>-0.088 (0.088)</td>
<td>-0.034 (0.063)</td>
<td>-0.159** (0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.156</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Dependent variable, AR_IndAdjusted, is industry median adjusted portfolio return for connected firms. 4/19/2000: Cheney becomes head of running mate selection committee; 7/21/2000: Cheney appoints himself as running mate; 11/22/2000: Third heart attack; 3/5/2001: Fourth heart attack. Robust standard errors, clustered at the day level, are in parentheses. Abnormal returns are calculated using a standard market model. All regressions include year, month-of-year, week-of-month, and day-of-week fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3. Relationship between probability of a Bush victory and excess returns, across all connected firms, over both a one-day and five-day period: clustered at date level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Returns over one-day period</th>
<th>Returns over five-day (weekly) period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk-adjusted returns to industry median (all connected firms)</td>
<td>Risk-adjusted returns to industry median (Halliburton only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(all connected firms)</td>
<td>(all connected firms)</td>
<td>(Halliburton only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔBush</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔBush</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔBush</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,729</td>
<td>1,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>133</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>338</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.041</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values represent coefficient on ΔBush (change in Iowa Electronic Markets probability on date t of Bush victory) in a regression with dependent variable of excess returns (in column 1), excess returns net of median industry returns (in column 2), and excess returns for Halliburton only (in column 3). In columns 1-3, returns are over a period of one day following date t; columns 4-6 repeat the same dependent variables but using a period of one business week following date t. The sample consists of all Cheney-connected firms (columns 1-2 and 4-5) and of Halliburton only (columns 3 and 6). Robust standard errors, clustered at date level, are in parentheses.
Table 4. Relationship between probability of Saddam’s capture and excess returns, across all connected firms in war-related industries, over both a one-day and five-day period: Clustered at date level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Returns over one-day period</th>
<th>Returns over five-day (weekly) period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk-adjusted returns (all connected firms in war-related industries)</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk-adjusted returns relative to industry median (all connected firms in war-related industries)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk-adjusted returns relative to industry median (Halliburton only)</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk-adjusted returns relative to industry median (all connected firms in war-related industries)</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk-adjusted returns relative to industry median (Halliburton only)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N | 392 | 392 | 92 | 76 | 76 | 18 |
| R2 | -0.005 | -0.006 | -0.009 | -0.002 | -0.035 | -0.041 |

Values represent coefficients on ΔSaddamJ03 (change in Tradesports probability on date t of Saddam Hussein being captured by June 2003) in a regression with dependent variable of excess returns (in column 1), excess returns net of median industry returns (in column 2), and excess returns net of median industry returns for Halliburton only (in column 3). In columns 1-3, returns are over a period of one day following date t; columns 4-6 repeat the same dependent variables but using a period of one business week following date t. The sample consists of all Cheney-connected firms in war-related industries (columns 1-2 and 4-5) and of Halliburton only (columns 3 and 6). Robust standard errors, clustered at the date level, are in parentheses.
References


