The United States and Europe
Steve Mancuso, Catholic University

I. RESOLUTIONS

Let’s start at the finish, with potential resolutions. Here are three different approaches to topics for the US-EU area.

A. U.S. AGENT -- both economic and defense policies

The first approach would be to frame a resolution from the standpoint of United States policy toward the European Union and NATO, but keep it somewhat general. It would limit potential plans to economic and defense policies, or just one or the other. Under this approach the resolution would not list further sub-areas of policy. It would be somewhat more free-form, giving the affirmative more room to come up with their own sub-area. The word “foreign” modifies “economic” to ensure the policies were not strictly domestic, such as trade assistance programs to displaced workers. Under this first resolution the affirmative would have the choice of addressing either economic or defense issues, and be able to direct the policy toward either the EU or NATO.

Resolved: the United States should substantially change its foreign economic and/or defense policies toward the European Union and/or NATO.

To limit a resolution in this area to economic issues one would confine it to the European Union, and not include NATO, which is primarily a defense institution.

Resolved: the United States should substantially change its foreign economic policy toward the European Union.

Likewise, to limit the area to defense issues one would confine it to NATO. There are some defense
issues related to the EU, but they are mainly accessed from the European side and would be more appropriately debated as part of an EU agent resolution.

Resolved: the United States should substantially change its foreign defense policy toward NATO.

Notice that the receiving entity in the above resolutions in each case is a body of nations, not individual ones. An alternative would allow the plan to be directed toward one nation. That approach would substantially broaden the resolution, and perhaps unduly take the focus off of major trans-Atlantic issues.

Resolved: the United States should substantially change its foreign economic policy toward one or more European Union member nations.

Resolved: the United States should substantially change its foreign defense policy toward one or more NATO member states.

B. U.S. AGENT -- LIST OF POLICY AREAS – we could list two, three or more

Under this approach the resolution would list the specific areas of policy issues. This would narrow down the terms “foreign economic” and “defense” to smaller subjects, reigning in affirmative ground and creativity to some extent. The stem of the resolution could be broad and directionless, using the familiar verb “change”.

Resolved: the United States should substantially change its foreign policy toward the European Union and/or NATO in one or more of the following areas: defense cooperation, trade liberalization, genetically modified agriculture, space cooperation, integration of Russia etc.

The above list is not meant to be exhaustive. The Topic Committee could investigate more policy areas for inclusion if this area is selected.

One other approach would be to use a verb with “direction” although that is difficult to formulate across
sub-areas of policy. One example of that would be to use the term “liberalize” this way. The problem with a directional verb is that it would greatly limit the affirmative ground, as one direction does not capture very well the full range of the policy issues in the core of the literature.

Resolved: the United States should substantially liberalize its foreign policy toward the European Union and/or NATO in one or more of the following areas: export controls, environmental and food regulations

C. The European Union as agent

Over the years many people have supported breaking away from the tradition of using United States–based agents in every resolution. Debating about the European Union seems to be one promising opportunity to do that. First, there is a vast amount of literature written in English. Second, since the European Union is now a well-defined governing entity it is fairly easy to find solvency articles written from the viewpoint of how that body should change its policy. If this topic area were selected one or two of the resolution choices could include the EU as an agent.

The issues regarding this approach to framing a resolution are similar to those that are discussed regarding the United States as an agent. Should the policy be limited to economic and defense, or just one of those? Should sub-areas of policies be listed?

One additional policy sub-area that would more appropriately be included in an EU-agent resolution would be the large and interesting literature regarding the integration of Russia into Western economic and defense planning. A basic resolution for this approach would be as follows:

Resolved: the European Union should substantially change its foreign economic and/or defense policies toward the United States and/or Russia.
Again, this resolution could be written to include just economic or just defense policies. It could list sub-areas of policy. It could be limited to just the United States as the “target” of the resolution.

II. ISSUE AREA DISCUSSION

The United States–Europe resolution is timely and well supported in policy-specific literature.

A. The Timely Underlying Context – Fraying Cross-Atlantic Relations

It goes without saying that we live in an interesting era in United States–European relations. Peruse any major daily newspaper, weekly periodical, or scholarly journal and you will discover front-page and in-depth analysis of the difficulties we face with our old allies. Web sites representing think tanks of all ideological stripes are quickly and comprehensively revising their “takes” on the Atlantic alliance with new positions, forged from the experiences of past years, and telescoped by events of the last few weeks. The sharply differing viewpoints between the United States, France, England and Germany concerning the attack on Iraq offer a glimpse of the future difficulties in the trans-Atlantic relationship. If Patriot fries are replacing French fries, can Liberty toast be far behind?

A debate topic about US-European relations therefore meets one important criterion, timeliness. The underlying state of US-EU relations would cut across and through all other debate in this policy area.

Here is a representative sample of evidence supporting the timeliness. The January/February issue of Foreign Affairs carries a major article that discusses the problems that will face trans-Atlantic relations.
“In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Americans and Europeans surprised each other in positive ways. George W. Bush, who had faced vast protests during his first visit to Europe earlier that summer and who was widely regarded there as an ill-informed cowboy, confounded Europeans' expectations with his patient, careful, and proportionate action in Afghanistan. In turn, Europeans also broke with stereotypes, strongly supporting military action not only against al Qaeda's network but also against its Taliban hosts. European leaders pronounced their "unlimited solidarity" with the United States, and in a matter of hours NATO allies invoked the Article V mutual defense clause of the North Atlantic Treaty. In a twist that few could have predicted before September 11, within a month of the terrorist attacks the United States was conducting a major war halfway around the world, and the biggest problem for its European allies was that they wanted to send more troops than Washington was prepared to accept.

Since then, however, relations between the transatlantic allies have sharply deteriorated. Europeans now regularly accuse the United States of a simplistic approach to foreign policy that reduces everything to the military aspects of the war on terrorism. Americans respond with resentment over Europe's unwillingness to support U.S. efforts to deal with hostile states such as Iraq. In the Middle East, the recent cycle of violence between Israelis and Palestinians has prompted Europeans to accuse Washington of unconditional support for Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Americans to accuse Europeans of going soft on terrorism, or even of anti-Semitism.”

In fact it may turn out that this is truly a unique, transformative time to debate about the future content and shape of our alliance relationships.

“U.S.-European differences on matters of policy and global strategy or governance are certainly nothing new. What is striking today, however, is that some serious observers are starting to conclude that the fundamental cultural and structural basis for a transatlantic alliance is eroding. Author Francis Fukuyama, who 13 years ago was declaring the triumph of common Euro-American values and institutions to be the "end of history," now speaks of the "deep differences" within the Euro-Atlantic community and asserts that the current U.S.-European rift is "not just a transitory problem." Jeffrey Gedmin, director of the Aspen Institute Berlin -- once a bastion of Atlanticism -- talks about Europe's "pathology" regarding the use of force and argues that U.S. and European views of security are now so different that "the old Alliance holds little promise of figuring prominently in U.S. global strategic thinking." Columnist Charles Krauthammer has not

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1 Philip H. Gordon, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies and Director of the Center on the United States and France at the Brookings Institution, “Bridging the Atlantic Divide.” FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January/February 2003
been alone in asserting that NATO -- once the centerpiece of the transatlantic alliance -- is "dead."²

In looking toward the current and near-term status of Vladimir Putin’s Russia, this may also be an important time to debate policies concerning integration of Russia into Western economic and defense institutions.

“The aftermath of September 11 offers some powerful opportunities for the United States, Europe, and Russia to work together against a common enemy, and has generated significant political will to bring Russia closer to the West. But serious obstacles to that integration still exist, ranging from conflicts over specific issues to differences over basic priorities. It is not at all clear that the United States and Europe can overcome their current disagreements over the future of NATO and the next steps in the anti-terrorist campaign in order to focus on relations with Russia. Nor is it clear that the Russian government can undertake the reforms required, both domestically and in foreign policy, to make integration with the West both possible and effective.

But despite the obstacles that lie before them and the frustrations they will encounter, the United States, Europe, and Russia have much to gain by establishing an effective and genuine trilateral partnership. Building this partnership will be a process, taking many years, if not decades. It will require many changes from both Russia and the West. But that process must start now, using the new window of opportunity. The next several months will be critical in launching this effort, which will benefit all three parties — Russia, the United States, and Europe.”³

B. MAJOR ADVANTAGE AND DISADVANTAGE AREAS

Clearly the largest advantage/disadvantage area would be **US-European relations.** There would be many affirmatives that could claim to increase relations. On the other hand affirmatives that took a

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² Philip H. Gordon, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies and Director of the Center on the United States and France at the Brookings Institution, “Bridging the Atlantic Divide.” FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January/February 2003

tougher line with Europe to gain a trade or capabilities advantage would risk causing a worsening in relations.

Further, the fact that there are many causes of strained relations between Europe and the United States creates an extremely fertile solvency debate regarding the ability of the affirmative to improve US-EU relations.

“There are many reasons why American and European attitudes toward power, sovereignty, and security differ, and why those differences seem particularly acute today. The "power gap" identified by Kagan is certainly a factor. It is only natural to expect that a country with the technological, military, and diplomatic resources of the United States is inclined to try to "fix" problems -- whether Balkan crises, missile threats, or rogue states -- whereas countries with fewer such resources at their disposal try to "manage" them. The United States' vast military power, technological prowess, and history of unparalleled accomplishment have imbued Americans with a sense of "can-do" optimism about the world that contrasts starkly with the relative pessimism, known in Europe as "realism," that comes from the more complex and ambivalent historical experiences of Europe's much older nation-states. U.S. power, combined with a lower tolerance for vulnerability that stems from the geographical blessing of friendly neighbors, also leads Americans to be far more ready than Europeans to take risks and spend money to deal with threats such as missile proliferation and Iraq.”

A second major advantage/disadvantage issue is in the area of foreign economic policy and concerns free trade and protectionism. There are numerous important trade disputes simmering across the Atlantic. The underlying unraveling of relations increases the risk that one of those conflicts could provoke a round of protectionist legislation on either side. An accounting of potential trade flare-ups offers a robust list for affirmatives and disadvantage impacts. The large size of this list, however, argues for a broad approach for an affirmative plan – as narrow plans would be unlikely to solve the many other disputes in a fashion that would prevent a protectionist spiral.

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4 Philip H. Gordon, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies and Director of the Center on the United States and France at the Brookings Institution, “Bridging the Atlantic Divide,” FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January/February 2003
“The beef hormones case, although it resulted in $117 million in retaliation by the United States, is only the tip of the proverbial iceberg. An EU moratorium on approval of new genetically modified organisms (GMOs) for import could result in much more acrimony and higher penalties if ever challenged in the WTO, as the United States has occasionally threatened. Pending European legislation on recycling, the use of ozone depleting chemicals and the production of greenhouse gases could also effectively limit imports of U.S. manufactures. Until a recent agreement, EU legislation on engine designs to mitigate aircraft noise pollution threatened to restrict the use of some U.S.-built aircraft in European skies, adversely affecting their value and the balance sheets of companies that owned them. For the most part, these disputes developed when legitimate government desires to protect citizens or the environment were pursued without sufficient regard for the impact of the resulting regulations in the international arena.

Of course, trade disputes based on regulatory differences have not been limited to environment and food safety — privacy concerns and taxation of e-commerce are among the many other issues on which differing regulatory approaches have led to sharp words across the Atlantic. As the U.S. and European economies become ever more intimately linked through trade, mutual investment, and the general process of globalization, the impact of conflicting regulatory regimes will become even greater. Thus, regulation-based disputes are likely to increase in number and frequency during the next few years. Because regulatory issues are intrinsically linked to national preferences and domestic politics, disputes over these matters are likely to be sensitive, involving agencies and actors with strong domestic orientations and constituencies, which are less prone to consider compromise to meet their trade obligations or for the sake of transatlantic comity. Disputes concerning environmental protection and food safety tend to be especially volatile, as these matters are often of great public interest. As a result, the public profile of any dispute tends to be higher, the political stakes are greater, and the ability to compromise in the face of public pressure is reduced.”

Issues concerning **environmental and food safety** extend beyond their trade-related impacts. Many nations copy the policies implemented by the European Union and the United States. Thus American-EU policies would literally effect environmental and safety standards and conditions worldwide.

“Environmental protection and food safety have been among the most volatile issues in the U.S.-European relationship. While they are now overshadowed somewhat by the

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transatlantic debate over Iraq and other political and military matters, tensions over environment and food safety are just below the surface, and — if not addressed — will have enduring corrosive and divisive effects. Indeed, the recent acrimony over these issues has contributed to concern about an erosion of shared transatlantic values and a deterioration in U.S.-European relations generally.

Moreover, as recently demonstrated at the Johannesburg UN summit on sustainable development, the failure of the United States and Europe to work together on these issues does not have only bilateral consequences. It represents a significant lost opportunity to provide leadership in addressing environment and food safety on a global level. The United States and Europe have both been leaders in these areas — a fact that is too often overlooked in the current debate. Unless they now find a way to reconcile their different perspectives and approaches, the United States and the European Union will miss real opportunities to work together in addressing global environmental and public health issues.

In recent years, U.S.-EU trade disputes have focused increasingly on differences in regulation, rather than the traditional barriers of tariffs or subsidies. Regulatory requirements established primarily with domestic concerns and politics in mind can affect the free flow of international commerce. Such regulatory differences have contributed to U.S.-EU disputes over a range of food and environmental issues, including beef hormones, genetically modified foods and feed, ozone depleting chemicals, and aircraft engines. As the U.S. and European economies become ever more intimately linked, such regulation-based disputes are likely to increase in number and frequency, and because regulatory issues are intrinsically linked to domestic politics, these matters are likely to be sensitive and difficult to resolve. Their impact will go beyond trade policy, contributing to concerns about a rise in tensions in the transatlantic relationship overall. The effect of these disputes reaches beyond the United States and the European Union, as standards established through U.S. and EU regulations often become de facto international standards. The outcome of U.S. and EU discussions will establish the pattern for how governments around the world deal with these new technologies and products, and will be key to the development of global regulations and markets.”

For example, European Union policies to restrict Genetically Modified Organisms (agriculture using biotechnology) are being copied by nations all around the world, threatening American farmers and the nutritional well-being of millions of people.

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“Developments in biotechnology in the areas of food and agriculture have presented the transatlantic relationship with one of its most difficult challenges, and future innovations in biotechnology are likely to test the relationship even more severely. In the United States, agricultural biotechnology, including genetically modified foods and feed, has for the most part been accepted as part of the normal process of technological innovation in both farming and the food industry. In Europe, however, a string of food safety scandals has damaged public confidence in food safety institutions. Although none involved GMOs, these episodes made the public (and the politicians), extremely wary of such new technology. Thus, in seeking to bridge transatlantic differences, a key issue will be consumer confidence. Effective risk assessment and risk management will be essential, and ways must be developed to provide consumers with the information and choice they desire. U.S.-EU differences over GMOs have also affected the international agricultural market as both Washington and Brussels have sought to convince other governments of the merit of their respective positions. This is not simply a matter of markets, however, as was demonstrated by the recent reluctance of some African governments to accept GM food aid, despite a looming famine.”

The GMO debate is playing out in many parts of Africa right now, with vast consequences for millions of people. Here is a recent report from the Wall Street Journal regarding Zambia’s rejection of American GMO’s. The pending United States response to Europe’s policy is one of the central policy issues in this topic area.

“Though facing a serious famine, Zambian officials decided to turn away 26,000 tons of U.S. food aid in October, saying the shipments contained genetically modified corn that wasn't safe. The kernels, Zambia's agriculture minister said, could pollute the country's seed stock and hurt its export markets.

To Bush aides, the move was stark proof that Europe's anti-biotech crusade has hit home even in countries critically short on food. But the deeper fear is this: That as Zambia goes, so may go many of the big food markets in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, where there are also rumblings of European-style unease over genetically modified crops and the need to block them from entry.

So how to stem the tide? Administration officials say they may have only one choice: to file a case at the World Trade Organization against the European Union's four-year moratorium on approving new U.S. biotech foods. The

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argument would be that the ban is purely political and based on no scientific finding of risk. "Europe is ground zero, but it is not at all the whole of our concern," says one U.S. trade official. "If we allow Europe to flout science and the international trading system, nothing will prevent others from doing the same."

Whether to pursue a WTO biotech suit is now a matter of intense administration debate as officials strive to craft a recommendation for the White House by early next year. U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick is said to favor going forward, but some senior State Department officials worry a food fight could complicate relations with Europe at a delicate time."8

Defense issues also confound and confront future United States and European policy-makers. Despite efforts to increase cooperation, there has been a growing and arguably dangerous separation in American and European defense policies and capabilities in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

"The events of September 11, 2001, and their aftermath have demonstrated anew the vital importance of U.S.-European security cooperation to confront emerging threats and to protect mutual interests and shared values. Yet, paradoxically, the transatlantic partnership — and the defense cooperation that gives it strength and sustenance — now appears more at risk than ever. Despite their growing economic interdependence, enduring political commonalities, and ongoing military cooperation within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), America and Europe seem to be drifting apart. The current situation has many causes."9

There are many causes for this divergence – leaving the affirmative many possible plan avenues, but also creating many solvency-based arguments for the negative.

"The transformation of the European and global security and political environment over


the last decade has significantly changed U.S. and European strategic visions and perspectives on their respective military roles and requirements. Legal and regulatory obstacles, many dating back to the Cold War, routinely complicate or impede defense cooperation. Although controls on the transfer of the most sensitive technologies are legitimate and indeed essential to national security, other restrictions are out of step with a world characterized by transnational industrial operations, a defense market that relies heavily on commercial technologies and products, and the reality of an increasingly integrated Euro-Atlantic economy. The forces compelling further integration and cooperation, however, are also strong. Despite the risk of strategic drift, the United States and Europe are bound by irreversible economic, political, and cultural ties. Although the United States today is capable of undertaking significant military operations independently, it will continue to need allies and partners to effectively counter diverse global challenges to national security in the coming decades. European states, too, will be driven by the imperative of coalition warfare. Although managing the transatlantic partnership can be difficult at times, the U.S.-European defense link remains essential to mutual security.”

While the European members of NATO are the ones who are falling behind, it is the United States that may have the biggest role to play in closing the capabilities gap and restoring cooperative defense policies.

“For several years NATO members have been pursuing divergent paths in developing their military forces. As a result, NATO forces are progressively less able to work well together. This summit can help bring these paths together. To succeed in what will likely be a difficult environment, all the allies must be genuine partners in the development of NATO’s new capabilities. This requires building a common vision of the transformation process, especially its priorities and management structures. The costs will be relatively small and the benefits substantial.

The United States should lead in this direction. NATO forces must be interoperable across the full range of NATO missions. Two priorities emerge as especially important in this regard: •The integration of information technology. This is necessary for timely decision-making to succeed at all levels. Furthermore, information must be shared if the risks of military operations are to be shared. Alliance ground surveillance could provide a useful basis for building such capabilities. •Precision weapons. These enable early strikes with the right amount of force on the right target. In this era of highly constrained rules of engagement and increased public scrutiny of military operations, no less can be

accepted.”\textsuperscript{11}

One major example in this area concerns the failure of \textbf{defense industry coordination} within NATO.

“NATO, from its early days, has tried to improve the interoperability of alliance forces. Much of the responsibility for interoperability has been delegated to the NATO Standardization Agency, but progress is painfully slow and many expectations remain unmet. For example, radios used by alliance forces in Kosovo could not connect national contingents appropriately, though they all met NATO standards. The task is becoming more complicated by rapidly changing technologies and the addition of another important institution – the European Union.

Another aspect of the problem is that U.S. requirements for new systems often do not specify interoperability with NATO. These then inhibit transatlantic standardization and the addition of new NATO members will not make achieving interoperability any easier. The United States should lead by example by designing-in interoperability. Efforts to deal with interoperability problems through trade and industry, such as NATO’s Industrial Advisory Group, also have been frustrating. Governments are not yet engaged in serious policy debates on the defense market and views on security policy and defense spending priorities differ widely.

The very nature of the defense business (and the role it plays in each country’s economic and security affairs) makes it a political lighting rod. While most governments pay considerable lip service to better transatlantic defense industrial cooperation, they are simultaneously following or establishing policies and practices that, ultimately, may cause the exact opposite to happen with the emergence of “Fortress Europe” and “Fortress America”. It is unlikely that European governments will raise substantially their defense procurement budgets, given pressing domestic demands in other areas. Europeans are thus unable to sustain their own defense industry, which naturally looks for other markets, of which the U.S. market is the biggest. As moves in this direction increase, U.S. administrations and lawmakers will become increasingly unwilling to fund programs run by foreign-based firms at the expense of jobs “back home”. “\textsuperscript{12}

The concept of a capabilities gap also includes the crucial \textbf{ability to share information} on a

\textsuperscript{11} Robert Hunter and George Joulwan, \textit{NEW CAPABILITIES: TRANSFORMING NATO FORCES}, Report by The Atlantic Council, September 2002

\textsuperscript{12} Robert Hunter and George Joulwan, \textit{NEW CAPABILITIES: TRANSFORMING NATO FORCES}, Report by The Atlantic Council, September 2002
fluid battlefield. This interoperability issue is becoming increasingly important to NATO in its efforts to extend its military power beyond its borders.

“At the highest levels of the alliance, cohesion is a function of shared decision-making along with its implied sharing of risks. These decisions depend ultimately on shared information. For allied combat cohesion specifically, a shared vision of the battlefield is critical – and this is more than a matter of hardware and software. Currently, U.S. forces have significantly more capability for dominant battle-space awareness than those of the other allies. Using advanced sensors, databases, weapons, and information links, U.S. forces are likely to spot enemy vehicles long before the other allies can. This also means that U.S. forces are able to launch strikes on those targets acting alone. However, allied troops maneuvering in the area might not receive necessary information because of incompatible communications equipment or limited bandwidth, and therefore might be at greater risk and potentially less effective. Furthermore, as allied systems would not be networked into U.S. systems, an allied contribution in such a scenario would not necessarily be sought. In comparison with the United States, the allies would not be able to receive and process information at the same speed and with the same degree of security.”

One last area of interoperability worth mention is the use of precision-guided munitions (PGM’s). The United States currently stands far ahead of its European allies in the accuracy of its weaponry. This separation creates practical problems on the battlefield that can jeopardize the effectiveness of our military operations.

“Given the increasing imperative for discriminate application of force, the United States is making significant investments and improvements in precision weapons capabilities. If its principal fighting partners do not make similar improvements, NATO military commanders will continuously face the problem of whether to rely primarily on U.S. airpower, or to use allied planes as well, which either cannot communicate well except “in the clear” or which do not carry the latest generation of laser-guided bombs. They therefore have a lower probability of reaching their destination (and a higher probability of causing collateral damage). In an era of highly constrained rules of engagement and increased media and public scrutiny of military action, the capability to put the right amount of force on the right target has increasing consequence. Improved precision weapons capabilities within the alliance would also help fill an important shortfall that calls for at least several of the allies to acquire an early strike capability. This shortfall

13 Robert Hunter and George Joulwan, NEW CAPABILITIES: TRANSFORMING NATO FORCES, Report by The Atlantic Council, September 2002
(and the resultant ability of the United States to react to a crisis before the allies) reinforces the notion that the United States is prone to act unilaterally and too quick to react to problems with military force.”

The affirmative might wish to take the other direction, however, arguing that increasing U.S. involvement in European defense issues is now counter to the national interest. There are those who advocate that the United States change its defense policy to encourage the European defense pillar, withdrawing American leadership in NATO. Until now, the United States has consistently opposed any significant independent military force in Europe, fearing that it would erode support for NATO’s primacy as a defense organization. For example, American opposition has slowed adoption of a “Rapid Reaction Force” based in Europe.

“U.S.-European tension over ESDP and NATO came sharply into focus during the Clinton administration’s closing months. Washington and its European allies became locked in an increasingly bitter dispute about the relationship between the EU’s proposed Rapid Reaction Force and NATO, specifically about whether the RRF should be embedded within the NATO frame-work or constitute an autonomous European military capability separate from NATO. The U.S.-EU controversy about ESDP and the RRF is the proverbial tip of the iceberg. Underlying the current discord are fundamental questions about the nature of the U.S.-European relationship, about American grand strategy, and about NATO itself. Inevitably, the new administration will have to come to grips with the question of whether the alliance—in its current form—has a future.

Given this background, the vehement reaction of U.S. policymakers to ESDP and the RRF reflects long-standing American fears that an equal and independent Europe would throw off Washington’s tutelage and Washington’s pervasive suspicion that, in this regard, ESDP and the RRF are Preventing Europe from achieving strategic self-sufficiency is precisely the goal of U.S. policy: Washington is seeking to uphold NATO’s primacy in order to maintain its leadership role in European security affairs. Thus, as it did during the Cold War, the United States pays lip service to the idea of European unity while opposing in practice any tangible moves toward an independent Europe. Hence, the United States insists that European integration, and EDSP, can occur only within the framework of “transatlantic partnership.” As then-under secretary of state Stuart Eizenstat said in 1999, “We will continue to celebrate the dream of a continent united through the European Union, but we must also hold before us another essential vision—

14 Robert Hunter and George Joulwan, NEW CAPABILITIES: TRANSFORMING NATO FORCES, Report by The Atlantic Council, September 2002
that of a transatlantic partnership. Cohen’s contention that the RRF could turn NATO into a “relic” is only the latest American warning to the EU that if it goes far down the road to real autonomy in defense and security— that is, if it seriously challenges U.S. preponderance— the Atlantic alliance could be shattered.”\textsuperscript{15}

A final major area of policy literature concerns the integration of Russia into Western economic and defense institutions. This issue is important not just for American and European security, but also as it impacts the political and economic freedoms of millions of Russians.

“The integration of Russia into the West will be one of the most important, and most difficult, tasks facing the United States and Europe during the next decade. Yet a closer relationship with the West will be key to the development of Russian prosperity, democracy, and stability — achievements that will benefit the West as well as Russia.

The attacks on September 11 and the resulting campaign against terrorism have given a decisive push to this effort, providing the political will for closer cooperation between Russia and the West. While the war against terrorism has provided concrete opportunities for collaboration between Russia and the West as they work together against a common enemy, serious obstacles to long-term cooperation still exist.

Specifically, there still remain serious differences of perspective and approach on key issues, including nonproliferation, Chechnya, the Middle East, Iran, and Iraq. These differences remain not just between Russia and the West, but also are central to recent tensions across the Atlantic. The window of opportunity opened by September 11 may not stay open for an extended period of time.

Thus, despite the difficulty, there is a need to move forward now with the first steps toward gradual and effective Russian integration with the West. These steps must happen along three critical tracks: integration of Russia into the transatlantic and global economies; the building of a new Euro-Atlantic security system; and responding to new global challenges, including terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Key to the success of this effort will be the ability of all three parties to transcend their differences and stay focused on the desirability of the eventual goal: a stable Russia integrated into a Euro-Atlantic community.”\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{15} Christopher Layne, CATO Institute Policy Analysis, DEATH KNEILL FOR NATO? THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION CONFRONTS THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY, Executive Summary, No. 394. April 4, 2001
There remains a tremendous challenge to successfully integrate Russia into the economic system of the West. The extent of U.S. involvement in that integration is one of the central issues for European policy makers.

“Although there is now a consensus that the Russian economy is headed in the right direction, there is also a recognition that significant problems remain. The Putin government has concluded that integration in the global economy will be essential if Russia is to achieve the reforms that are key to its future prosperity. But for Russia to participate effectively in the wider economy, it must first face the very difficult task of reforming the Russian economy itself. Without transparent and effective legal regimes in such areas as banking and corporate governance, the Russian economy will not see significant participation by foreign investors.

Russian accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) will be a prerequisite for closer relations with the European Union and will certainly be the key step forward in its efforts to join the international economy. But joining that organization will also present some very difficult challenges, particularly for those Russian industries not yet competitive in the world market. In the United States and Europe, there is recognition that a stable, prosperous Russia is good for general peace and prosperity. But, with the important exception of energy supplies, the western stake in the Russian economy is limited, and thus the inclusion of Russia in the global economy is rarely given a high priority. Nevertheless, while Russia must take on the major share of the burden of reform, the West can offer targeted assistance and rewards that will ease the way for those in Russia who support constructive change.”

C. SOLVENCY AUTHORS

1. Economic Policies

US agent – solvency advocate for taking GMO disputes to the WTO.

“If the EU passes a labeling and traceability measure with requirements that are

essentially unworkable, the United States should give serious consideration to starting the process of pursuing a case through the WTO dispute resolution mechanism. That case should not challenge the EU’s obligation to establish a certain level of safety for its citizens, but should be focused on the workability of any such scheme and ensuring that it is nondiscriminatory.”18

US agent – A solvency advocate for greater collaborative assessment and exchanges of environmental policies and regulations.

“The United States and the EU should reaffirm their common commitment to environmental protection. On the U.S. side, this will require greater engagement and leadership, especially from the White House and Congress. An interagency group on international aspects of environmental protection would help give this issue a higher profile across the government. The commitment of the United States and the EU could also be demonstrated by a joint statement on environmental protection and its compatibility with international trade, to be issued at the next U.S.-EU summit in the spring of 2003. Although risk assessment has not been the major point of difference over environmental issues, encouraging more collaborative assessments, perhaps through the NTA scientific cooperation agreements, can help build a stronger foundation for U.S.-EU understanding and cooperation in this area.

Exchanges between appropriate U.S. and EU agencies could be extremely useful in fostering the sharing of perspectives and development of cooperative activities and should be mandated and funded by Congress. Among the long-term aims might be the joint development of standards for environmental technologies that are compatible with international trading obligations and the design of appropriate mutual recognition agreements. Collaboration in risk management will be essential in avoiding future tensions and could begin with a comparison of best practices, both in environmental protection and in regulatory policy. Such a comparison could be undertaken by industry and NGOs, as well as by U.S. and EU agencies, and could be valuable in identifying specific mechanisms that contribute to environmental protection while not creating barriers to commerce.” 19

US agent – solvency advocate for FDA-EFSA exchanges as a solution to GMO.


“The United States should encourage European efforts to restore public confidence in food safety institutions, and should thus be as supportive as possible of the new European Food Safety Authority. Exchanges between the FDA and the EFSA should be established in order to facilitate sharing of perspectives and best practices, with the goal of enhancing the risk assessment capabilities of both institutions. The United States should also continue to stress the central role of the Codex Alimentarius as the primary body for establishing food safety standards internationally.”

US or EU agent – solvency advocate for collaborative risk assessments for GMO.

“Whenever possible, the United States and the EU should move toward a more collaborative risk assessment process, especially in relation to GM products. The establishment of the EFSA may offer opportunities in this area, as may the current push for increased scientific cooperation under the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA). It might be especially useful to consider whether a scientific risk assessment procedure that falls between the current GRAS (“generally regarded as safe”) and food additives procedures would be useful. The end goal of this scientific collaboration should be to establish a foundation for a transatlantic mutual recognition agreement on agricultural biotechnology products.”

US or EU agent – solvency advocate for labeling, product tracing for GMO.

“Since some form of labeling and product tracing is probably inevitable in some countries, the United States and the European Union should focus their efforts on ensuring that such a scheme is workable and not misleading while providing consumers with sufficient choice. Labeling that allows the easy identification of GM-free products and the development of a market in those goods is most likely to provide consumers with the widest choice. Any such scheme must be enforceable through testing or certification. This may make it desirable for the U.S. government to establish a certification regime for GMOs, after conducting a survey of existing certification practices to see which might serve as an appropriate model.”

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US agent – A solvency advocate for setting higher environmental standards for international projects

“U.S. government and industry must re-engage on the issue of standards, particularly within the international standards setting bodies. This should not be treated as an area of mere technical discussion, but as an issue in which U.S. leadership (from both the government and private sector) will be key in ensuring that the results are compatible with both protecting the environment and the obligations of international commerce. Establishing new congressional reporting requirements on the status of international standards and the actions of U.S. agencies could provide the necessary stimulus. But this is not simply a government responsibility — U.S. corporations should also be prepared to take on the necessary leadership roles in private-sector bodies.”

2. Defense Policies

US agent – Two solvency advocates for improving the U.S. export control regime, permitting greater cross-ocean cooperation.

“The U.S. export control system requires far-reaching reform. The current system, erected during the Cold War to protect then-unique U.S. military technologies from Soviet espionage, is no longer adequate. The rapid advance and diffusion of commercial technologies within an evolving international economic and political system provides allied military forces with the promise of vastly increased combat effectiveness but presents new challenges for military and industrial security. Rather than protecting U.S. security, the current system undermines it by impeding cooperation between the United States and trustworthy allies.

Necessary reforms include a narrowing of the list of U.S. controlled items (i.e., drop those items that are already outside the ability of the United States and Europe to control, such as a number of commercial, dual-use items) to those whose proliferation could truly augment adversary military capabilities. Such reforms should also involve rationalization of the interagency review process to accelerate and streamline the processing of license applications, and review and revision of the Export Administration Act (governing dual-use items), the Arms Export Control Act (governing munitions), and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations to allow for closer alignment with contemporary defense and

technological realities. A reformed export control system should avoid detailed regulation of the vast majority of exporters who merely seek normal business arrangements. Rather, it should focus on stemming proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to volatile Third World states and on the enforcement of the rules against those who deliberately seek to circumvent controls.”

See also from a new report by The Atlantic Council:

“In following up the Prague summit, transformation efforts must address several problems related to buying new equipment. Unfortunately, national procurement decisions and export controls have not facilitated interoperability over the last several years. In the short term, the U.S. government will likely need to relax export controls if it wishes allies to have comparable capabilities. At the same time, increased technology transfer will need to be accompanied by improved safeguards on the part of the European allies. Over the longer term, rules – in the form of an alliance-wide, public-private Code of Conduct – are needed to create a common defense market with open competition, reciprocal market access and transparent procurement.”

US agent – solvency advocate for endorsing greater European defense autonomy.

“Instead of resisting Europe’s bid for autonomy and independence, the Bush administration should embrace it. No doubt, relations between the United States and a truly equal Europe will be quite different qualitatively from the transatlantic relationship that has prevailed during the past five decades. As Kissinger observed in the mid-1960s, although it ultimately might prove to be a price worth paying, the United States indeed would pay a price if Europe achieved political and economic unification. A unified Europe no longer would be subservient to Washington and would pursue its own agenda in international politics. It was naïve, Kissinger said, to suppose that “Europe would unite in order to share our burdens or that it would be content with a subordinate role once it had the means to implement its own views. Europe’s main incentive to under-take a larger cooperative role in the West’s affairs would be to fulfill its own distinctive purposes.” Kissinger’s insight is as valid today as it was 36 years ago—indeed, perhaps more so. Nevertheless, there are two reasons why the United States should “pay the price.” First, in the long run, the price of European independence is likely to be less than the price of Europe’s continuing subordination to the United States, which inevitably will fan resentment (albeit of a different kind) on both sides of the Atlantic. Second, attempts to maintain American preponderance are bound to trigger a nasty geopolitical backlash


against the United States.

The time has come for the United States to withdraw from Europe militarily and to let the Europeans take care of the Balkans and similar parochial matters while the United States directs its attention to maintaining its global geopolitical interests outside Europe. Implicitly, some Bush administration policy-makers recognize the need for restructuring the U.S.-European relationship. If the administration accepts ESDP and the RRF as legitimate expressions of European autonomy— and thereby acknowledges NATO’s diminishing relevance—it no doubt will be subject to accusations that it is “isolationist.” The fear of such criticism—which truly is a canard—should not unduly trouble the administration, because it is easily rebutted.”

US agent – solvency advocate for Spearhead Prototype Initiative to solve defense coordination

The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), launched at the alliance’s 50th anniversary Washington summit in April 1999, created a comprehensive list of general measures for members, but it did not provide sufficient guidance for force development. Such a broad capabilities-based approach is unlikely to be sufficiently focused or measurable in the absence of a designated force on which to focus. For this reason, any future DCI-like initiative (including one with a compressed list of measures) will likely fail if it does not address how to organize forces, provide for their training and exercises and measure performance outputs. In contrast, a transformation force would do all this and also provide guidance for individual members on how to prepare their forces and specialized modules. U.S. forces could lead by example. The best way to manage the transformation of NATO forces would be the development of a prototype Spearhead Force that incorporates what military experts collectively believe to be the most useful doctrine, training and equipment. This force would be robust, well-equipped and trained, and, once fully constituted in a crisis, ready for rapid deployment either within or outside the European theater. It should incorporate U.S. forces, but not to the extent that they substitute for other allies making substantial commitments to, and taking important management roles in, the transformation process. Such a force would facilitate the transformation of NATO forces by providing: • a command structure to develop plans and monitor preparedness; • a specific, well-exercised, cohesive force to carry out the missions; and • program measures to acquire the integrated capabilities needed to equip it.”


27 Robert Hunter and George Joulwan, NEW CAPABILITIES: TRANSFORMING NATO FORCES, Report by The Atlantic Council, September 2002
US agent – solvency advocate for shared missile defense

“Missile defense systems fit into the category of precision weapons and they also have wider importance. They play a critical role in protecting vulnerable allied forces in the field, so missile defense warrants special attention. The technologies and skills involved in the full range of missile defense tasks, including target acquisition, tracking, timely processing, rapid decision-making and fast missiles with high, kinetic-kill accuracy, all have much broader applicability. And, of course, missile defense systems must be well integrated into NATO’s overall command and control systems. It must be clearly understood that independent national missile defenses are not a realistic option for Europe. Missile defense needs to be a shared undertaking by allies on both sides of the Atlantic.”28

US agent – solvency advocate for precision guided weapons transfers.

“Many improvements in precision weapons capabilities can be achieved at relatively low cost by modifications to existing platforms. In addition, the economy-of-scale benefits of NATO-wide acquisitions help reduce the costs of new weapons. For example, the joint direct attack munitions (JDAM) is a guidance tail kit that converts existing unguided free-fall bombs into accurate, all-weather “smart” munitions. The cost of these conversion kits has come down to an economical $15,000 each.”29

US and EU agent – solvency advocate for information sharing interoperability

“Interoperability is the logical focus of information integration efforts. An alliance ground surveillance system, for example, could provide a useful program to further interoperability. In addition, interoperability can be fostered by multinational crews on intelligence platforms. Also, common interface standards need to be clearly specified, but it is not necessary that the internal mechanisms of information systems be standardized. Furthermore, the NATO process of adopting the rapid advances in information technology appears to be stalled by a system that effectively keeps pace with the slower members. Improved integration will also likely require agreement on a limited number of information formats to be used for information sharing. These formats should be appropriate for the types of information likely to be needed for the full range of NATO missions. For example, “tracks” for sensing moving targets should be standardized,

28 Robert Hunter and George Joulwan, NEW CAPABILITIES: TRANSFORMING NATO FORCES, Report by The Atlantic Council, September 2002

29 Robert Hunter and George Joulwan, NEW CAPABILITIES: TRANSFORMING NATO FORCES, Report by The Atlantic Council, September 2002
presumably with different formats for tracks of vehicles, aircraft, or missiles.”

EU and US agent – solvency advocate for EU/NATO interoperability

“After Prague, NATO leaders should devote more attention to relations with the European Union (EU), as it also tackles the problem of military transformation and the development of the ESDP. Indeed, intra-European political pressure is often more effective than transatlantic haggling for change in Europe. The Galileo satellite global positioning system will provide an interesting test case in the challenges of NATO-EU interoperability and will deeply concern both the United States and aerospace contractors on both sides of the Atlantic. The Galileo program was approved for funding as a civil project by the EU and the European Space Agency. It represents a substantial commitment of public funding at a time when European defense budgets remain under pressure. Ho the United States and the EU resolve issues of non-interference, interoperability, access, and industrial base implications could provide either a positive or negative roadmap for future concerns that arise within NATO, as well as between NATO, the EU and the United States.”

US agent – solvency advocate for increased defense industry cooperation.

“Sustaining the transatlantic security partnership in the future will require not only political but, increasingly, more effective defense industrial cooperation. Although governments alone are responsible for shaping national security strategy, successful implementation of strategies and policies depends, among other things, on the possession of well-trained and properly armed military forces. The maintenance of an effective military capability, in turn, can only be accomplished in partnership with defense industry. Achieving and maintaining military forces adequate to meet the security challenges of the twenty-first century means nurturing and sustaining a global and transatlantic technology and industrial base capable of producing the defense technologies and systems that will be needed to fight the wars of the future.”

EU Agent -- solvency advocate for the advantage area of EU/NATO capabilities gap.

30 Robert Hunter and George Joulwan, NEW CAPABILITIES: TRANSFORMING NATO FORCES, Report by The Atlantic Council, September 2002

31 Robert Hunter and George Joulwan, NEW CAPABILITIES: TRANSFORMING NATO FORCES, Report by The Atlantic Council, September 2002

Growing gaps between U.S. and European military capabilities are making allied defense cooperation and interoperability more difficult. Continuation of this trend will have adverse political consequences within the NATO alliance and threaten the members’ security. The defense transformation envisioned on both sides of the Atlantic rests critically on the effective exploitation of technology. Current European forces are already straining national budgets. Technological transformation could prove to be unaffordable. Trade-offs within defense budgets are helpful but do not suffice.

Both NATO and the European Union should make an effort to coordinate on defining priority defense requirements and equipment needs that could be met by consortia or partnerships among industrial suppliers and technology companies across the Atlantic. Cooperation on missile defense and unmanned aerial vehicles are two significant areas where coordination can avoid redundant spending. While much can be done to facilitate greater interoperability through technology pooling and common planning, European governments are unable to deploy advanced capabilities rapidly enough as a result of continuing low and insufficient levels of defense spending. A serious European commitment to increasing spending in both military R&D and weapons procurement would be a first step toward bridging the growing transatlantic capabilities gap. As part of that commitment, European members of NATO and the member states of the European Union should agree on the minimum level of real annual growth in defense spending they deem necessary and realistic.”

US or EU agent – solvency advocate to solve the problems of industrial merger.

“While a joint EU-U.S. working group has been established to harmonize defense merger decisions, the initiative should be broadened to include the discovery and analysis period before a decision is made and to establish procedures for appeals after a decision has been made. The existence of such clear and fair-minded procedures would reduce disincentives for companies to look abroad for foreign partners, rather than continue to focus exclusively on domestic sources. A multilateral dialogue on foreign direct investment (FDI) is crucial. Both sides must work on harmonizing regulations governing foreign investments in defense companies and provide greater transparency into procedures used to review such possibilities, as well as on industrial security and disclosure policies. The U.S. regulatory process governing FDI needs streamlining, with more supple rules for firms and countries that do a respectable job of protecting technology flows. The Europeans, for their part, need to ensure that national and EU policies on FDI and competition do not inhibit reciprocal U.S access to the European

US or EU agent – solvency advocate for increased interoperability and a Rapid Reaction Force.

“On the other hand, the move toward a more autonomous EU military capability is accompanied by uncertainty about the missions for which that force should be prepared. It is far from clear that all Europeans have accepted the high-intensity missions for which the U.S. military is being designed; nor are Europeans united in accepting missions for their forces outside the European theater. The most recent U.S. proposal for the creation of a NATO rapid reaction force could have a significant impact on the future of intra-European and transatlantic security cooperation. Even if the problems of institutional competition between NATO and the EU can be resolved, different security priorities could continue to obstruct progress toward achieving improved interoperability. These variant plans and military requirements could increasingly affect the ability of the United States and Europe to sustain interoperability, as well as the priority they assign to coalition war fighting.”

3. Russian Integration

US or EU agent – solvency advocate for debt repayment and other assistance programs to increase Russian economic integration into the West.

“The United States and Europe should seek a consensus on a constructive way to alleviate the burden of debt repayment on the Russian economy. One option might be to offer some debt forgiveness in exchange for a defined program of domestic economic reform, or for Russian programs to reduce the dangers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. The United States and Europe should offer additional resources to help build a more effective constituency for corporate governance and banking reform. To encourage Russian accession to the WTO, the United States and Europe should offer enhanced technical assistance and be flexible with respect to transition periods, while encouraging greater understanding among Russian policymakers and the public of the minimal requirements for accession.”


36 The Report of a Joint Working Group of the Atlantic Council of the United States, the Centre for European Reform, and the Institute of the U.S. and Canadian Studies at the Russian Academy
US and EU agent – solvency advocate for various ways to increase integration of Russia into
NATO and Western defense issues

“Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a clear need to restructure the institutional
framework that has provided security in Europe for the last fifty years. Although NATO
has retained the role of the primary western security organization, there has not been a
clear agreement among the allies about the nature of the threats facing the alliance or the
consequences for NATO’s roles and missions. The aftermath of September 11, and
particularly the U.S. decision not to run the military part of the anti-terrorist campaign
through NATO, has brought these issues into sharper focus.

At the same time, President Putin’s firm support of the U.S.-led campaign has brought
Russia closer to the alliance than ever before. It is now time to involve Russia more
closely in the evolving arrangements that provide for European security. Specifically, the
U.S.–European preoccupation with NATO’s future should not be used to delay
discussions with Russia about the format of a Euro-Atlantic security framework; instead a
trilateral discussion could serve as the catalyst for genuine NATO reform. And while
NATO enlargement is an integral part of constructing a new Euro-Atlantic framework, it
should be managed in a way that enhances the relationship between Russia and the
candidate countries.

The new NATO-Russia Council offers a genuine opportunity to enhance Russian
inclusion into western security arrangements, and although many pitfalls exist, it could be
an essential mechanism in creating a common approach to the security challenges facing
the West and Russia today. Finally, successful Russian involvement in a Euro-Atlantic
security framework will require a revamped strategic nuclear relationship with the United
States.”

NATO/EU agent – solvency advocate for greater defense integration with Russia

“NATO should adapt its strategic concept to the environment and requirements of the
post-September 11 world. This should include a consensus on contingencies that may

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37 The Report of a Joint Working Group of the Atlantic Council of the United States, the Centre
for European Reform, and the Institute of the U.S. and Canadian Studies at the Russian Academy
of Sciences, THE TWAIN SHALL MEET: THE PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIA-WEST
RELATIONS, Policy Paper, September 2002
require the use of military force, which should in turn provide the basis for revising force requirements and operational plans. All western militaries — including Russian forces — should be reformed and strengthened so they can deal effectively with the new threats, and the West should seriously consider providing funds and technical expertise to assist the Russians in this task. Russian and NATO militaries should collaborate more on a technical level as a means of reducing suspicion and building familiarity. The NATO-Russia Joint Council should focus initially on a few key areas of discussion and identify some specific measures that can be undertaken together to address those issues.38

III. ARGUMENT AREAS

Affirmative Advantages

- NATO Cohesion (out of area operations, ethnic conflicts)
- Russian Economic Stability
- Russian Political Stability – Nationalism
- Trade Protectionism
- Economic Collapse
- Global Starvation
- Human Rights
- Soft Power/ Hard Power
- Military Doctrines – Warfighting
- US-Europe Relations Good/ Bad
- Environmental Standards
- European Ethnic Conflict
- Democracy

Negative Disadvantages

- US-European Relations Good/ Bad
- Trade Wars
- US Politics
- European Politics
- Spending – US and Europe
- US-Russian Relations Good/ Bad
- US-China Relations
- Putin Authoritarianism/ Nationalism
- DA’s to Biotechnology

Critical Arguments (both affirmative and negative)

- Objectivism
- Statism/ Borders
- Criticisms of Western values
- Criticisms of humanism
- Pacifism/ Militarism
- Deontology
- Threat construction
- Gender
- Criticisms of realism
- Global Governance
- Capitalism
- Science
IV. REFERENCES – WEB SITES

Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation State
http://www.arena.uio.no/

The Atlantic Council of the United States
http://www.acus.org/default.htm

The Boll Foundation
www.boll.org

Center for European Reform
http://www.cer.org.uk/

Europa – Activities of the European Union
http://europa.eu.int/pol/index-en.htm

European Options
www.europeanoptions.org

The European Policy Centre
www.theepc.be

European Research Papers Archive
http://eiop.or.at/erpa/

Forum Europe
http://www.forum-europe.com/

George C. Marshall Center for European Studies
http://www.marshallcenter.org/

International Institute for Strategic Studies
http://www.iiss.org/

NATO Review
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/overview.htm

RAND Europe
http://www.rand.org/rand europe/

Sustainable Europe Research Institute
http://www.seri.at/errors-index.htm
UK Think Tank Directory
http://www.policylibrary.com/Thinktanks/UKthinktanks.htm