PUBLICATIONS

“Negotiating from Weakness in International Trade Relations,” Journal of World Trade 44 (3), 2010

“Three Islands of Knowledge about Negotiation in International Organizations,” Journal of European Public Policy, 2010

"Breaking Deadlocks in International Institutional Negotiations: The WTO, Seattle and Doha." June 2009. International Studies Quarterly.

"Growing Power Meets Frustration in the Doha Round's First Four Years," 2007. Developing Countries and Global Trade Negotiations, ed. Larry Crump and Javed Maswood (Routledge)

Negotiating Trade: Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA. 2006. Cambridge University Press.

Chairing a WTO Negotiation. June 2005. In Journal of International Economic Law 8(2): 425-448, and in Reforming the World Trading System: Legitimacy, Efficiency and Democratic Governance, edited by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and James Harrison (Oxford University Press).

Escenarios para Cancun. Proceso, (September), 2003. Proceso.com.mx

La OMC, otra vez en punto muerto [The WTO, deadlocked again], Foreign Affairs en Español 3, (Julio-Septiembre):111-118, 2003.

Creating Data on International Negotiation Strategies, Alternatives, and Outcomes, International Negotiation 7:39-52, 2002.

Bounded Rationality and the World Political Economy: The Nature of Decision Making. In Governing the World's Money, edited by David M. Andrews, C. Randall Henning, and Louis W. Pauly Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 2002.

The world political economy is driven by bounded rationality, yet many economists and political scientists still sidestep this forty-year-old idea. Accumulating evidence shows the costs of this neglect, even granting that other perspectives have been productive. Greater investment in research premised on individual bounded rationality would improve our knowledge empirically, theoretically, and practically, as a minority in each discipline is showing. Greater attention to how economic policy decisions are actually made would improve our theories' empirical validity. A new constructivism rebuilt upon a bounded rationality microfoundation would be more complete theoretically and better able to account for cultural change. Taking a fresh look at classical rational choice and constructivism from this perspective might dissolve the adversarial debate between them. Sounder knowledge of real decision making would also make our theory more useful in the real world. Rich opportunities await young and other scholars interested in breaking new ground.

The Seattle Impasse And Its Implications For The World Trade Organization. In The Political Economy of International Trade Law, edited by Daniel Kennedy and James Southwick. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

A few tricks of the Negotiating Trade, but can they produce a rabbit by November? World Trade Agenda, 2 (July), 2001.

Review of "Open Economy Politics: The Political Economy of the World Coffee Trade", by Robert Bates, American Political Science Review 95: 250-01 (March), 2001.

Case Study Methods in International Political Economy. In International Studies Perspectives 2:161-176, 2001. Revised version published as Case Study Methods in International Political Economy. 2004. In Cases, Numbers, Models: International Relations Research Methods. Edited by D. Sprinz and Y. Wolinsky. University of Michigan Press.

IPE scholars frequently use qualitative methods to contribute to theory building, but we could get greater value from them. Single case studies are actually a family of research designs: the disciplined interpretive case study, the hypothesis generating case study, the least-likely, most-likely and deviant case studies. The method of difference employs comparison and attempts to eliminate rival interpretation by choosing two or more cases that match in important respects. These methods enjoy several inherent advantages relative to statistical methods, and they suffer from several disadvantages. Neither family of methods is sufficient. The two complement one another and ultimately must be combined.

Negotiating the World Economy. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2000.

“The United States, the ITO, and the WTO: Exit Options, Agent Slack, and Presidential Leadership,” in The WTO as an International Organization, ed. Anne O. Krueger (University of Chicago Press, 1998), with Barry Eichengreen

Market Conditions and International Economic Negotiation: Japan and the United States in 1971. In International Economic Negotiations: Models versus Reality, edited by Victor Kremenyuk, Gunnar Sjöstedt and Edward Elgar.