Special Note: Attendance at (although not necessarily enrollment in) the various Development Seminars is highly recommended not only this semester but throughout each student's career at USC. These seminars are held on Wednesday afternoons 4-5:30 PM in KAP 319, with some exceptions. A wide variety of topics will be treated, representing excellent opportunities for students to become familiar with many issues and techniques at the frontiers of the field and to meet and hear important professionals from outside the university and in some cases from outside of Economics. USC PhD students are expected to present their work in at least one such seminar during their career. Copies of the papers to be presented are normally available a few days in advance in the basket marked DEVELOPMENT on the cabinets beside the mailboxes in KAP 300A as well as on-line. Of special relevance are the seminars on Aug 31, Sept 28, Nov. 30.

*Every student that I have not had in class before is requested to meet with me during the first two weeks as a personal introduction.*

Please note that circumstances may arise requiring some adjustment in the syllabus during the semester.

I. Purposes:

1. To familiarize the student with the main theoretical perspectives on the problems of developing or less developed countries (LDCs);
2. To introduce the student to a wide variety of problems and paradoxes in development; some readings are the classics dating back to the 1950s while others are very current.
3. To familiarize the student with some of the most important contributions to the field and which help distinguish this field from others in economics and political economy; this includes structure, equilibrium traps, linkages, power relations, informality.
4. To give the student experience in critical evaluation of the assumptions, modeling, empirical evidence and the validity of the policy and other recommendations derived from existing theories and models.
5. To get the student started on doing original research in the field by solving existing puzzles and paradoxes, critiquing and modifying existing models, identifying ways to obtain more relevant empirical evidence, developing new models and deriving new policy implications.
6. To identify some new issues that are thus far relatively under-explored.

II. Subject Matter and the Relation of this Course to Others

Since the Department offers a variety of different courses in the field of Development Economics/Political Economy, Econ 523 History and Development; 639 Political Economy of Institutions; 644 Economic Development Programming and Policy Planning, this course deliberately gives only minimal attention to the topics covered in depth in those courses. As such, its focus is on the microeconomics of development, but including institutional and structural issues.

III. Background:

Given the considerable interest in this subject by students outside of Economics, the minimal prerequisites for this course are deliberately limited to only Econ 303 or its equivalent. Naturally, the tools of graduate microeconomics Econ 500 or 503 are highly desirable. Some experience in econometrics or empirical analysis is also essential since on most topics considered special attention is given to empirical studies. However, to cater to the students without such background, class discussion and many of the readings will be non-mathematical. Inevitably of course, some of the readings contain sections involving algebraic formulations and the use of calculus. All students are required to at least get the gist of what is being done in these manipulations even if they cannot do it themselves.

Students with strong theoretical and empirical tools are strongly encouraged to (and indeed are expected to) attempt applications of these tools when and where they feel they are
relevant. Students are encouraged to share their experience in or on developing countries with the rest of the class when that experience seems relevant to the issues and articles under discussion.

IV. Standards, Course Requirements and Grades:
(1) Grading in this course is generally from A to C or C-. (2) The work load in the class is quite heavy and hence students are discouraged from taking more than two other graduate level courses in Economics. (3) No requests for INCOMPLETE at the end of the class will be considered unless strictly justified for emergency health reasons. (4) In so far as possible, the student should read the assigned material prior to or immediately after the date at which it is dealt with in the class indicated in this syllabus unless otherwise specified. Students will take turns serving as discussants and/or presenters of these papers. (5) In writing papers, students should be careful to attribute to others the data, ideas, etc. taken from them by providing detailed references so as to avoid any suspicion of plagiarism and make it easy for anyone reading the paper to quickly locate the reference. In so far as possible data should be obtained from standard international or standard sources, not from blogs etc. Every paper should attempt to have an introduction, brief review of relevant literature, a theoretical model, and empirical or at least anecdotal evidence. (6) Class Participation is an important part of the course and will consist of attendance, questions both asked and answered, and the quality of assigned paper or report presentations. Students are expected to be prepared for class and to intervene when relevant and to make reports and presentations when asked. (7) Overall weights in final grade: Class participation including class presentations (10%), 3 Short Papers (15% each with 12 page maximum for the text part (not including tables, figures) double spaced. Term Paper (25%), and Final Exam (20%). The exam will be based on starred readings (*) and class discussion (which includes (**) items that will be presented orally.

V. Schedule of Due Dates
Paper 1: September 20 8AM
Paper 2: October 11 8AM
Paper 3: November 8 8AM
Term Paper: December 1 8AM
Final Exam December 13 8-10AM
All papers should be typed via a word processor. Double spaced and delivered in hard copy at the time designated.

VI. Alternative Short Paper Topics as well as for Term Papers:

Paper 1:
   a. Slavery in Africa. Explain when and where slavery existed in Africa (or in a part of Africa). Be sure to distinguish it from other similar kinds of institutions. For at least one specific area, why did it appear and subsequently disappear? What were the short-run and long-run effects in the area you focus on? Was it profitable? If so, to whom? Was there anything voluntary about the people brought into slavery? How was the market organized?
   b. Explain and provide evidence for that explanation why land sales and/or rental markets are underdeveloped in the rural areas of a particular country or region. (Especially useful: de Janvry et al 2001).
   c. Describe briefly, derive policy implications of and critique one empirical attempt to test for a development trap in a developing country. Does it exist? And how do you know? In that context what would you recommend to get out of the trap?

Paper 2:
   a. Compare a model with one incomplete factor market with one with two incomplete markets as well as with no incomplete markets. What different implications can you derive? (Do not consider the same incomplete market as in Bardhan and Udry). Explain how you might test which model is the most appropriate.
b. Explain with reference to actual experience why crop insurance is totally or partially not available in a developing country of your choice. Cite attempts to develop it.
c. Use two or more case studies (other than Taiwan and Philippines) to identify conditions under which agricultural exports can lead to rapid growth and industrialization
d. Conduct a Comparative Analysis of at least two Different Agricultural Cooperatives, Marketing Boards, or Growers Associations, Examine the extent to which participation is and should be compulsory. Identify the externalities involved. What explains differences in their success in dealing with these externalities?
f. Produce comprehensive cross country and over time data on land ownership inequality (Land Ginis) and explain either the determinants thereof or the effects thereof.

Paper 3:
a. Find historical statistics on an emerging stock market (or any stock market in a developing country). Identify relevant rules under which the market has operated over time and possible changes therein. What are the institutional constraints on the development of this market? What policy recommendations would you make to limit these constraints and why? (Useful reference: Peter Blair Henry Do Stock Market Liberalizations Case Investment Booms? (check his website at Stanford Business School)
b. Using de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital and some of the work by Libecap, e.g., Libecap 1978 as background, compare the institutions that have emerged historically in the mining sector of an LDC of your choice with the comparable ones for the U.S.. Give greater priority to a highly valued type of product like diamonds, gold, silver, etc. as opposed to iron ore, bauxite. What explains the differences and what are the effects? What social and economic problems seem to be associated with mining? Do you agree that the fundamental differences are because of the way property rights have evolved?
c. For any kind of risk reduction mechanism, institution or market, compare the way that institution has developed in a developing country with that in a developed country. What lessons from experience in the one context can be drawn for the other?
d. Culture, diet and attitudes may shape expectations, tendency to cooperate, save and invest, bear risk. Discuss measurement problems. Develop a hypothesis of how such differences may have arisen and how they might explain different historical trajectories in different societies, e.g., countries or groups within countries. Offer at least anecdotal evidence for or against your hypothesis. Write a research proposal about what you might do to accomplish a more adequate test of your hypothesis. Read Bryan Caplan’s “Stigler-Becker vs Myers-Briggs” as well as Chapter 2 in Y&N and some of the references therein and Platteau Ch 5-7.
e. What effects are the bio-tech revolution and patenting of crop varieties having on LDC agriculture? Analyze the benefits and costs of alternative strategies that LDCs may take in dealing with these problems.
f. Trace the history of court system in one or more developing countries. Find indicators of the efficiency of the judicial system over time and evidence of their influence on economic activity. Which sectors and types of agents are most affected?
g. What explains variations across countries and over time in Deforestation? E.g.,
Why is Haiti so Deforested Relative to Dominican Republic? (Kenneth Evan Sharpe Peasant Politics: Struggle in a Dominican Village Johns Hopkins Press1977)
h. Are there positive or negative spillovers from Private Foreign Direct Investment? Analyze a case study, critique the methodology and its findings. What biases are possible in the study?

VII. Class Schedule  Note: * indicates required reading,** article for class presentation

1. The Concept of Development and Its Implications for Well-being, Happiness
   *A.K. Sen "The Concept of Development", HDE, Ch1

2. Some Methodological Issues in Development
   a. Equilibrium or Disequilibrium
   Nugent and Yotopolous "What Has Orthodox Development Economics Learned from Recent Experience?" WD 7 1979, 541-554
   b. Operational Problems and Hypothesis Testing
   YN Ch 2,3

3. Some General Theories and Strategies of Development Economics
   The Dual Economy Model and Labor Surplus
   *A. Lewis Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor" The Manchester School reprinted in AS
   Comment, Reply Sept 1971
   D. Jorgenson, Testing Alternative Theories of the Development of a Dual Economy" in I. Adelman and E. Thorbecke The Theory and Design of Economic Development or similar paper

4. Traps:. Theories of Low Level Equilibrium Traps and Strategies to Get Out of Them
   Leibenstein, Nurkse, Hirschman, Geshenkon, Boeke and Mydal,
   Multiple Equilibria and Game Theory Coordination Problems, Interlocked Technology and Externalities
   R. Nurkse 1953. Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries
   Some Relevant Games for Use in Traps and other issues
   **Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny “Industrialization and the Big Push” JPE 97, 1003-1026. reprinted in MR, Ch 1.
** Present and Comment on an Example of an Empirical Examination of a Development Trap at the Micro Level
5. Important Analytics for Household and Factor Demand Analysis
*Bardhan and Udry, Ch. 1-3

6.a Labor Markets and Migration
Bardhan and Udry, Ch 4.5
Ray, Ch. 10
J.G. Williamson "Migration and Urbanization" HDE Ch 11, 425-465.
M.R. Rosenzweig "Labor Markets in Low-Income Countries" HDE, Ch. 15 714-762.

6b. Property Rights in Man: Slavery and Encomiendas
Conrad and Meyer: The Economics of Slavery and Other Studies in Economic History Aldine: Chicago 1964
E. Domar and M. Machina 1984 On the Profitability of Russian Serfdom JEH 44 (4) 919-955.
Tom Brass Towards a Comparative Political Economy of Unfree Labor
Joseph Inikori 1992 Slavery and Atlantic Commerce 1650-1800 AER 82 (May)
Philip Curtin 1998 The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex Cambridge University Press.
Nathan Nunn 2005”Historical Legacies: A Model Linking Africa’s Past to its Current Underdevelopment”
7. Female and Child Labor Force Participation and Fertility, Security and Remittances
J.B. Nugent, “The Old Age Security Motive for Fertility”, PDR 11 (March 1985
Butler and Horowitz Labor Supply and Wages among Nuclear and Extended Households: The Suranamese Experiment
**Kaushik Basu and P.H. Van 1998 The Economics of Child Labor, American Economic Review 88

8. Transaction Costs and Contractual Issues, Labor Markets and Regulation
*Bardhan and Udry Ch. 6
Ray, Ch. 11, 12
Sadoulet and de Janvry Ch 9
Sadoulet, deJanvry and C. Benjamin, Labor Market Imperfections and Selective Separability in Household Models: A Predictive Typology of Mexican Ejidatarios”
**Foster and Rosenzweig 1994: A test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market; Contractual Arrangements, Effort and Health” RE Stat and reprinted in BUR ch 6
Campos, Hsiao, and Nugent in Process
9. The Sharecropping Controversy

- J-P Platteau and J.B. Nugent "Contractual Relationships and their Rationale in Marine Fishing" JDS

* Radwan Shaban 1987 Testing between Competing Models of Sharecropping JPE and reprinted Ch 4 in BUR

J. Stiglitz "Economic Organization, Information and Development" HDE, Ch. 5
- Karla Hoff, "Land Taxes, Output Taxes and Sharecropping: Was Henry George Right?" and Jonathan Skinner, "If Agricultural Land Taxation is so Efficient, Why Is It So Rarely Used?" in Hoff, Braverman and Stiglitz,
  Datta and Nugent 1989, ch2 in Nabli and Nugent, eds.


10. Transaction Costs, Property Rights, the Land Market, Land Inequality

Grossman and Hart 1986 “Ownership” JPE.

** Hernando de Soto The Mystery of Capital 2000 Ch 5,6

- Nugent and Robinson “Are Endowments Fate?”

Nugent and Saddi When and How Do Land Rights Become Effective? Historical Evidence from Brazil

- John McIntire "Markets and Contracts in Agricultural Pastoralism" in Hoff, Braverman and Stiglitz

Hoff "Designing Land Policies: An Overview" Ch 11 in Hoff, Braverman and Stiglitz
- Basu Ch 11,12

- H.P. Binswanger, Klaus Deininger and Gershon Feder Power, Distortions, Revolt and Reform in Agricultural Land Relations, HDE v 3B ch 42, 2659-2772

- **Nugent and Sanchez, "Tribes, Chiefs and Transhumance" EDCC.
11. Credit Markets

*Beatriz Armendariz de Aghion and Jonathan Morduch 2005. Economics of Microfinance Cambridge: MIT Press, Ch 1,2

Bardhan and Udry Ch 7, 9


Ray Ch. 14


Basu, Ch. 13


Dasgupta Ch 9

Clive Bell, Credit Markets and Interlinked Transactions", HDE, Ch 16

Timothy Besley 1996. "Savings, Credit and Insurance" Ch. 36 in HDE V 3A


http://www.jstor.org/view/00223808/di000006/00p0044u/0?currentResult=00223808%2bd500006%2b00p 0044u%2b0%2c01%2b19981200%2b9995%2b80018799&searchID=cc993341.10612512640&frame=nofr ame&sortOrder=SCORE&userID=807db963@usc.edu/01cc9933410050e192c2&dpi=3&viewContent=Art icle&config=jstor


12. Informal Credit Markets and Institutions

*Beatriz Armendariz de Aghion and Jonathan Morduch Economics of Microfinance Cambridge: MIT Press 2005, Ch 3


Stiglitz “Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets” Ch 4 in Hoff, Braverman and Stiglitz
Chris Udry "Credit Markets in Northern Nigeria: Credit as Insurance in a Rural Economy Ch5 in Hoff, Braverman and Stiglitz See also Ch 6,7
T.W. Guinnane “A Failed Institutional Transplant: Raiffeisen’s Credit Cooperatives in Ireland, 1894-1914” Explorations in Economic History January 1994

**M. Ghatak and Tim Guinnane 1999. The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability; Theory and Practice JDE 60, 1-34. Reprinted in MR Ch. 16.

13. Risk , Insurance and Adjustment Mechanisms

James Scott The Moral Economy of the Peasant 1976
Samuel Popkin The Rational Peasant 1979
Bardhan and Udry Ch 8
* Ray Ch 15
Sadoulet and de Janvry Ch 4-6
D.M. Newbery, "Agricultural Institutions for Insurance and Stabilization" Ch. 14 in Bardhan, ed. H.Binswanger, K. Deininger, and G. Feder "Power, Distortions, Revolt and Reform in Agriculture and Land Relations Ch 42 in HDE v3B
Nugent and Sanchez: 1999“The Local Variability of Rainfall and Tribal Institutions: The Case of Sudan” Journal of Behavior and Organization,
Basu Ch14


Gershom Feder 1985 "The Relation between Farm Size and Farm Productivity: The Role of Family Labor, Supervision and Credit Constraints", *JDE* 18 ((August), 197-314.

*A. Hirschman "A Generalized Linkage Approach to Development with Special Reference to Staples"* *EDCC* 25 (1977)

Y. N. Ch 4-6, 8, 15

C.P. Timmer "The Agricultural Transformation" *HDE* Ch 8, 275-331.

Basu Ch 6,7

W. Owen, "The Double Developmental Squeeze on Agriculture" *AER* 56 (March 1966) 43-70.

Basu, Ch. 8-11

P. Bardhan, ed. *The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions*, esp. Ch 2,4,5,6, and 18

M. Kevane (1996) "Agrarian Structure and Agrarian Practice: Typology and Application to Western Sudan" *AAE* 78 (1) 236-245


P. K. Bardhan 1973 “Size, Productivity and Returns to Scale: Analysis of Farm-Level Data in Indian Agriculture” *JPE* 18

15. Famines, Poverty and Income Distribution

Bardhan and Udry Ch 10, 11


G. F. Fields *Poverty, Inequality and Development*. Cambridge, N.Y. : Cambridge U Press (1980), Ch. 1-4

Ray Ch 7- 9


M. Lipton "Urban Bias Revisited" *JDS* 20 (1984) 139-166


16. Savings, Investment, and Effects of Income Inequality

**Christina Paxson 1992 Using Weather Variability to Estimate the Response of Savings to Transitory Income in Thailand AER 82, 15-33, reprinted as Ch 7 in BUR.


17. Household Structure, Gender, Decision-Making and Distribution

Beatriz Armendariz de Aghion and Jonathan Morduch Economics of Microfinance Cambridge: MIT Press 2005, Ch 7
Haddad, Brown, Richter and Smith 1995. Gender Dimensions of Economic Adjustment Policies: Potential Interactions and Evidence to Date *World Development* 23 (6), 881-896
*C. Udri 1996 “Gender, Agricultural Production and the Theory of the Household JPE 104 1010-1046, reprinted as Ch 4 in BUR.*
Anne Marie Goetz and Rina Sen Gupta 1996 "Who Takes the Credit? Gender, Power and Control over Loan Use in Rural Credit Programs in Bangladesh" *WD* 24 (1), 45-63.
Basu Ch 15
Haddad and Kanbur 1990 How Serious is the Neglect of Intra-household Inequality, *Economic Journal* 100 (September) 866-881.
Mark Pitt, Mark Rosenzweig and Md. Nzmul Hassan 1990 "Productivity, Health and Inequality in the Intrahousehold Distribution of Food in Low Income Countries" *AER* 80 1139-1156.
E. Rose Consumption Smoothing and Excess Female Mortality in Rural India *REStat*. 81 (1), 41-49.
J. Hoddinott, "Rotten Kids or Manipulative Parents: Are Children Old Age Security in Western Kenya?" *EDCC* (April 1992), 545-565.
18. Education, Health and Human Capital

YN, Ch 10,11
J.R. Behrman and A.B. Deolalikar "Health and Nutrition", HDE, Ch 14
**M.R. Rosenzweig Population Growth and Human Capital Investments: theory and Evidence
JPE 98, S12-S70. Reprinted as Ch 2 in BUR.
** Prince and Steckel 1998 “Tallest in the World : Native Americans of the Great Plains in the
Nineteenth Century” NBER Historical paper 112 and subsequently AER.

19. Culture, Geography, and Tastes

Bryan Caplan 2001 Stigler-Becker versus Myers-Briggs “ Why Preference-Based Explanations are Scientifically Meaningful and Empirically Important”, JEBO, forthcoming
J-P Platteau Ch 5, 6

20. Industrialization, Structural Change and Trade

M. Syrquin,"Patterns of Structural Change" HDE Ch. 7
H. Pack, "Industrialization and Trade" HDE Ch. 9.
J.B. Nugent and M. K. Nabli, "The Development of Financial Markets and the Size Distribution of Manufacturing Plants" WD
Ravallion and Datt “When Is Growth Pro-Poor? Evidence from the Diverse Experiences of India’s States”
Foster and Rosenzweig 2005 Agricultural Development, Industrialization and Rural Inequality
**Chang-Tai Hsieh and Peter J. Klenow 2003 “Relative Prices and Relative Prosperity”,
NBER Working
N. H. Leff, "Industrial Organization and Entrepreneurship in the Developing Countries," EDCC (July 1978)
Nugent and Yhee “South Korea’s SMEs: Achievements, Problems and Policy Issues of Relevance to Developing Countries” Small Business Economics,
J. Galvez and J. Tybout, "Microeconomic Adjustments in Chile during 1977-81: The Importance of Being a Grupo,” WD 13 (8) 1985 969-994
**Frazer 2005”Which Firms Die A Look at Manufacturing Firm Exit in Ghana” EDCC, 53 (3)

22. Technological Change and FDI Spillover Effects

Bardhan and Udry Ch 12
YN Ch. 9
Ray Ch 5
Foster and Rosenzweig 1996“Learning by Doing and Learning from Others: Human Capital and Technical Change in Agriculture JPE 104, 1176-1209, reprinted as Ch 11 in BUR
N. Singh 1997 “Some Aspects of Technological Change and Innovation in Agriculture” in K. Basu Agrarian Questions , 92-129.
Nottenburg, C. P. Pardey and B Wright Accessing Other People’s Technology: Do Non-Profit Agencies Need It? How to Obtain It, EPTD Discussion paper No 79 IFPRI Sept 2001 AgBioForum
Per Pinstrup Anderson 1999 Biotechnology for Developing Country Agriculture: Problems and Opportunities IFPRI CGIAR. Org/2020 /focus/focus02
H. Brent 2000 Assessing the Impacts of Agricultural Biotechnologies IDRC Canada
23. Institutions, Governance, Political Economy and Development: Empirical Studies including those focusing on the demise of Africa

Mancur Olson “Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations Are Rich and Others Poor” JEP 1996 (p)
http://www.jstor.org/view/08953309/di980587/98p0302z/0?currentResult=08953309%2bd4980587%2 b98p0302z%2b%2c01%2b19960400%2b9995%2b80039599&searchID=cc993341.10612508860&frame
wContent=Article&config=jstor

24. How to Operationalize Institutions?
**Chattopadhyay and Duflo Efficiency and Rent Seeking in Local Government: Evidence from Randomized Policy Experiments in India
**Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004 “Efficiency and Rent Seeking in Local Development: Evidence from Randomized Policy Experiments in India”.

25. Courts and Judicial Systems and Their Effects
Matthieu Chemin Does the Quality of the Judiciary Shape Economic Activity? Evidence from India, LSE 2004
*Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer 2003, “Courts” QJE May 453-517.
Ron Harris Industrializing English Law 2000, Cambridge University Press 
Timur Kuran, 
Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2000 Tunnelling, AER May 22-27. 
Greif, Milgrom and Weingast 1994 “Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the MerchantGuild”, JPE August 1994 


Easterly 2001, Ch. 12 Mauro, 
http://www.jstor.org/view/00220515/dm990869/99p0006i/0?currentResult=00220515%2bdm990 
869%2b99p0006i%2b0%2c01%2b19970900%2b9995%2b80029099&searchID=8dd5533b.1061 
2516020&frame=noframe&sortOrder=SCORE&userlD=807db963@usc.edu/01cc9933410050e1 
92c2&dpi=3&viewContent=Article&config=jstor

For data on corruption etc. see the Website of Transparency International


Alesina and LaFerrara 2000 “Participation in Heterogeneous Communities, QJE 115, 847-904. 
Melinda Smale and Vernon Ruttan Social Capital and Technical Change: The Groupements Naam of Burkina Faso 
Deepa Narayan Focus on People's Participation: Evidence from 121 Rural Water Projects" 
http://www.jstor.org/view/00029602/dm992703/99p0163q/0?currentResult=00029602%2bd 
m992703%2b99p0163q%2b0%2c01%2b19889900%2b9995%2b80110099&searchID=8dd5 
5340.10614249470&frame=noframe&sortOrder=SCORE&userlD=807db95c@usc.edu/018d 
d553400050c5de2e&dpi=3&viewContent=Article&config=jstor

J. Sobel 2002 Can We Trust Social Capital? JEL 40 (1) 139-154


Peter Boettke “The New Comparative Political Economy”,
**Djankov, La Porta, Lopes de Silanes and Shleifer 2002. The Regulation of Entry
http://www.jstor.org/view/00028282/di950083/95p00956/0?currentResult=00028282%2bd950083%2 bb95p00956%2b%2c01%2b19740600%2b9995%2bb80259399&searchID=8dd55340.10614251162&fram e=noframe&sortOrder=SCORE&userID=807db95c@usc.edu/018dd553400050c5de2e&dpi=3&vie wContent=Article&config=jstor

C.K. Rowley and G. Tullock, eds. The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking
E. Appelbaum and E. Katz “Seeking Rents by Setting Rents: The Political Economy of Rent Seeking”
http://www.jstor.org/view/00130133/di983491/98p0150s/0?currentResult=00130133%2bd8983491%2 bb98p0150s%2b%2c01%2b19870900%2b9995%2b80129099&searchID=8dd55340.10614251950&fr ame=noframe&sortOrder=SCORE&userID=807db95c@usc.edu/018dd553400050c5de2e&dpi=3&vie wContent=Article&config=jstor


29. Trade and Environment

*W, Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor Is Trade Good for the Environment? AER
S. Pargal and D. Wheeler 1996. “Informal Regulation of Industrial Pollution in Developing Countries: Evidence from Indonesia” JPE 104 (dec) 1314-1327
Ligon and Naraoin Government Management of the Village Commons: Comparing Two Forest Policies” JEEM
**Andrew Foster, Mark Rosenzweig and Jere Behrman, 2000 Population Growth, Income Growth and Deforestation: Management of Village Common Land in India”

VIII. Textbooks and Journals

A. Textbooks and Key Reference Books (on reserve in Leavey Library)
Beatriz Armendariz de Aghion and Jonathan Morduch Economics of Microfinance Cambridge: MIT Press 2005,
Lawrence Haddad, John Hoddinott and Harold Alderman Intrahousehold Resource Allocation in Developing Countries. International Food Policy Research Institute, Johns Hopkins University Press.
Mustapha Nabli and Jeffrey Nugent 1989. *Institutions and Development: Theory and Applications to Tunisia*

**B. Journals**

AER American Economic Review
AJAEB American Journal of Agricultural Economics
CMJE Cambridge Journal of Economics
EDCC Economic Development and Cultural Change
EJ Economic Journal
EPW Economic and Political Weekly
JDA Journal of Developing Areas
JDE Journal of Development Economics
JDS Journal of Development Studies
JEL Journal of Economic Literature
JME Journal of Monetary Economics
JLE Journal of Law and Economics
JPE Journal of Political Economy
MS Manchester School
OEP Oxford Economic Papers
PDR Population and Development Review
QJE Quarterly Journal of Economics
REST Review of Economics and Statistics
WBER World Bank Economic Review
C. Useful Websites and Data Sources:

Resources for economists on the internet at: http://econwpa.wustl.edu/EconFAQ/EconFAQ.htm1
Penn World Tables version 5.6 for 152 countries on 29 variables 1960-1992 NBER available through the University of Toronto as http://datacentre.epas.utoronto.ca:5680/pwt/pwt.htm1
The Interamerican Bank and The Asian Development Bank also have nice Web sites:
UNDP web site http://www.undp.org
OECD:
http://www.oecd.org/dac/Indicators/htm/list.htm
http://www.oecd.org/dac/Indicators/pdf/METHOD.PDF
has all the info or the source for each indicator
http://www.oecd.org/dac/Indicators/index.htm
Hardcopy yearbooks available in VKC Library:
United Nations, Yearbook of National Account Statistics
UNIDO, UNCTAD, ILO, FAO and the regional commissions of the United Nations also put out yearbooks and data series of different types
Poverty Data from Xavier Sala-I-Martin The World Distribution of Income NBER 8933
Resources for economists on the internet at:
http://econwpa.wustl.edu/EconFAQ/EconFAQ.htm1
Penn World Tables version 5.6 for 152 countries on 29 variables 1960-1992 NBER available through the University of Toronto as http://datacentre.epas.utoronto.ca:5680/pwt/pwt.htm1
The Interamerican Bank and The Asian Development Bank also have nice Web sites:
UNDP web site http://www.undp.org
United Nations, Yearbook of National Account Statistics
UNIDO, UNCTAD, ILO, FAO and the regional commissions of the United Nations also put out yearbooks and data series of different types