

*Democratic Stability and Its Limits: An Analysis of Chile's 1993 Elections**

Gerardo L. Munck

ONCE AGAIN, Chile stands out within the Latin American region. In the early 1970s, Salvador Allende's brand of socialism attracted worldwide attention and captured the imagination of the international Left. In the years thereafter, Pinochet's authoritarianism set the pace for a global resurgence of the new Right. Finally, in just the last few years, Chile has become a symbol of a new sort, rapidly establishing itself as a democratic success story. Chile's democratic progress becomes especially evident when viewed alongside the large set of Latin American countries that have democratized since the late 1970s. Indeed, an analysis of the last presidential and congressional elections in Chile (11 December 1993) indicates that it has undoubtedly made greater strides toward democratic consolidation than any other country in Latin America — all the more striking when one considers that its transition from authoritarian rule was concluded only as recently as 1990.

Chile's recent election was also remarkable and significant as an indicator of democratic development for certain things that did not happen as well. There was little drama and uncertainty. No miracles were promised, and no big changes

Gerardo L. Munck is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His most recent article is "Beyond Electoralism in El Salvador: Conflict Resolution through Negotiated Compromise" (*Third World Quarterly*, 1993), and he is currently engaged in completing a book provisionally entitled *THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF AUTHORITARIANISM: MILITARY RULE IN ARGENTINA, 1976-1983*. His research interests include democratic transitions in Latin America and Eastern Europe as well as the links between economic reform and democratization.

* Research for this article was supported by a grant from the Campus Research Board of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The author would like to thank Paul Drake, Kurt Weyland, and three anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier draft of this article; however, the author assumes responsibility for any errors.

in policy were expected from the candidates up for election. In this climate of normalcy, the citizenry voted to retain the coalition of center-left parties that had ruled the country for the past four years. On the face of things, Chile had an unexciting and not particularly noteworthy election that maintained its political continuity. Yet it is precisely this normalcy and emphasis on continuity — characteristics absent for some time now in a region that has been battered by and is still recovering from the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression — that makes Chile's election so outstanding.

Indeed, not only does Chile's 1993 election signify a break with the regional trend but it also hopefully signals the beginning of a new one in Latin America's recent move toward democracy. This was not a "founding election," one in which voters get their first chance to elect leaders and express sentiments that are primarily anti-authoritarian, nor was it the kind of election, so common in the last few years, in which citizens voted to rid themselves of democratically elected leaders whose legitimacy had steadily eroded under the ongoing crises of governability. In a departure from these regional trends, Chile's recent election was a vote for democracy of deep significance. It offers convincing proof that Chile has been able to move beyond Allende and Pinochet to create for itself a new type of politics, one capable of striking a successful balance between democratic participation on the one hand and governability on the other — a political challenge that has been as elusive as it is central to the future of Latin America.

Within this overall picture of stable democracy, however, it is important to point out that major tensions with important implications for the future evolution of Chilean democracy remain beneath the surface. The core of the problem centers on the future of the political Right within the present democratic system, a future which depends, to a large extent, on the continuation of those restrictions on the democratic process inherited from the Pinochet years. The Left, on the other hand, must justify its existence by trying to open up the political

agenda to encompass issues which have been thus far foreclosed by those same anti-democratic, institutional constraints so stubbornly and strongly defended by the Right. These opposing views of both Left and Right toward the status quo therefore remain a latent source of conflict within the body politic, threatening to disrupt the careful balance between participation and the power to make decisions that has been so painstakingly erected. Close analysis of these 1993 elections indicates that both tendencies — the stabilizing and the destabilizing — are presently at work in Chile's democratic system.

CONTINUITY AND DEMOCRATIC STABILITY: THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE

A POSITIVE reading of the 1993 election hinges primarily on the outcome of the presidential race, the first to be held under democracy since 1970.¹ The vote for president — whose term of office was reduced from eight years to only six just days before the election (by agreement of leaders from all parties) — was dominated by the contest between candidates of the two leading electoral coalitions: the center-left *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* (CPD) and the right-wing *Unión por el Progreso de Chile*.

The favored candidate, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, a Christian Democrat and son of former Chilean president Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970), was the standard-bearer for the incumbent *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* (CPD or Coalition of Parties for Democracy), which had been successful in electing Patricio Aylwin to the presidency in 1989. It is made up of forces from the Center, dominated mainly by Christian Democrats (*Partido Demócrata Cristiano* or PDC), along with two parties from the Left: the Socialists (*Partido Socialista* or PS) and the *Partido por la Democracia* (PPD or Party for Democracy). Frei's main opponent was Arturo Alessandri Besa, head of the right-wing coalition known as the *Unión por el Progreso de Chile* (UPC or Union for the Progress

of Chile),² whose core consisted of two highly conservative parties — the *Renovación Nactonal* (RN or National Renewal) and the *Unión Democrática Independiente* (UDI or Independent Democratic Union) — which had been the backbone of opposition to the Aylwin government.

Since public opinion polls had been according a steady, sizable lead to Frei over Alessandri for some months in advance of the election, little drama surrounded the presidential race itself. Nonetheless, the final, quite predictable result — Frei received 58% of the votes to Alessandri's 24.4% — was still tremendously important (see Table 1). The import of Frei's victory was that it signified a clear break with a pattern that has been all too common in other recently democratized countries in the region, one in which the citizenry first vote against the old regime and its allies in "founding elections,"³ only to vote later against the most recently elected regime when it proves unable to deliver on its promises. Thus, it must be emphasized, Chile's vote for continuity represents a positive step toward consolidating its democracy.

Table 1
Presidential Election Results, 1989 and 1993
(percentage of valid votes)

	1989		1993
Coalition of Parties for Democracy			
(CPD): P. Aylwin	55.17	CPD: E. Frei	58.01
		Other Left candidates:	
		M. Max-Neff	5.55
		E. Pizarro	4.69
		C. Reitze	1.17
Right Parties:		Right Parties:	
H. Büchi	29.40	A. Alessandri	24.39
Independent Right:		Independent Right:	
F.J. Errázuriz	15.43	J. Piñera	6.18

SOURCES: Figures on the 1989 election are from Baño (1990: 72); figures on the 1993 election are from the Ministerio del Interior (1993: 1).

Though voting against democratic incumbents may result in a rapid alternation in power, this turnover has been anything but beneficial toward the consolidation of democracy, as a superficial reading of events might suggest. Rather, as post-authoritarian governments bow out practically in disgrace and having lost all their initial legitimacy, the task of democratization becomes even more complex, and the tendency for abuse of the still fragile democratic systems increases.

Various instances illustrate the dynamics of this situation. In Brazil, for example, the failed presidency of José Sarney gave way to an administration, led by Fernando Collor de Mello, fraught with disputes between the executive and legislative branches that ended with Collor's impeachment. In Argentina, the very transition from a weakened president, Raúl Alfonsín, to his successor, Carlos Menem, was punctuated by hyperinflation and food riots. Following this inauspicious beginning, Menem then led an administration singularly bent on concentrating power in the executive on the one hand while undermining the autonomy of both the legislature and judiciary on the other. In the polarized situation of Peru, the administration of Alán García had become so discredited that it paved the way for tendencies even more undemocratic. The anti-incumbent vote courted by Alberto Fujimori was so much of an undisguised anti-party and anti-Congress vote that it served to justify President Fujimori's move to dissolve Congress, suspend constitutional rule, and render political parties impotent through the so-called "Fuji-coup," or *autogolpe*.⁴ Thus, the vote against democratic incumbents in the context of fragile democracies has generally served as proof of (a) the inability of recently installed democratic administrations to govern in the context of economic crisis and of (b) the failure of political parties to gain and retain the support of the population. In consequence, this turning against incumbent governments has testified to the weakness rather than the strength of the region's democracies (Portantiero, 1993: 24-26).

Chile's vote to keep the governing *Concertación* (CPD) in power at the end of its first post-authoritarian government not only departs from this regional trend but also shows that it is

possible for the citizenry to vote for something they know. In this regard, Frei's victory carries even greater resonance, particularly given that he commanded an even higher percentage of the vote than that which outgoing President Aylwin had been able to garner four years earlier despite having to compete in a six-way race that included three candidates to his political Left (see Table 1). Indeed, his election represents a landmark in Chile's electoral history: the first transfer of power between leaders of the same party since 1946, with the winning candidate receiving the largest number of votes since 1931. Furthermore, within the context of all of Latin America, it also constitutes the clearest sign yet of a vote for political elites that work within parties and through democratic institutions; it represents a true vote for democracy.

This positive trend, indicative of democratic stability, is further supported by evidence of the healthy state of Chilean parties beyond those included in the governing coalition. A crucial indicator in this regard is that the percentage of voters who supported an anti-party message fell from 15.5% of all valid votes gained in 1989 by presidential candidate Francisco Errázuriz to 11.73% received in 1993 by presidential candidates José Piñera and Manfred Max-Neff.⁵ Quite telling, moreover, was the decision of Errázuriz to join the right-wing UPC coalition following the 1989 election and to serve as a leader of the *Unión de Centro Centro* (UCC) party. The *fujtmortización* of politics — the tendency for the electorate to reject established political parties and for politicians to campaign against such parties and official government institutions such as the Congress — shows little indication of taking hold in Chile.⁶

In sum, the very lack of drama surrounding Chile's 1993 election tends to obscure one of the country's more significant achievements: the balance it has been able to strike between participation and governability. Where this balance remains elusive (as in much of Latin America), democratic experiments continue to flounder. In Chile, on the other hand, it is probably the factor most responsible for Frei's victory. While there can be no doubt that the Frei name contributed to his victory, what

set him apart from other "officialist" candidates in Latin America was that he could run on the record of the Aylwin administration in a way that other "officialist" candidates who followed failed presidencies could not. More succinctly, Chile's experience with democracy has not been linked to the problem of governability, in contrast to the experience of other Latin American countries, where broad democratic participation has resulted in administrations unable to govern.

Indeed, the Aylwin administration was remarkably successful by comparison. During its tenure in office (1990 through 1993), the growth of its gross domestic product (GDP) averaged just over 6% per year; the annual inflation rate, which has declined each year, averaged just under 18%, while the number of Chileans living below the poverty line went down from 40% to only 33% of the population in just 3 years.⁷ Regarding its record on human rights, the government could claim, despite the restraints under which it operated, that it had (a) appointed the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (the Rettig Commission), (b) investigated the violation of human rights committed during the Pinochet regime, and (c) issued the comprehensive Rettig Report on those abuses (National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, 1993). In addition, it had been able to secure prison sentences for those responsible for the assassination of Orlando Letelier, General Manuel Contreras, former head of the secret police known as the DINA (*Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional*), and his lieutenant.⁸ Unlike the situation in Argentina, where the attempt to bring the violators of human rights to account triggered a series of military rebellions that shook the Alfonsín government, Chile was able to take similar steps without provoking any major disruption in civil-military relations.

As a result, by 1993 Chileans had something for which to vote. Not only had the government coalition shown itself capable of governing, but it had continued to act in a unified manner, including the ability to close ranks behind the Frei candidacy in the wake of the primary elections.⁹ By showing itself able to buck the troubled Latin American trend to engage

in frequent alternations in power, the overwhelming victory of Frei and the CPD serves as graphic evidence of Chile's democratic progress and gives a substantial boost to its political stability in the process.¹⁰

THE CONGRESSIONAL RACES: ELECTORAL DISTORTIONS, INTRA-COALITIONAL BALANCES, AND POTENTIAL SOURCES OF DESTABILIZATION

IF THE presidential race testifies to the overall health of Chilean democracy in general and the strength of the two main electoral coalitions in particular, an analysis of the congressional races reveals a more complex set of issues. These issues arise from a number of factors that serve to influence the outcome of those races — contests to replace the entire Chamber of Deputies as well as for 18 seats in the Senate — and, in so doing, distort the makeup of the Congress.¹¹ Also, only by looking at the congressional contests is it possible to assess the strength of individual parties within the two major coalitions, those of the Center-Left as well as those on the Right. Because the makeup of Congress and the intra-coalitional balances are likely to have as much (if not more) impact on day-to-day politics as the outcome of the presidential race and because they contain the potential for destabilizing influences or tendencies, examining the congressional contests in greater detail helps to shed light on certain important aspects of the current political dynamics in Chile.

The Makeup of Congress: Overrepresentation of the Right

Probably the most striking trend that emerges from an analysis of the 1993 congressional elections is that despite the sweeping majority vote for the governing coalition, the latter made no gains in the Congress. Thus, even though *Concertación* (CPD) candidates for the Chamber of Deputies garnered

55.42% of all valid votes compared to only 36.56% for UPC candidates on the Right, the CPD was still only able to hang onto its previous majority of 70 seats (out of 120). On the other hand, the right-wing UPC coalition acquired two additional seats, taken from the Communists in the *Movimiento de Izquierda Democrático Allendista* (MIDA) coalition, which raised its total to 50 seats. In the 18 Senate races, the two coalitions — the CPD on the Center-Left and UPC on the Right — each won 9 seats, thus splitting the take. However, since more CPD-held seats were up for election this time, it meant that the CPD lost one of its seats to the Right. In what has to be one of the great oddities of Chilean democracy, the CPD government ended up with only 21 (out of 46) seats in the Senate, which ensured that it would remain in the minority (see Tables 2 and 3). As in 1989, winning a vast electoral majority simply did not translate into control of the Congress.

Table 2
The Makeup of Congress, 1989 and 1993
(number of seats)¹²

	1989		1993	
	Deputies	Senators	Deputies	Senators
Center-Left Coalition				
Coalition of Parties for Democracy (CPD)				
PDC	39	13	37	13
PS	18	4	15	5
PPD	7	1	15	2
PR	6	3	2	1
SD	-	1	-	-
PDI	-	-	1	-
Subtotal	70	22	70	21
Left Coalition				
MIDA	2	-	-	-
Right Coalitions and Allies				
RN	32	13	29	11
UDI	14	2	15	3
UCC	-	-	2	-
Independents	2	1	4	3
Designated	-	8	-	8
Subtotal	48	24	50	25
Total	120	46	120	46

SOURCE: *El Mercurio* (Santiago, Chile), December 13, 1993, p. C3.

Reasons for this strange anomaly can be found, on the one hand, in two features inherited from the Pinochet years: (1) the "majoritarian binomial" electoral system and (2) the institution of "designated" senators and, on the other hand, the election strategy of the *Partido Comunista* (PC) and other minor parties on the Left. Though the logic of the Chilean electoral system — one of the factors responsible for the CPD's failure to gain control of Congress — is quite complex, its biases are readily apparent. The peculiar "binomial" system provides for two seats in each district and allows each party (or coalition of parties) to present two candidates; the voters, however, can choose only one candidate. The complexity is given by the fact that the winners are determined through a two-step process. First, the votes received by a party's (or coalition's) two candidates are added up; the winners, first of all, are the parties that attain the two biggest pluralities. In the second step, within the victorious parties, winners are determined on the basis of which candidates obtain the highest number of votes. Given this process, the two top vote-getters are not assured of victory. Rather, a party or coalition is only able to win both seats if it doubles the votes of its closest competitor.

This electoral system, as opposed to those based on proportional representation, provides an incentive for parties to form coalitions (or large electoral blocs) and then to engage in intra-bloc, pre-election negotiations to decide on the number of candidates to be put up by each party. From a democratic standpoint, this could be viewed as a positive practice on the grounds that it works against a high level of party fragmentation. But the Chilean system also has another central thrust: it tends to favor the second-largest electoral bloc. In other words, while the largest electoral bloc would have to gain more than two-thirds of the votes to win both seats in each district, the second-largest bloc can win one of every two contested seats with just over a third of the votes. In the Chilean context, this means — as the architects of the system intended — that the Right, which historically has received only a third of the vote, would be overrepresented in the Congress.¹³ Indeed, this certainly held true in the 1993 elections for the Chamber of

Table 3. Chamber of Deputies Election Results, 1993
 (percentage of valid votes)¹⁴

	Nº Candidates	Nº Votes	% of Total Votes	Nº Candidates	Nº Votes/ Candidates	Nº Seats Won	% Seats Won	Votes/Seat Ratio
Center-Left Coalition (Coalition of Parties for Democracy (CPD))								
PDC	48	1,803,090	27.12	37	37,564	37	30.8	48,732
PS	28	800,116	12.03	15	28,575	15	12.5	53,341
PPD	25	784,681	11.80	15	31,387	15	12.5	52,312
PR	11	196,623	2.96	2	17,875	2	1.6	98,311
PDI	1	33,031	0.50	1	33,031	1	1.6	33,031
SD	4	52,261	0.79	-	13,065	-	-	-
Independents	3	15,101	0.23	-	5,034	-	-	-
Subtotal	120	3,684,903	55.42	70	30,707	70	58.3	52,641
Left Coalitions (MIDA)								
PC	70	339,011	5.10	-	4,843	-	-	-
Independents	20	86,144	1.30	-	4,307	-	-	-
MAPU	3	6,506	0.10	-	2,169	-	-	-
Subtotal	93	431,661	6.49	-	4,642	-	-	-
New Left								
AH-V	31	66,550	1.00	-	2,147	-	-	-
Independents	16	25,852	0.38	-	1,616	-	-	-
ME	1	2,206	0.03	-	2,206	-	-	-
Subtotal	48	94,608	1.42	-	1,971	-	-	-
Right Coalition (Union for the Progress of Chile)								
RN	41	1,078,862	16.23	29	26,314	29	24.2	37,202
UDI	29	805,350	12.11	15	27,771	15	12.5	53,690
Independents	24	319,119	4.80	4	13,297	4	3.3	79,780
UCC	24	211,822	3.19	2	8,826	2	1.6	105,911
P. del Sur	1	12,739	0.19	-	12,739	-	-	-
PN	1	2,647	0.04	-	2,647	-	-	-
Subtotal	120	2,430,539	36.56	50	20,254	50	41.7	48,611
Independents								
Independents	4	7,041	0.10	-	1,760	-	-	-
Total	385	6,648,752	100.00	120	17,269	120	100.0	55,406

SOURCE: Author's calculations on the basis of official data from the Ministerio del Interior (1993).

Deputies. The Right-wing UPC coalition won 41.7% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies with only 36.56% of the votes, giving them a larger advantage than the winning CPD coalition. Though the CPD won 55.42% of the votes, these provided the coalition with just 58.3% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies (see Table 3).

The second factor that prevented the *Concertación* from making any gains in Congress, despite its wide majority, was the election strategy of those parties on the Left that were not members of the *Concertación* (CPD). While this factor is also related to structural biases in the election system as a whole, it is more directly strategic and hence contingent in nature. If the electoral system allowed the Right to gain one seat in each two-seat district with just over a third of the votes, registration of the two coalitions to the Left of the governing coalition *Concertación* went against the logic of the electoral system, which is set up to encourage formation of only two broad electoral blocs. The Right was implicitly favored by allowing its candidates to gain one seat per district with even less than the already modest requirement of one-third of the votes.¹⁵ In effect, the votes received by the two coalitions of the *Concertación* — the MIDA (*Movimiento de Izquierda Democrática Allendista*), which included the Communist Party (PC), independents, and the *Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario* (MAPU or Movement of United Popular Action and the *Nueva Izquierda* (New Left) coalition, made up of the *Partido Alianza Humanista-Verde* (AH-V or Humanist-Green Party Alliance), independents, and the *Movimiento Ecológico* (ME or Ecological Movement) — affected at least nine out of the 60 contests for the Chamber of Deputies and at least one of the nine races for the Senate. If one assumes that the votes that went to these two coalitions would have (i.e., without them) gone to CPD candidates, then in every contest, one more member of the CPD — rather than of the rightist UPC — would have been elected.¹⁶ Even if this assumption is somewhat optimistic (for it is likely that some of those voters would simply not have voted at all), the role of the Communists and other minor parties of the Left still, to some degree, hurt the ruling

CPD coalition and helped the parties of the Right. The electoral strategy of the (primarily Communist) Left thus compounded the biases of the electoral system inherited from the Pinochet years and prevented the government from making significant gains, especially in the Chamber of Deputies.

A third factor of a non-electoral and less complicated nature explains why the government's *Concertación* retained its minority status in the Senate. This anomaly was due to one of the various odd features of Chile's 1980 Constitution: "designated" senators. Just before President Aylwin assumed office in 1990, this provision allowed Pinochet and other government officials beholden to him to appoint (that is, designate) nine senators who were then able to take their seats alongside those who had won their seats by direct election.¹⁷ The presence of these "designated" senators (later reduced to eight when one died in office and was not replaced) directly tilted the political balance in favor of the conservatives and forced the *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* into the minority in that body. Thus, the slight majority of 21 to 17 senators that the government parties were able to eke out in the elections (despite the electoral features discussed above) translated into a 25 to 21 majority for the forces of the Right. In effect, this blatantly undemocratic provision of Chile's constitution worked to deny the country's principal political coalition the power to legislate commensurate with its electoral support.¹⁸

All in all, the upshot of the 1993 elections has been that the balance of political forces in the Congress has remained, for all practical purposes, unchanged. The *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* (CPD) failed to make the type of gains — such as gaining control of at least two-thirds of the Chamber of Deputies and half the seats in the Senate — that would have altered the government/opposition relationship in any significant way. Thus, one can anticipate that the same political dynamics that have marked the 1990-93 period will probably continue, at least for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the congressional elections did register some changes in another

direction: the relative strength of the individual parties within the leading coalitions. Given the impact that these intra-coalitional shifts in power may have on the dynamics of current Chilean politics, particularly their potential to accentuate either stabilizing or destabilizing tendencies, it would be useful to examine this aspect of the elections more closely. In the remainder of this article, I will assess the state of Chile's democracy in two broad areas by looking at (1) the ways in which the continuities perpetuated by the 1993 elections will affect, especially in inter-coalitional terms, the long-term process of democratic consolidation, and (2) the manner in which the changes brought about by the elections, particularly in the area of intra-coalitional relationships, may also affect this process, whether positively or negatively.

A Role for the Right in Chilean Democracy?

One of the major areas of continuity which the 1993 elections preserved for the above-mentioned reasons is the relatively strong position of the Right within the Chilean democratic system, a position that derives from and depends heavily upon specific institutional arrangements inherited from the Pinochet years. The significance of this factor is hard to overemphasize. Because these institutional provisions affect the role of the Right within the present system, they also determine, to a large extent, the Right's allegiance to that system, a factor widely viewed as essential in consolidating democracy. For example, it was clearly the intention of the framers of the election law drawn up by the Pinochet regime (as discussed above) to protect the interests of the political Right by ensuring that the Right would retain sufficient power in the Congress to block any initiatives that might threaten its interests. Indeed, not only has the law operated in this fashion, but it has even functioned as a stabilizing force by assuring that the Right would have no reason to fear democracy as it did in the early 1970s. There can be little doubt that the electoral law, accepted by the present governing coalition as the price of Pinochet's vacating *La Moneda* (the government house),

has worked to provide the Right with a political stake in the current system.

However, even though Chile's recent democratic gains have come at the price of accepting certain institutional rules which are, ironically, undemocratic in nature, further consolidation of that democracy is likely to require major reform. Because the legacies of the Pinochet era prevent a majority vote from translating into a strong majority in the Congress, those constraints are hardly innocent in their effects.¹⁹ Rather, such features as binomial elections and designated senators undermine the tendency of most democratic systems to overrepresent the primary electoral force and thus favor the probability that presidents will lack majorities in the Congress. As multiple studies have shown, this situation is conducive to a destabilizing inability to govern, a major pitfall of presidential democracies (Linz, 1994; A. Valenzuela, 1993). Therefore, the current restrictions on the democratic process could jeopardize the delicate balance that now characterizes the political system, a central factor in Chile's present success as a democracy: the balance between the demand for participation (likely to increase as the restrictions inherited from the Pinochet days are increasingly perceived as artificial) and the demand for decision-making power, apt to be tested more and more in the days ahead, particularly as new issues on the post-Pinochet agenda arise and need to be addressed.

Consequently, as Chile moves beyond the Pinochet age, the balance between participation and governability, essentially a dynamic factor, will have to be adjusted to meet new demands. The crux of the problem, therefore, is that the Right appears to operate upon and insist on the validity of a static conception of this balance based upon the supposition that democracy can survive in a state of suspended animation, simply freezing the political relationships established during the initial transition to democracy in the late 1980s. However, this poses a dilemma. The permanence of those features that are most overtly undemocratic and have served to ameliorate the Right's fear of democracy are increasingly likely to conflict

with the need to respond to changing demands over time. Therefore, Chile's prospects for democracy in the future are contingent, at least in part, upon reforming the electoral system and those other institutional features inherited from the Pinochet administration.

However, the politics of institutional reform makes progress on this front quite unlikely. Because the *Concertación* government lacked the needed votes in Congress from the very beginning of the Aylwin administration (March 1990), all possibility of any major reform has depended upon its ability to negotiate with the right-wing parties.²⁰ This option never materialized. It could be argued that, at least in the beginning, the lack of reform was due to shortcomings of the government itself. Indeed, leaders of the rightist *Renovación Nacional* (RN) had shown themselves, early on, open to some bargaining over constitutional reforms, and it is possible that a bolder, more creative strategy on the part of the government might have led to constitutional reform. Nevertheless, as time went on, the political Right became increasingly recalcitrant regarding further liberalization. For one thing, the electoral fortunes of the Right began to wane. Particularly after the municipal elections in June 1992, the parties of the Right retreated into a reactive, ever more defensive position that was hostile to any government proposal for reform.²¹

In this respect, the election of 1993 will probably serve only to harden the position of parties on the Right. Their decline at the polls first became apparent in the municipal elections of 1992, when the vote for parties on the Right fell to 38% from its previous 1989 high of 43.21%. In the 1993 congressional elections, this support slipped yet again to just 36.56% (see Table 4). Moreover, the result of the presidential election, in which the aggregate vote for the Right decreased from 44.83% (in 1989) to only 30.57% in 1993, provided further evidence of the extent of that decline (see Table 1). Given the Right's slim prospects of winning the presidency in the near future, the best course of action for the Right and for democracy in Chile would appear to be to hold on to its power to veto any

reform proposal that could further weaken its position in the Congress. Thus, on the face of things, what is good for Chilean democracy is at odds with what is good for the political Right.

The balance between the two major forces within the right-wing *Unión por el Progreso de Chile* (UPC) — *Renovación Nacional* (RN) and the *Unión Demócrática Independiente* (UDI) — only deepens this dilemma. From the beginning, hopes for reform depended upon the government's ability to strike a deal with leaders of *Renovación Nacional* (RN), who appeared much more receptive to a broader democracy than the leaders of the *Unión Demócrática Independiente* (UDI), who still adhere to the Pinochet project. To the extent that the RN party was able to grow and establish itself as the major party within the Right, therefore, the prospects for reform grew. However, in the balance of forces between the two parties of the UPC, the 1993 elections gave a boost to the UDI relative to the RN, thus dashing any hopes that the RN might dominate representation by the Right. If the ratio of votes in 1989 ran roughly 2-to-1 in favor of the RN, by 1993 this ratio had dropped to just 4-to-3 in favor of RN (see Table 4).²² Reflecting this gain, the UDI has narrowed the gap in the seats it holds in both the lower and upper houses even though the RN still benefits from the electoral law in a way the UDI does not.²³

Equally important in revealing important national trends then underway was the contest between the two main parties of the Right — the UDI and the RN — for the key district of Las Condes, in which the two parties, in a highly symbolic competition, went head-to-head for the right to represent this traditionally conservative, wealthy district in the Chamber of Deputies. In this "battle of the Rights," as the election was billed, the voters gave a slight edge to UDI candidate Carlos Bombal over Andrés Allamand, president and standard-bearer of the RN. Because both candidates were elected at the expense of the Christian Democratic candidate, the political impact of the UDI victory was muted. However, it did strengthen the hand of the UDI sufficiently to muster support for its proposal that the parties of the Right stand together in the

Table 4
Chamber of Deputies Election Results, 1989 and 1993
and Municipal Election Results, 1992
(percentage of valid votes)²⁴

	1989 Deputies	1992 Municipal	1993 Deputies
Center-Left Coalition			
Coalition of Parties for Democracy (CPD)	51.48	53.2	55.42
PDC	26.14	28.9	27.12
PS	--	8.5	12.03
PPD	--	9.2	11.80
Left Coalitions and Other Left Parties			
MIDA (PC)	5.31	6.6	7.91
	--	6.6	6.49
Right Coalitions and Other Right Parties			
RN	43.21	38.0	36.56
UDI	18.22	13.4	16.23
UCC	9.17	10.2	12.11
	--	8.1	3.19

SOURCES: Figures on the 1989 election are from Baño (1990: 72) and Garretón (1993: 17, 22); figures on June 1992 municipal elections are from Scully and Valenzuela (1993: 9); figures on the 1993 election are from Table 2.

Congress and act as a bloc, thereby foreclosing any hope on the part of the government that it might be able to gain support for reform by negotiating, one-on-one, with leaders of the RN. In sum, the 1993 elections brought about certain changes within the Right which seem destined to shore up and emphasize its negative direction.

It is unclear just what role the Right — unable to advance its own initiatives, increasingly dependent upon biased rules for its survival and opposed to any reforms that might remove them — is destined to play in Chilean democracy. In a reinforcing logic, because the position of the right-wing UPC depends upon its institutional protections, its future fortunes are increasingly tied to the use of its veto to prevent any change in those undemocratic arrangements. This dialectic has undermined the hope that a truly democratic Right would emerge around the *Renovación Nacional*, posing one of central dilemmas clouding Chile's democratic prospects. If the Right's participation and contribution to democratic stability depends on maintaining such patently undemocratic features as designated senators and/or aberrant electoral laws, then the failure to reform those bars to democracy could well lead to problems of governability. As a minority holding the majority hostage, the Right is more and more likely to collide with the majority's need and ability to respond to new developments and challenges. Only if the Right demonstrates a willingness to support democratic reforms and abide by fair rules of the game will democracy be secure.

The "New Equilibrium" within the Government Coalition

The electoral weakness of the Right, together with the requirement that it develop loyalty toward the democratic rules of the game, frame the main strategic choices faced by the government coalition. As a counterpart to the predicament of the Right, the Center-Left forces must also find a way in which to make the short-term need to democratize institutions of government (in order to carry out their electoral mandate while

avoiding the pitfall of ungovernability) compatible with the long-term need to foster the Right's trust in the workings of a democratic system and its ability to serve its interests as well. This is not a simple task for the government inasmuch as it must be approached in a way that does not trigger any regressive reaction on the part of the Right. Consequently, meeting this challenge requires that forces from both the Center and the Left within the governing *Concertación* should exercise a well-directed restraint in their initiatives. Such a policy of restraint may well have different implications for *Concertación* parties at the polar extremes of Center and Left, thus creating challenges within the CPD and running the risk of straining intra-coalition relationships. Such a situation could pose a serious threat to the unity of the CPD as a whole by driving a wedge between the Center and Left and undermining the original consensus that facilitated the transition to democracy in 1988 and the subsequent advances of the Aylwin administration.

The problem for the *Concertación* government is that the status quo the Right seeks to uphold is more restrictive for the Left than for the Center. The main party of the Center, the *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (PDC), does not fare at all badly under the present system. As the largest partner of the *Concertación* (CPD), it has been able to name its own candidate to head the coalition and thus has been able to control the executive from 1990 to 1994. If all goes well, it will continue to do so for the balance of the decade. In addition to their gains under the presidential system, the PDC has benefited much more from the current election laws than has the Left. As a result, one of the strains within the government coalition has been the Left's perception that as the minor partner, it has been subject to undue constraints. On the one hand, it has borne the cost of being in government without reaping its share of benefits compared to the PDC. On the other hand, its *raison d'être* and identity as a member of the Left was open to challenge from those Leftist parties which remained outside the government coalition and which, for that very reason, were freer to raise the flag of social change. Conse-

quently, Leftist members of the *Concertación* have been more impatient with the status quo than those of the Center.

This situation not only presented the Center with a major challenge to its leadership but also with an opportunity to strengthen its roots within society to the extent that it proved able to manage centrifugal tendencies. Nevertheless, the future of democracy, as those in the Center well understand, rests on being able to create the broadest consensus possible, especially given the significance of the forces on both Left and Right. Indeed, a major lesson culled from the breakdown of democracy in 1973 is that it is essential for the supporters of the Center and the Left, who have the greatest stake in democracy, to learn how to work together to preserve it. In the current context, this means that the Center and the Left must manage their differences within a pro-democratic front, such as the *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* (CPD), at least until such time as the Right develops greater trust in and loyalty toward the democratic rules of the game.²⁵

If Center/Left unity is considered central to the fate of Chile's democracy, then the 1993 election results were a most positive development in that regard. A first glance at the election results shows that (a) the PDC gained almost the same percentage of votes and seats in Congress as it did in 1989 and thus, (b) it is still the largest party in Chile and the principal partner in the governing coalition. Nonetheless, the 1993 election did effect some changes in the balance of power within the coalition by giving an important boost to the Left.²⁶ Both the *Partido por la Democracia* (PPD) and the *Partido Socialista* (PS), which make up a Left-wing sub-group in the *Concertación*, increased their strength at the polls, going from the 17.7% of the vote reaped jointly in the municipal elections of 1992 to some 23.83% of the vote for representation in the Chamber of Deputies in 1993.²⁷ The latter percentage — which comes close to the PDC's 27.12% — goes a long way to narrow the gap between the Centrist PDC and the Leftist PPD-PS sub-group, easing some internal tensions within the governing coalition in the process (see Table 4).²⁸

As leaders of the PDC were quick to point out, the Left benefited from the *Concertación's* decision not to run PDC candidates in a number of districts;²⁹ however, even with this consideration, it is evident the Left made a strong showing. The ratio of voters to candidates fielded was 37,564 per PDC candidate and 29,891 per PPD-PS candidate, i.e., slightly less than a 5-to-4 ratio (calculated from Table 2). Moreover, considering races in which candidates from the Center and Left faced one another, the Left more than held its ground. In the 42 (out of 60) races for deputy where the PPD or the PS ran candidates along with the PDC, the PPD-PS trailed the PDC by a margin of 25.07% to 32.07% of valid votes, but in the five (out of nine) Senate races in which both the Left and Center fielded candidates, the PPD-PS outdid the PDC by a margin of 30.12% to 27.47%.³⁰ Immediately after the elections, the leaders of the PS and PPD were clearly justified in expressing their satisfaction in what they called the "new equilibrium" within the *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia*.

Consolidating the gains of the Left and boosting its confidence, this new equilibrium is reflected in the makeup of the Congress. Although the PDC continues to benefit from the electoral system vis-à-vis the PPD-PS,³¹ the Left (and particularly the PPD) made important gains in the number of seats held so that its representation in both houses doubled (see Table 2). Thus, a major source of tension within the *Concertación* — the Left's fear of being overshadowed by the Center — has been considerably laid to rest. The appearance of the "new equilibrium" substantially reduces the possibility of the PDC becoming a hegemonic force, which had loomed as a strong possibility following the PDC gains in the 1992 municipal elections.³² Now that the PPD and PS feel their role within the CPD is more secure, they are better able to demonstrate a responsible attitude regarding the pace with which reforms are pursued.

The 1993 elections also laid to rest another fear of PPD-PS leaders, namely, that its image as an agent of social change would be tarnished by identification with a government bound

by institutional restrictions. Indeed, the PPD-PS actually gained ground vis-à-vis the non-government Left, which turned in a fairly dismal performance at the polls. Aside from affecting the outcome in a few races (as mentioned above), neither the Communist parties and their allies in the *Movimiento de Izquierda Democrático Allendista* (MIDA) nor the minuscule parties in the New Left coalition succeeded in raising a major protest vote or making any gains.³³ The Communists clearly failed in their effort to equate the government's economic policies with those of the Pinochet years and were barely able to muster the 5% of votes required by law to remain a registered party.³⁴ All the worries that the PPD-PS nourished regarding the Communist Left thus came to naught and were decisively vanquished.

In sum, in contrast to the situation within the Right, the 1993 election results have turned out to be positive for the CPD, reducing internal tensions and producing a more harmonious relationship among its members. While changes such as a reform of the electoral system and the removal of designated senators still remain a key demand and necessary step in Chile's progress toward democracy, at least the governing coalition is now able to meet the challenges ahead as a unified body.³⁵

THE CONTRIBUTION OF ELITE LEARNING AND CHOICES TO DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION: BEYOND THE 1993 ELECTIONS

THE FACT that Chile has been able to make rapid strides in consolidating its recently regained democracy places it in an enviable position. The normalcy of the 1993 elections and the victory of the governing coalition are both good signs that the country has been able to establish a certain level of democratic stability. However, this stability, while positive in a comparative context, conceals certain tensions and pressures for reform created by the status quo which are crucial to its future. As Chile moves toward the end of the century, the country faces the challenge of how to build on the stability thus

far attained by advancing the reforms so necessary to a fully democratic state. The point to be made is that the compromises that have brought Chile this far down the road will not necessarily ensure the consolidation of democracy in the future. In fact, further progress depends upon the ability to strike a careful balance between demands that sometimes seem quite contradictory: the demands of stability and change.

Resolving this challenge is far from certain, which leaves much room for continued learning and intervention by political elites across the political spectrum. From the standpoint of the Center and the Left, the lessons of their struggle against Pinochet remain as relevant as ever. That is, as the political spectrum regains its old three-thirds format, divided fairly evenly among the Left, the Center, and the Right, it is essential to avoid the polarization that undermined democracy back in 1973. The fate of Chile's democracy at the present time thus remains closely linked with the ability of the *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* (CPD) to remain united, incorporating the agreement between the Center and the Left to subordinate their differences in pursuit of the common democratic goal. In this respect, the 1993 elections reinforced this ability and agreement, for the solid showing of the Left increased its confidence and helped to strengthen the unity of CPD. However, while the election may have strengthened the pro-democratic government coalition, it did nothing to advance the democratic reforms that the Left supports so vigorously.

The big question, then, remains: will the Right agree to break with its past and commit itself to the rules of democracy and if so, when? In this area, the election results offer less cause for optimism. Unfortunately, the December 1993 presidential and congressional elections indicated a further slide in electoral support for the Right (already evident in the municipal elections of June 1992) as a whole, not to mention the loss of ground within the UPC suffered by the *Renovación Nacional*, the more liberal of the two Right-wing parties. The conjunction of these two developments has placed the Right even more on

the defensive and hardened its determination to hang on to its prerogatives and oppose reform. Since the prospects of the Right's winning the presidency appear practically nil for the immediate future, its power depends entirely on its representation in the Congress, a position which is highly dependent upon the biases of the electoral system and the undemocratic practice of designating senators instituted by the Pinochet administration. Any alteration of this system and these practices is therefore highly threatening to the present position of the Right; for this reason, it has consistently resisted proposals to democratize the political system further that have been demanded by the Left.

If the Center and Left have been willing to pay the price for instituting democracy and removing Pinochet from office by acquiescing to certain undemocratic institutional rules, the challenge that lies ahead — how to reform the remaining mechanisms that bar access to power and open the political agenda to the will of the majority — is a question that the center-left parties cannot resolve by themselves. The future of Chilean democracy depends upon extending the lessons of *convivencia* (coexistence), which the Center and the Left were compelled to learn so painfully during their struggle with Pinochet, to the forces of the Right. The Right must learn to trust and commit itself to democratic rules of the game. It must somehow move beyond its current position that stability can only be ensured by maintaining the undemocratic prerogatives devised and implemented under Pinochet. The Right must learn to differentiate between the rule of law and its own particular interests and to defend the rule of law regardless of the outcome. While democracy entails certainty of procedure, its essence is uncertainty as to outcome.

Though the lesson is directed primarily to the Right, the learning process itself is an interactive one. It is equally the task of the government and incumbent upon it to demonstrate to the Right — through words and deeds — that it can live with democracy, even if that should mean the Right (like every other group) may not necessarily prevail. To this end, the CPD

should try to avoid initiatives which the Right could interpret as overly threatening. Raising the defensiveness of the Right would certainly backfire and provoke the Right to act — or react — out of a fear of being trapped. Such a situation would undermine whatever degree of trust that the governing coalition has been trying to build, if not instill, since the late 1980s and would represent an important setback.³⁶ Consequently, this learning process of the Right becomes even more complex than that of the Center-Left, in which the latter agreed to relegate its differences to a secondary plane in order to unite in support of the larger goal of promoting democracy. What is at stake now and central to the consolidation of Chilean democracy is whether the Center and Left forces in the government can persuade the Right to give primacy to its support of democracy, acknowledging the need for reform over and above the various differences incidental to particular groups and parties.

As the *Concertación* begins its second term in office, it faces the key challenge of how to balance the need for employing restraint in its exercise of power so as not to heighten any feeling of exclusion by the Right while simultaneously continuing to push firmly for reforms that will eventually eradicate the last restrictive legacies left from the country's authoritarian era. Though this is difficult, it is not an unrealistic challenge for the Center/Left forces of the CPD, particularly in light of the 1993 election outcome. While the Left has been more anxious to remove legacies hanging over from the Pinochet government than the Center, its good showing at the polls in 1993 should reassure the Leftists of their continued credibility and support and give them some breathing space. With a new lease on life with which to address this challenge, the political elites of the Center/Left now have a better chance of avoiding being pushed into desperate solutions and continuing to practice the politics of responsibility than at any other time since Chile began its re-encounter with democracy.

NOTES

1. The 1989 elections, which resulted in the setting up of a democratic government, were carried out while the Pinochet-led military was still in full control of the state. For an interpretive review of some important books on the Pinochet years, see Munck (1994b); on the 1989 presidential and congressional elections, see Baño (1990); Constable and Valenzuela (1990); and Angell and Pollack (1990).

2. As with Frei, Alessandri also came from a traditional political family: his grandfather, Arturo Alessandri, was twice president in the 1920s, while his uncle, Jorge Alessandri, was president in 1958-64. Both major candidates also attempted the leap to the presidency from posts as senators.

3. On the notion of founding elections, see O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 61-64).

4. On the political dynamic operating in these cases, see O'Donnell (1994).

5. The rate of abstention was 8.71%, while blank and null votes constituted a fairly standard 5.53% of the votes cast (Chile: Ministerio del Interior, 1993:1).

6. I would like to thank Manuel Antonio Garretón for this observation (Garretón, 1993a).

7. The positive economic trends were reflected in one of the rarest occurrences in Latin America's recent experience with democracy, namely that Aylwin would finish his presidential term with the same Minister of Finance, Alejandro Foxley, whom he had appointed upon taking power in 1990. On the reduction of poverty, see Ruiz-Tagle (1993: 642).

8. Orlando Letelier had been Ambassador to the United States and Minister of Defense under Allende; he was killed in 1976 while in exile in Washington, DC. The verdict, handed down on 12 November 1993, entailed a seven-year sentence for Contreras and six years for Colonel Pedro Espinoza, operations chief of the DINA. Both sentences have been appealed.

9. In the coalition's primary (May 1993), Frei defeated Ricardo Lagos of the PPD by a margin of 64% to 36%. After the vote, in an exemplary display of unity, all members of the governing coalition

came together in support of the Frei candidacy. On the other hand, the only realistic electoral alternative, presented by the Right and its candidate Alessandri failed to articulate a clear proposal. The fear factor, which had worked for the Right in 1988 and 1989, had become weaker, since the uncertainty that had originally surrounded the possibility of a shift away from the Pinochet government toward what was then viewed as an opposition coalition had dissipated. This was due, in part, to the performance of the *Concertación* while in office as well as to the fact that the Center/Left coalition had taken up and become identified with many of the issues and positions long monopolized by the Right. Acknowledging this fact, Alessandri tried to distance himself from the past "dictatorship." However, he was unsuccessful in drawing up and delivering a message that offered voters a serious alternative to that of the government's candidate. The other candidate of the Right, José Piñera, had been a key architect of the 1979 Labor Plan and ran as an independent identified with the *pinochetista* Right; for Rightist links to the Pinochet government, see Silva (1992-93).

10. Another case that departs from the larger trend of turning against the party in power is that of Argentina, where the incumbent Peronists easily won the elections for Congress in October 1993, some four years after newly-elected President Menem abandoned his campaign promises and began to implement a radical, market-oriented program. In this case, however, a negative factor — that is, the memory of two bouts of hyperinflation and the fear that it evoked — was probably the major factor behind the vote. Even more importantly, in the case of Argentina as well as in Peru (two cases where there is a realistic chance that the outcome of the presidential elections in 1995 will keep the governing party in power), continuity is linked to the permanence of one leader, Menem and Fujimori, respectively. Because the issue of continuity has become personalized, it has been linked to constitutional reforms (needed to lift the previous ban on presidential reelection to succeed himself in office) which have been pursued in a way that has weakened the legitimacy of institutions. These reforms, already approved in Peru (*via* a plebiscite held in October 1993), are practically certain to be approved in Argentina. In Chile, on the other hand, the constitution was changed, just prior to the 1993 election, to shorten the presidential term of office — from eight years to only six — even when it was practically a foregone conclusion that Frei was the probable winner. Even if one argued that this change was motivated by nothing more than the desire of the PDC leadership to speed up the rotation of elites, it indicates that continuity is more a function of institutions than of strong leaders, as is the case in Argentina and Peru.

In the latter situations, the personalization of power is bound to give continuity a different meaning than it has in Chile, at least from the perspective of democratic stability. The case of Mexico raises a different set of issues due to the inherently undemocratic nature of that electoral process.

11. Deputies are elected for four-year terms, while Senators are elected for eight years. As a one-time exception, however, 18 Senators were elected for terms of only four years in the 1989 election.

12. [This note refers to Table 2.] A short note is called for regarding the acronyms used in this table. In 1993, the *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* consisted of the Christian Democrats (PDC), the Socialists (PS), the *Partido por la Democracia* (PPD), the centrist Radicals (*Partido Radical* or PR) and Social Democrats (*Social Democracia* or SD), and the Left-wing *Partido Democrático de Izquierda* (PDI).

In 1993, there were two Left-wing coalitions: the *Movimiento de Izquierda Democrático Allendista* (MIDA) and the *Nueva Izquierda* (or New Left). The MIDA took in the Communists (*Partido Comunista* or PC), the *Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario* (MAPU), and Independents. The two seats that had been assigned to the MIDA in 1989 have been won by the *Unidad para la Democracia* (UD), an electoral alliance of the Communists, the Christian Left, the Almeyda Socialists (registered under the label of *Partido Amplio de Izquierda Socialista* or PAIS), and other smaller groups. The second coalition of the Left — the *Nueva Izquierda* — was made up of the *Partido Alianza Humanista-Verde* (AH-V, an alliance of Humanists with the Greens), Independents, and the *Movimiento Ecologista* (ME).

In 1993, the Right also formed a coalition, called the *Unión por el Progreso de Chile* (UPC), which consisted of *Renovación Nacional* (RN), the *Unión Democrática Independiente* (UDI), Independents, and a number of smaller parties: the *Unión de Centro Centro* (UCC), the *Partido Nacional* (PN), and the *Partido del Sur*. In 1989, the UDI and RN had formed a coalition called *Democracia y Progreso*. Given their conservative origins, the designated senators are lumped together as allies of the Right-wing parties.

13. The electoral system approved under Pinochet also reinforces the hold of the conservatives on power through a territorial bias, whereby a proportionally greater number of seats are contested in rural areas where the conservative vote is relatively stronger. While a territorial bias is something quite common in upper chambers, Chile's law applies also to lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, as well. As described by Constable and Valenzuela: "The 20 smallest

[and rural] districts, with a population of 1.5 million, elect 40 deputies, while the 7 largest, with a comparable population, can choose only 14" (Constable and Valenzuela, 1989-90: 176).

14. [This note goes with Table 3.] Chilean electoral data are hard to analyze because the logic behind Chile's electoral laws is to discourage parties from running candidates in all races. These figures therefore do not fully and accurately represent the electoral strength of each party. The percentage of total votes attributed to each party is given by simply adding up all votes received by a given party, which is then divided by the total number of votes cast. In the more fine-tuned analysis of the intra-coalitional relationship of forces presented below, the vote count is more accurate. The figures in this table are useful, however, for the purpose of assessing the strength of the two main electoral blocs, given that these two blocs presented two candidates in all 60 races.

15. The two key assumptions on which the framers of Chile's electoral system operated were that the Right would retain slightly over a third of the votes and that forces of the Center and the Left would be unable to unite sufficiently so as to form a bloc. As the vote for the Right declines to close to one-third of the electorate, as has been the case over the last few years, the electoral strategy of the Leftist forces that operate outside the government coalition has gained in significance. By deciding either to join forces with the government coalition or to forego running its own candidates, the (primarily Communist) Left could make it harder for the Right to take advantage of the electoral system. This element is what makes this strategy more of an immediately contingent factor in contrast to the electoral laws themselves, which can be changed only if the government forces gain two-thirds of the seats in both houses of the Congress or are able to convince a sufficient number of conservative senators and deputies to vote for the reforms.

16. These hypothetical results would have given the government coalition a 79 to 41 majority in the lower house, though it would still remain in the minority in the Senate (calculations based on data from Chile, Ministerio del Interior, 1993).

17. According to the Constitution, Pinochet, as president, was entitled to name two senators; while three were to be appointed by the Supreme Court and four by the National Security Council. Each of these nine senators would serve an eight-year term of office.

18. Short of a constitutional reform, time will erode some of the bias introduced by the designated senators. In 1997, the eight designated senators who now hold seats will come to the end of their

terms and Eduardo Frei, as president, will be entitled to name two new senators. Given the makeup of the other two bodies with the power to appoint senators, the Supreme Court and National Security Council, it is probable that their appointees will reflect conservative inclinations. But the four-seat shift that would come from the presidential choices does open up the realistic possibility that government parties might finally gain a majority in the Senate.

19. For a full account of the institutional legacies inherited from the Pinochet period and how these affected the interaction between the government and the opposition during the early days of the Aylwin administration, see Samuel Valenzuela (1992), Loveman (1991), and Rabkin (1992-93). On the general debate over the impact of features of the preceding type of authoritarian regime and the mode of transition on the process and dilemmas of democratic consolidation, see Munck (1994a: 363-65, 368-72), and Schmitter (1994).

20. The need to seek support among the right-wing parties is indicated by the number of seats the government parties control and by the fairly large majorities that are required in order to institute the needed reforms. To change the Constitution, a two-thirds majority — that is, of 80 deputies and 31 senators — is required. To change what are called “organic laws,” a 4/7ths majority (i.e., 69 deputies and 26 senators) is required. The difficulties faced by the government are evident in the fact that only three constitutional reforms were passed during the Aylwin administration: (1) giving the president the power to grant amnesty to criminals convicted of terrorist actions; (2) the regional and municipal reform which permitted direct elections for municipal posts and created new regional governments; and (3) the decision to reduce the presidential term from 8 years to 6 years, with no immediate reelection.

21. Manuel A. Garretón (1993: 31-35) argues that one mistake made by the Aylwin administration was that it never formulated an overall strategy to carry out the necessary political reforms so that by the time the government did introduce its package of reforms in the Congress (June 1992), the window of opportunity that had opened in 1989 had already closed. The Aylwin package of reforms sought to reestablish democratic control over the armed forces, eliminate the designated (e.g., non-elected) senators, relax control of the military over the National Security Council, and make the electoral system more proportional. For more information on reforms to the Constitution proposed in June 1992, see Walker (1992).

22. This ratio of 4-to-3 is based upon the RN's getting 16.23% of all the valid votes for deputies compared to the corresponding figure

for the UDI of 12.11%. Taking the 16 (out of 60) races for deputy in which the RN and UDI ran head to head, the RN gained 24.40% of all valid votes compared to just 19% going to UDI candidates. These relatively high figures, evidence of the Right's uneven strength at the national level, mean that the relative strength of the UDI goes up from 74.6% of the RN votes (based on national returns) to 77.87% of the RN votes. In the Senate races, both parties went head to head in only two out of nine races. Here, the RN gained 23.97% of valid votes to the UDI's 11.65%. That is to say, the electoral power of the UDI declines to just 48.6% of the RN's votes. Because this ratio is based on only two races, the trend that emerges from the races for deputy seats is more reliable (these figures are calculated from data of Chile, Ministerio del Interior, 1993).

23. RN's 16.23% of votes for deputies allowed it to win 24.2% of all seats, while the UDI's 12.11% of votes translated into a gain of 12.5% of all seats. Indeed, the RN is the biggest beneficiary of the electoral system, while the UDI reaps no particular benefit (see Table 3).

24. Totals do not necessarily add up to 100% due to the votes received by Independent candidates.

25. If, at that moment, a more open competition were to develop between the Center and the Left, it would not threaten democracy as it would at the present. On the learning experience of political elites under authoritarianism in Chile, see Garretón (1989).

26. Chile thus joins the trend toward strong showings by the Left in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet bloc and following severe programs for economic adjustment. This trend began with the recent elections in Greece, Poland, Italy, Venezuela, Hungary, and El Salvador and is likely to continue in 1994 with the elections in Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay.

27. It is hard to figure out the 1989 vote for the PPD-PS due to the complex evolution of both parties. Following a split that took place in the PS in 1979, two wings emerged: the more orthodox PS-Almeyda and the moderate PS-Nuñez. In October 1987, for the purpose of registering Socialists for the 1989 plebiscite, the Nuñez Socialists formed the PPD; the Almeyda Socialists, on their part, joined the Communists, the Christian Left and other smaller groups in an electoral alliance named the *Unidad para la Democracia* (UD). Finally, after the 1989 election, the PS unified, but the PPD continued to exist. The PDI is a third, but minor, partner in the Left sub-pact within the CPD.

28. The PDC gained 11.2% more votes than the PPD-PS in the 1992 municipal elections and only 33% more in the 1993 election for

deputies. Thus, the PPD-PS's share of the vote went from 61.2% of the PDC vote to 87.87%.

29. The difference was not all that great. The PDC did not run in 12 out of the total of 60 districts, while the PPD-PS did not run in seven districts. In sum, the PPD-PS fielded only five fewer candidates than the PDC (see Table 3).

30. These figures are calculated on the basis of the data from Chile, Ministerio del Interior (1993).

31. In terms of number of votes, the PDC needed 48,732 votes for each seat, compared to 53,341 for the PS and 52,312 for the PPD. In terms of percentages, the PDC gained 30.8% of the seats with 27.12% of the votes, while the PS gained 12.5% of the seats with 12.03% of votes, and the PPD also gained 12.5% of seats with 11.8% of votes (see Table 3). Because the PDC gained 31.66% of seats with only 26.14% of the votes in 1989, the PDC derived fewer benefits from the electoral law in 1993 (Garretón, 1993: 22).

32. Timothy Scully argues that the Christian Democrats (PDC) underwent a process of secularization, or de-ideologization, as a result of its experience under authoritarian rule and has turned away from its previous hegemonic aspirations by giving greater emphasis to coalition building. In Scully's terms (1992: 199-201), the PDC has become more of a "positional" type of Center party, as opposed to the "programmatic" party it was between the late 1950s and early 1970s. Other authors, such as Baño (1992: 147-48) and Garretón (1993: 20), argue that the danger of a resurgence of the PDC's hegemonic aspirations, embodied in the idea of the *camino propio*, was quite real in mid-1985/86 and again after Aylwin assumed power in 1990.

33. MIDA's vote of 6.5% in the 1993 election for deputies practically replicates the 6.6% it pulled in the 1992 municipal election, but it should be considered alongside its poor performance in the presidential race (in which its candidate, Eugenio Pizarro, received only 4.7% of the votes) and the fact that it loses the two deputies it had going into the 1993 elections.

34. While the PC just made the requisite 5% in the election for deputies, others were less fortunate: the MAPU, *Partido Alianza Humanista-Verde*, and the *Movimiento Ecologista* on the Left; *Social Democracia* and the *Partido Radical* in the Center; and the *Partido Nacional*, *Partido del Sur*, *Unión de Centro Centro* on the Right.

35. To these reforms one can add the need to reform the presidential system, given the obstacles it raises to coalition building.

As indicated, the winner-take-all logic of presidentialism leads to the expectation that the PDC will lock its Leftist partners out of the country's main political prize. For now, this tension is resolved by a very parliamentary distribution of cabinet posts and the president's stress on coalition building. Though the formal pact that binds members of the government coalition does not call for a distribution of cabinet posts according to a formula of quotas, in practice the distribution of posts does respect, in general terms, the relative strength of the individual parties. In 1990, the Christian Democrats held 10 (of 20) cabinet posts, with the PPD-PS holding six, and minor parties the remaining four. In 1994, the Christian Democrats received 12 (of 21) Cabinet posts, while the PPD-PS got seven, and minor parties the remaining two. However, in the long run, as Arturo Valenzuela argues, the stability of the democratic system rests on the reforms of the "exaggerated presidentialism that the country inherited from the military regime" (A.Valenzuela, 1993: 11). Given the veto power of the Right in the Congress, however, it may be inadvisable to shift power to a legislature that still has a significant undemocratic component at the current time. Indeed, the reforms affecting executive/legislative relations would be best treated along with those that pertain to the electoral system.

36. If the rise of conservative parties "preaching reliance on the automatic mechanisms of the market" has made "the 'voiding' of democracy rather than its breakdown" a more realistic option within Latin America, as Marcelo Cavarozzi (1992: 124) puts it, impatience with a democratic system seen as lacking substance could lead to no democracy at all. This way of posing the dilemmas in consolidating democracy is developed by O'Donnell in terms of the counterposition of the dangers of an authoritarian regression by "sudden death," that is, by a classic military *coup* or by the "slow death" provoked by a progressive restriction of civil power (O'Donnell, 1992: 19).

ACRONYMS

- AH-V Partido Alianza Humanista-Verde (Humanist and Green Party Alliance)
- CPD Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (Coalition of Democratic Parties)
- MAPU Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario (Popular Unitary Action Movement)
- ME Movimiento Ecologista (Ecological Movement)
- MIDA Movimiento de Izquierda Democrático Allendista (Democratic Left Allende Movement)
- PC Partido Comunista (Communist Party)
- PDC Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party)
- PDI Partido Democrático de Izquierda (Democratic Left Party)
- PN Partido Nacional (National Party)
- PPD Partido por la Democracia (Party for Democracy)
- PR Partido Radical (Radical Party)
- PS Partido Socialista (Socialist Party)
- RN Renovación Nacional (National Renovation)
- SD Social Democracia (Social Democracy)
- UCC Unión de Centro Centro (Center Center Union)
- UD Unión Democrática Independiente (Independent Democratic Union)

REFERENCES

- ANGELL, A. and B. POLLACK (1990) "The Chilean Elections of 1989 and the Politics of the Transition to Democracy." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 9, 1: 1-23.
- BAÑO, R. (1990) "Chile: tendencias políticas y resultados electorales después de veinte años." *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* LII, 4: 69-82.
- BAÑO, R. and M. CANALES (1992) "De la dictadura a la democracia," pp. 97-185 in Patricio Meller *et al.* *Chile: evolución macroeconómica, financiación externa y cambio político en la década de los 80.* Madrid, Spain: Fundación CEDEAL.
- CAVAROZZI, M. (1992) "The Left in Latin America: The Decline of Socialism and the Rise of Political Democracy," pp. 101-127 in Jonathan Hartlyn, Lars Shoultz and Augusto Varas (eds.) *The United States and Latin America in the 1990s.* Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Chile. Ministerio del Interior (1993) *Informativo Elecciones 1993* (Cómputo N° 4). Santiago de Chile: Ministerio del Interior.
- CONSTABLE, P. and A. VALENZUELA (1990) "Democracy Restored." *Journal of Democracy* 1, 2 (Spring): 3-12.
- _____ (1989-90) "Chile's Return to Democracy." *Foreign Affairs* 68, 5 (Winter): 169-86.
- GARRETON, M. (1993a) Author interview with Manuel Antonio Garretón, Santiago de Chile, December.
- _____ (1993b) "La redemocratización política en Chile: Transición, inauguración y evolución" (mimeo). Paper presented at a conference of the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), July.
- _____ (1989) "La oposición partidaria en el régimen militar chileno: un proceso de aprendizaje para la transición," pp. 395-465 in Marcelo Cavarozzi and Manuel A. Garretón (eds.) *Muerte y resurrección: Los partidos políticos en el autoritarismo y las transiciones en el Cono Sur.* Santiago de Chile: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO).

- LINZ, J. (1994) "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?" pp. 3-87 in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (eds.) *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives* (Vol. 1). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- LOVEMAN, B. (1991) "¿Misión Cumplida? Civil Military Relations and the Chilean Political Transition." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 33, 3 (Fall): 35-74.
- MUNCK, G. (1994a) "Democratic Transitions in Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Politics* 26, 3 (April): 355-75.
- _____ (1994b) "Authoritarianism, Modernization, and Democracy in Chile." *Latin American Research Review* 29, 2: 188-211.
- National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (Rettig Commission) (1993) *Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation* (2 Vols). South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- O'DONNELL, G. (1992) "Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes," pp. 17-56 in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds.) *Issues and Prospects of Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- _____ (1994) "Delegative Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 5, 1 (January): 55-69.
- O'DONNELL, G. and P. SCHMITTER (1986) *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- PORTANTIERO, J. (1993) "Revisando el camino: las apuestas de la democracia en Sudamérica." *Sociedad* (Buenos Aires) 2 (May): 17-34.
- RABKIN, R. (1992-93) "The Aylwin Government and Tutelary Democracy: A Concept in Search of a Case?" *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 34, 4 (Winter): 119-94.
- RUIZ-TAGLE, J. (1993) "Tareas pendientes: reducción de la pobreza y distribución de los ingresos en Chile." *Mensaje* (Santiago) 425 (December): 640-43.

- SCHMITTER, P. (1994) "Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 5, 2 (April): 57-74.
- SCULLY, T. (1992) *Rethinking the Center: Party Politics in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Chile*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- SCULLY, T. and J.S. VALENZUELA (1993) "From Democracy to Democracy: Continuities and Changes of Electoral Choices and the Party System in Chile" (Working Paper 199). Notre Dame, IN: The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame.
- SILVA, E. (1992-93) "Capitalist Regime Loyalties and Redemocratization in Chile." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 34, 4 (Winter): 77-117.
- VALENZUELA, A. (1993) "Latin America: Presidentialism in Crisis." *Journal of Democracy* 4, 4 (October): 3-16.
- VALENZUELA, S. (1992) "Democratic Consolidation in Post- Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions," pp. 57-104 in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds.) *Issues and Prospects of Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- WALKER, I. (1992) "La Reforma Constitucional." *Mensaje* (Santiago) 410 (July): 213-15.