Abstract

The Internet protocol suite, TCP/IP, was first proposed fifteen years ago. It was developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and has been used widely in military and commercial systems. While there have been papers and specifications that describe how the protocols work, it is sometimes difficult to deduce from these why the protocol is as it is. For example, the Internet protocol is based on a connectionless or datagram mode of service. The motivation for this has been greatly misunderstood. This paper attempts to capture some of the early reasoning which shaped the Internet protocols.

Introduction

For the last 15 years [1], the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense has been developing a suite of protocols for packet switched networking. These protocols, which include the Internet Protocol (IP), and the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), are now U.S. Department of Defense standards for internetworking, and are in wide use in the commercial networking environment. The ideas developed in this effort have also influenced other protocol suites, most importantly the connectionless configuration of the ISO protocols [2,3,4].

While specific information on the DOD protocols is fairly generally available [5,6,7], it is sometimes difficult to determine the motivation and reasoning which led to the design.

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1 Original work was supported in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under Contract No. N00014-83-K-0125. The 2013 revision was supported by NSF under award number 1219557.
In fact, the design philosophy has evolved considerably from the first proposal to the current standards. For example, the idea of the datagram, or connectionless service, does not receive particular emphasis in the first paper, but has come to be the defining characteristic of the protocol. Another example is the layering of the architecture into the IP and TCP layers. This seems basic to the design, but was also not a part of the original proposal. These changes in the Internet design arose through the repeated pattern of implementation and testing that occurred before the standards were set.

The Internet architecture is still evolving. Sometimes a new extension challenges one of the design principles, but in any case an understanding of the history of the design provides a necessary context for current design extensions. The connectionless configuration of ISO protocols has also been colored by the history of the Internet suite, so an understanding of the Internet design philosophy may be helpful to those working with ISO.

This paper catalogs one view of the original objectives of the Internet architecture, and discusses the relation between these goals and the important features of the protocols.

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**This paper makes a distinction between the architecture of the Internet and a specific realization of a running network. Today, as discussed below, I would distinguish three ideas:***

1. **The core principles and basic design decisions of the architecture.**
2. **The second level of mechanism design that fleshes out the architecture and makes it into a complete implementation.**
3. **The set of decisions related to deployment (e.g. the degree of diversity in paths) that lead to an operational network.**

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**Fundamental Goal**

The top level goal for the DARPA Internet Architecture was to develop an effective technique for multiplexed utilization of existing interconnected networks. Some elaboration is appropriate to make clear the meaning of that goal.

The components of the Internet were networks, which were to be interconnected to provide some larger service. The original goal was to connect together the original ARPANET[8] with the ARPA packet radio network[9,10], in order to give users on the packet radio network access to the large service machines on the ARPANET. At

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2 I am indebted to John Wroclawski, both for the suggestion that led to this revision, and for the insight that there are three concepts to be distinguished, not two.
the time it was assumed that there would be other sorts of networks to interconnect, although the local area network had not yet emerged.

This paragraph hints at but does not state clearly that the Internet builds on and extends the fundamental goal of the ARPANET, which was to provide useful interconnection among heterogeneous machines. Perhaps even by 1988 this point was so well-understood that it did not seem to require stating.

There is also an implicit assumption that the end-points of network connections were machines. This assumption seemed obvious at the time, but is now being questioned, with architectural proposals that “addresses” refer to services or information objects.

An alternative to interconnecting existing networks would have been to design a unified system which incorporated a variety of different transmission media, a multi-media network.

Perhaps “multi-media” was not well-defined in 1988. It now has a different meaning, of course.

While this might have permitted a higher degree of integration, and thus better performance, it was felt that it was necessary to incorporate the then existing network architectures if Internet was to be useful in a practical sense. Further, networks represent administrative boundaries of control, and it was an ambition of this project to come to grips with the problem of integrating a number of separately administrated entities into a common utility.

This last is actually a goal, and probably should have been listed as such, although it could be seen as an aspect of goal 4, below.

The technique selected for multiplexing was packet switching.

Effective multiplexing of expensive resources (e.g. links) is another high-level goal that is not in the explicit list but very important and well-understood at the time.

An alternative such as circuit switching could have been considered, but the applications being supported, such as remote login, were naturally served by the packet switching paradigm, and the networks which were to be integrated together in this project were packet switching networks. So packet switching was accepted as a fundamental component of the Internet architecture. The final aspect of this
fundamental goal was the assumption of the particular technique for interconnecting these networks. Since the technique of store and forward packet switching, as demonstrated in the previous DARPA project, the ARPANET, was well understood, the top level assumption was that networks would be interconnected by a layer of Internet packet switches, which were called gateways.

From these assumptions comes the fundamental structure of the Internet: a packet switched communications facility in which a number of distinguishable networks are connected together using packet communications processors called gateways which implement a store and forward packet forwarding algorithm.

In retrospect, this previous section could have been clearer. It discussed both goals and basic architectural responses to these goals without teasing these ideas apart. Gateways are not a goal, but a design response to a goal.

We could have taken a different approach to internetworking, for example providing interoperation at a higher level—perhaps at the transport protocol layer, or a higher service/naming layer. It would be an interesting exercise to look at such a proposal and evaluate it relative to these criteria.

Second Level Goals
The top level goal stated in the previous section contains the word "effective," without offering any definition of what an effective interconnection must achieve. The following list summarizes a more detailed set of goals which were established for the Internet architecture.

1. Internet communication must continue despite loss of networks or gateways.
2. The Internet must support multiple types of communications service.
3. The Internet architecture must accommodate a variety of networks.
4. The Internet architecture must permit distributed management of its resources.
5. The Internet architecture must be cost effective.
6. The Internet architecture must permit host attachment with a low level of effort.
7. The resources used in the Internet architecture must be accountable.

This set of goals might seem to be nothing more than a checklist of all the desirable network features. It is important to understand that these goals are in order of importance, and an entirely different network architecture would result if the order were changed. For example, since this network was designed to operate in a military context, which implied the possibility of a hostile environment, survivability was put as a first goal, and accountability as a last goal. During wartime, one is less concerned with detailed accounting of resources used than with mustering whatever resources are available and rapidly deploying them in an operational
manner. While the architects of the Internet were mindful of accountability, the problem received very little attention during the early stages of the design, and is only now being considered. An architecture primarily for commercial deployment would clearly place these goals at the opposite end of the list.

Similarly, the goal that the architecture be cost effective is clearly on the list, but below certain other goals, such as distributed management, or support of a wide variety of networks. Other protocol suites, including some of the more popular commercial architectures, have been optimized to a particular kind of network, for example a long haul store and forward network built of medium speed telephone lines, and deliver a very cost effective solution in this context, in exchange for dealing somewhat poorly with other kinds of nets, such as local area nets.

The reader should consider carefully the above list of goals, and recognize that this is not a "motherhood" list, but a set of priorities which strongly colored the design decisions within the Internet architecture. The following sections discuss the relationship between this list and the features of the Internet.

At the beginning of the NSF Future Internet Design (FIND) project, around 2008, I proposed a list of requirements that a new architecture might take into account. Here are these two lists to compare:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1988</th>
<th>2008</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Internet communication must continue despite loss of networks or gateways.</td>
<td>1. Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Internet must support multiple types of communications service.</td>
<td>2. Availability and resilience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Internet architecture must accommodate a variety of networks.</td>
<td>3. Economic viability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Internet architecture must permit distributed management of its resources.</td>
<td>4. Better management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Internet architecture must be cost effective.</td>
<td>5. Meet society’s needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The Internet architecture must permit host attachment with a low level of effort.</td>
<td>6. Longevity</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. The resources used in the Internet architecture must be accountable.</td>
<td>7. Support for tomorrow’s computing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8. Exploit tomorrow’s networking</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9. Support tomorrow’s applications</td>
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<td></td>
<td>10. Fit for purpose (it works...)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The list from 1988 does not mention the word “security”. The first 1988 requirement, that the network continue operation despite loss of networks or gateways, could be seen as a specific sub-case of security, but the text in the next section of the original paper (see below) does not even hint that the failures might be due to malicious actions. In retrospect, it is difficult to reconstruct what our mind-set was when this paper was written (which is in the years immediately prior to 1988). By the early 1990s, security was an important if unresolved objective. It seems somewhat odd that the word did not even come up in this paper.

The modern list calls out availability and resilience as distinct from the general category of “security”, a distinction that was motivated by my sense that this set of goals in particular were important enough that they should not be buried inside the broader category. So there is some correspondence between goal 1 in the 1988 list and 2 in the 2008 list.

The 2008 list has economic viability as its third objective. As I noted above, the 1988 paper discussed “the problem of integrating a number of separately administrated entities into a common utility”, which seems like a specific manifestation of the recognition that the net is built out of parts. But the focus on economic viability seems to have been poorly understood, if at all.

Survivability in the Face of Failure

The most important goal on the list is that the Internet should continue to supply communications service, even though networks and gateways are failing. In particular, this goal was interpreted to mean that if two entities are communicating over the Internet and some failure causes the Internet to be temporarily disrupted and reconfigured to reconstitute the service, then the entities communicating should be able to continue without having to reestablish or reset the high level state of their conversation. More concretely, at the service interface of the transport layer, this architecture provides no facility to communicate to the client of the transport service that the synchronization between the sender and the receiver may have been lost. It was an assumption in this architecture that synchronization would never be lost unless there was no physical path over which any sort of communication could be achieved. In other words, at the top of transport, there is only one failure, and it is total partition. The architecture was to mask completely any transient failure.

This last sentence seems, in retrospect, a bit unrealistic, or perhaps poorly put. The “architecture” does not mask transient failures at all. That is not
the goal, and it seems like an unrealizable one. The rest of the paragraph makes the actual point—if transient failures do occur, the application may be disrupted for the duration of the failure, but once the network has been reconstituted, the application (or, specifically, TCP) can take up where it left off. The rest of the section discusses the architectural approach to make this possible.

Again in retrospect, it would seem that an important sub-goal would be that transients are healed as quickly as possible, but I don’t think there was any understanding then, and perhaps not now, of an architectural element that could facilitate that sub-goal. So it is just left to the second-level mechanisms.

To achieve this goal, the state information which describes the on-going conversation must be protected. Specific examples of state information would be the number of packets transmitted, the number of packets acknowledged, or the number of outstanding flow control permissions. If the lower layers of the architecture lose this information, they will not be able to tell if data has been lost, and the application layer will have to cope with the loss of synchrony. This architecture insisted that this disruption not occur, which meant that the state information must be protected from loss.

In some network architectures, this state is stored in the intermediate packet switching nodes of the network. In this case, to protect the information from loss, it must replicated. Because of the distributed nature of the replication, algorithms to ensure robust replication are themselves difficult to build, and few networks with distributed state information provide any sort of protection against failure. The alternative, which this architecture chose, is to take this information and gather it at the endpoint of the net, at the entity which is utilizing the service of the network. I call this approach to reliability "fate-sharing." The fate-sharing model suggests that it is acceptable to lose the state information associated with an entity if, at the same time, the entity itself is lost. Specifically, information about transport level synchronization is stored in the host which is attached to the net and using its communication service.

There are two important advantages to fate-sharing over replication. First, fate-sharing protects against any number of intermediate failures, whereas replication can only protect against a certain number (less than the number of replicated copies). Second, fate-sharing is much easier to engineer than replication.

There are two consequences to the fate-sharing approach to survivability. First, the intermediate packet switching nodes, or gateways, must not have any essential state information about on-going connections. Instead, they are stateless packet switches, a class of network design sometimes called a "datagram" network. Secondly, rather more trust is placed in the host machine than in an architecture where the network ensures the reliable delivery of data. If the host resident algorithms that ensure the
sequencing and acknowledgment of data fail, applications on that machine are prevented from operation.

Despite the fact that survivability is the first goal in the list, it is still second to the top level goal of interconnection of existing networks. A more survivable technology might have resulted from a single multimedia network design. For example, the Internet makes very weak assumptions about the ability of a network to report that it has failed. Internet is thus forced to detect network failures using Internet level mechanisms, with the potential for a slower and less specific error detection.

See the discussion below about where failures should be detected.

Types of Service
The second goal of the Internet architecture is that it should support, at the transport service level, a variety of types of service. Different types of service are distinguished by differing requirements for such things as speed, latency and reliability. The traditional type of service is the bidirectional reliable delivery of data. This service, which is sometimes called a "virtual circuit" service, is appropriate for such applications as remote login or file transfer. It was the first service provided in the Internet architecture, using the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)[11]. It was early recognized that even this service had multiple variants, because remote login required a service with low delay in delivery, but low requirements for bandwidth, while file transfer was less concerned with delay, but very concerned with high throughput. TCP attempted to provide both these types of service.

The initial concept of TCP was that it could be general enough to support any needed type of service. However, as the full range of needed services became clear, it seemed too difficult to build support for all of them into one protocol.

The first example of a service outside the range of TCP was support for XNET[12], the cross-Internet debugger. TCP did not seem a suitable transport for XNET for several reasons. First, a debugger protocol should not be reliable. This conclusion may seem odd, but under conditions of stress or failure (which may be exactly when a debugger is needed) asking for reliable communications may prevent any communications at all. It is much better to build a service which can deal with whatever gets through, rather than insisting that every byte sent be delivered in order. Second, if TCP is general enough to deal with a broad range of clients, it is presumably somewhat complex. Again, it seemed wrong to expect support for this complexity in a debugging environment, which may lack even basic services expected in an operating system (e.g. support for timers.) So XNET was designed to run directly on top of the datagram service provided by Internet.
Another service which did not fit TCP was real time delivery of digitized speech, which was needed to support the teleconferencing aspect of command and control applications. In real time digital speech, the primary requirement is not a reliable service, but a service which minimizes and smooths the delay in the delivery of packets. The application layer is digitizing the analog speech, packetizing the resulting bits, and sending them out across the network on a regular basis. They must arrive at the receiver at a regular basis in order to be converted back to the analog signal. If packets do not arrive when expected, it is impossible to reassemble the signal in real time. A surprising observation about the control of variation in delay is that the most serious source of delay in networks is the mechanism to provide reliable delivery. A typical reliable transport protocol responds to a missing packet by requesting a retransmission and delaying the delivery of any subsequent packets until the lost packet has been retransmitted. It then delivers that packet and all remaining ones in sequence. The delay while this occurs can be many times the round trip delivery time of the net, and may completely disrupt the speech reassembly algorithm. In contrast, it is very easy to cope with an occasional missing packet. The missing speech can simply be replaced by a short period of silence, which in most cases does not impair the intelligibility of the speech to the listening human. If it does, high level error correction can occur, and the listener can ask the speaker to repeat the damaged phrase.

It was thus decided, fairly early in the development of the Internet architecture, that more than one transport service would be required, and the architecture must be prepared to tolerate simultaneously transports which wish to constrain reliability, delay, or bandwidth, at a minimum.

This goal caused TCP and IP, which originally had been a single protocol in the architecture, to be separated into two layers. TCP provided one particular type of service, the reliable sequenced data stream, while IP attempted to provide a basic building block out of which a variety of types of service could be built. This building block was the datagram, which had also been adopted to support survivability. Since the reliability associated with the delivery of a datagram was not guaranteed, but "best effort," it was possible to build out of the datagram a service that was reliable (by acknowledging and retransmitting at a higher level), or a service which traded reliability for the primitive delay characteristics of the underlying network substrate. The User Datagram Protocol (UDP)[13] was created to provide a application-level interface to the basic datagram service of Internet.

The architecture did not wish to assume that the underlying networks themselves support multiple types of services, because this would violate the goal of using existing networks. Instead, the hope was that multiple types of service could be constructed out of the basic datagram building block using algorithms within the host and the gateway. For example, (although this is not done in most current implementations) it is possible to take datagrams which are associated with a controlled delay but unreliable service and place them at the head of the transmission queues unless their lifetime has expired, in which case they would be
discarded; while packets associated with reliable streams would be placed at the back of the queues, but never discarded, no matter how long they had been in the net.

This section of the paper may reflect my own, long-standing preference for QoS in the network. However, the discussion is about a much more basic set of service types, and an architectural decision (splitting IP and TCP), which gives the end-node and application some control over the type of service. There is no mention in this paper of the ToS bits in the IP header, which were the first attempt to add a core feature that would facilitate any sort of QoS in the network. Discussions about QoS at the IETF did not start for another several years later. But this section does suggest that the idea of queue management as a means to improve application behavior was understood even in the 1980s, and the ToS bits (or something like them) would be needed to drive that sort of scheduling. I think, looking back, that we really did not understand this set of issues, even in 1988.

It proved more difficult than first hoped to provide multiple types of service without explicit support from the underlying networks. The most serious problem was that networks designed with one particular type of service in mind were not flexible enough to support other services. Most commonly, a network will have been designed under the assumption that it should deliver reliable service, and will inject delays as a part of producing reliable service, whether or not this reliability is desired. The interface behavior defined by X.25, for example, implies reliable delivery, and there is no way to turn this feature off. Therefore, although Internet operates successfully over X.25 networks it cannot deliver the desired variability of type service in that context. Other networks which have an intrinsic datagram service are much more flexible in the type of service they will permit. but these networks are much less common, especially in the long-haul context.

Even though this paper comes about five years after the articulation of the end-to-end arguments, there is no mention of that paper or its concepts here. Perhaps this was due to the fact that this paper was a retrospective of the early thinking, which predated the emergence of end-to-end as a named concept. The concept is lurking in much of what I wrote in this section, but perhaps in 1988 it was not yet clear that the end-to-end description as presented in the 1984 paper would survive as the accepted framing.

Varieties of Networks
It was very important for the success of the Internet architecture that it be able to incorporate and utilize a wide variety of network technologies, including military
and commercial facilities. The Internet architecture has been very successful in meeting this goal: it is operated over a wide variety of networks, including long haul nets (the ARPANET itself and various X.25 networks), local area nets (Ethernet, ringnet, etc.), broadcast satellite nets (the DARPA Atlantic Satellite Network[14,15] operating at 64 kilobits per second and the DARPA Experimental Wideband Satellite Net[16] operating within the United States at 3 megabits per second), packet radio networks (the DARPA packet radio network, as well as an experimental British packet radio net and a network developed by amateur radio operators), a variety of serial links, ranging from 1200 bit per second asynchronous connections to TI links, and a variety of other ad hoc facilities, including intercomputer busses and the transport service provided by the higher layers of other network suites, such as IBM's HASP.

The Internet architecture achieves this flexibility by making a minimum set of assumptions about the function which the net will provide. The basic assumption is that network can transport a packet or datagram. The packet must be of reasonable size, perhaps 100 bytes minimum, and should be delivered with reasonable but not perfect reliability. The network must have some suitable form of addressing if it is more than a point to point link.

There are a number of services which are explicitly not assumed from the network. These include reliable or sequenced delivery, network level broadcast or multicast, priority ranking of transmitted packet, multiple types of service, and internal knowledge of failures, speeds, or delays. If these services had been required, then in order to accommodate a network within the Internet, it would be necessary either that the network support these services directly, or that the network interface software provide enhancements to simulate these services at the endpoint of the network. It was felt that this was an undesirable approach, because these services would have to be re-engineered and reimplemented for every single network and every single host interface to every network. By engineering these services at the transport, for example reliable delivery via TCP, the engineering must be done only once, and the implementation must be done only once for each host. After that, the implementation of interface software for a new network is usually very simple.

**Other Goals**
The three goals discussed so far were those which had the most profound impact on the design on the architecture. The remaining goals, because they were lower in importance, were perhaps less effectively met, or not so completely engineered. The goal of permitting distributed management of the Internet has certainly been met in certain respects. For example, not all of the gateways in the Internet are implemented and managed by the same agency. There are several different management centers within the deployed Internet, each operating a subset of the gateways, and there is a two-tiered routing algorithm which permits gateways from different administrations to exchange routing tables, even though they do not completely trust each other, and a variety of private routing algorithms used among
the gateways in a single administration. Similarly, the various organizations which manage the gateways are not necessarily the same organizations that manage the networks to which the gateways are attached.

Even in 1988 we understood that the issue of trust (e.g. trust among gateways) as an important consideration.

On the other hand, some of the most significant problems with the Internet today relate to lack of sufficient tools for distributed management, especially in the area of routing. In the large Internet being currently operated, routing decisions need to be constrained by policies for resource usage. Today this can be done only in a very limited way, which requires manual setting of tables. This is error-prone and at the same time not sufficiently powerful. The most important change in the Internet architecture over the next few years will probably be the development of a new generation of tools for management of resources in the context of multiple administrations.

It is interesting that the limitations of manual route configuration were understood in 1988, and we are not yet really beyond that stage. It is not clear even now whether our persistent lack of progress in this area is due to poor architectural choices, or just the intrinsic difficulty of the tasks. Certainly, in the 1970s and 1980s we did not know how to think about network management. We understood how to “manage a box”, but we had no accepted view on systems-level management.

It is clear that in certain circumstances, the Internet architecture does not produce as cost effective a utilization of expensive communication resources as a more tailored architecture would. The headers of Internet packets are fairly long (a typical header is 40 bytes), and if short packets are sent, this overhead is apparent. The worse case, of course, is the single character remote login packets, which carry 40 bytes of header and one byte of data. Actually, it is very difficult for any protocol suite to claim that these sorts of interchanges are carried out with reasonable efficiency. At the other extreme, large packets for file transfer, with perhaps 1,000 bytes of data, have an overhead for the header of only four percent.

Another possible source of inefficiency is retransmission of lost packets. Since Internet does not insist that lost packets be recovered at the network level, it may be necessary to retransmit a lost packet from one end of the Internet to the other. This means that the retransmitted packet may cross several intervening nets a second time, whereas recovery at the network level would not generate this repeat traffic. This is an example of the tradeoff resulting from the decision, discussed above, of providing services from the end-points. The network interface code is much simpler, but the overall efficiency is potentially less. However, if the retransmission rate is low enough (for example, 1%) then the incremental cost is tolerable. As a rough rule
of thumb for networks incorporated into the architecture, a loss of one packet in a hundred is quite reasonable, but a loss of one packet in ten suggests that reliability enhancements be added to the network if that type of service is required.

Again, this 1988 paper provides a nice “time capsule” as to what we were worrying about 25 years ago. Now we seem to have accepted the cost of packet headers, and we seem to have accepted the cost of end-to-end retransmission. The paper does not mention efficient link loading as an issue, nor the question of achieving good end-to-end performance.

The cost of attaching a host to the Internet is perhaps somewhat higher than in other architectures, because all of the mechanisms to provide the desired types of service, such as acknowledgments and retransmission strategies, must be implemented in the host rather than in the network. Initially, to programmers who were not familiar with protocol implementation, the effort of doing this seemed somewhat daunting. Implementers tried such things as moving the transport protocols to a front end processor, with the idea that the protocols would be implemented only once, rather than again for every type of host. However, this required the invention of a host to front end protocol which some thought almost as complicated to implement as the original transport protocol. As experience with protocols increases, the anxieties associated with implementing a protocol suite within the host seem to be decreasing, and implementations are now available for a wide variety of machines, including personal computers and other machines with very limited computing resources.

A related problem arising from the use of host-resident mechanisms is that poor implementation of the mechanism may hurt the network as well as the host. This problem was tolerated, because the initial experiments involved a limited number of host implementations which could be controlled. However, as the use of Internet has grown, this problem has occasionally surfaced in a serious way. In this respect, the goal of robustness, which led to the method of fate-sharing, which led to host-resident algorithms, contributes to a loss of robustness if the host misbehaves.

This paragraph brings out a contradiction in the architectural principles that might have been made more clearly. The principle of minimal state in routers and movement of function to the end-points implies a need to trust those nodes to operate correctly, but the architecture does not have any approach to dealing with hosts that mis-behave. Without state in the network to validate what the hosts are doing, it seems that there are few ways to discipline a host. In 1988, the problem was anticipated but we clearly had no view as to how to think about it.

The last goal was accountability. In fact, accounting was discussed in the first paper by Cerf and Kahn as an important function of the protocols and gateways. However,
at the present time, the Internet architecture contains few tools for accounting for packet flows. This problem is only now being studied, as the scope of the architecture is being expanded to include non-military consumers who are seriously concerned with understanding and monitoring the usage of the resources within the Internet.

Again, a deeper discussion here might have brought out some contradictions among goals—without any flow state in the network (or knowledge of what constitutes an “accountable entity”) it seems hard to do accounting. The architecture does not preclude what we now call “middle-boxes”, but the architecture also does not discuss the idea that there might be information in the packets to aid in accounting. I think in 1988 we just did not know how to think about this.

Architecture and Implementation
The previous discussion clearly suggests that one of the goals of the Internet architecture was to provide wide flexibility in the service offered. Different transport protocols could be used to provide different types of service, and different networks could be incorporated. Put another way, the architecture tried very hard not to constrain the range of service which the Internet could be engineered to provide. This, in turn, means that to understand the service which can be offered by a particular implementation of an Internet, one must look not to the architecture, but to the actual engineering of the software within the particular hosts and gateways, and to the particular networks which have been incorporated. I will use the term "realization" to describe a particular set of networks, gateways and hosts which have been connected together in the context of the Internet architecture. Realizations can differ by orders of magnitude in the service which they offer. Realizations have been built out of 1200 bit per second phone lines, and out of networks only with speeds greater than 1 megabit per second. Clearly, the throughput expectations which one can have of these realizations differ by orders of magnitude. Similarly, some Internet realizations have delays measured in tens of milliseconds, where others have delays measured in seconds. Certain applications such as real time speech work fundamentally differently across these two realizations. Some Internets have been engineered so that there is great redundancy in the gateways and paths. These Internets are survivable, because resources exist which can be reconfigured after failure. Other Internet realizations, to reduce cost, have single points of connectivity through the realization, so that a failure may partition the Internet into two halves.

If I were writing this section today, I would actually talk about three distinctions:
1. The core principles and basic design decisions of the architecture.

2. The second level of mechanism design that flesh out the architecture and make it into a complete implementation.

3. The set of decisions related to deployment (e.g. degree of redundancy in paths) that lead to an operational network.

The word “realization” seems to map to the third set of decisions, and the second set is somewhat missing from this paper. One could argue that that omission was intentional: the paper was about the architecture, and what this text is saying is that one of the goals of the architecture was to permit many realizations, a point that might have been listed as another goal. But it is equally important to say that a goal of the architecture was to allow for many different alternatives for mechanism design as well—the design decisions of the architecture should permit a range of mechanism choices, not embed those decisions into the architecture itself.

I believe that in 1988 we saw, but perhaps did not articulate clearly, that there is a benefit to architectural minimality—that is, to specify as little as possible consistent with making it possible for subsequent mechanisms to meet the goals.

Were I writing the paper now, I would add a new section, which draws from the previous sections the set of core principles of the architecture, linking them back to the goals they enable.

### Core architectural principles:

Packet switching.

- Effective multiplexing of resources.
- Ability to operate over a range of networks.
- Support for a wide range of applications.

Gateways (what we call routers today)

- Ability to exploit existing networks of many sorts—e.g. minimal assumptions about what the networks would do.
No flow state in routers, which implies no flow setup, and thus the “pure” datagram model. Also implies strict separation of IP from TCP, with no knowledge of TCP in routers.

- Availability in the face of failures
- Minimal requirements for functions in gateways

Co-location of flow state with end-points of flows. (fate-sharing)

No mechanisms to report network failures to end-points.

Trust in the end-node

Minimal assumptions about service functions and performance.

Totally missing from this paper is any discussion of packet headers, addressing, and so on. In fact, much earlier than 1988 we understood that we had to agree on some format for addresses, but that the specific decision did not influence our ability to address the goals in the list. Early on in the design process (in the mid-1970s), variable-length addresses were proposed, which would have served us much better with respect to the goal of longevity. It was rejected because at the time, the difficulty of building routers that could operate at line speeds (e.g. 1.5 mb/s) made parsing of variable-length fields in the header a challenge. In my 1988 list “longevity” is missing—probably a significant oversight. But in the 1970s we made a design choice that favored the pragmatics of implementation over flexibility.

The packet header also embodied other design choices, which we thought we had to make in order to facilitate or enable the design of the second-level mechanisms that flesh out the architecture into a complete implementation. The idea of packet fragmentation supported the goal that we be able to exploit pre-existing networks. Today, Internet is the dominant architecture, and we can assume that issues like network technology with small packet sizes will not arise.

The use of a TTL or hop count was an architectural decision that tried to allow more generality in how routing was done—we wanted to tolerate transient routing inconsistency. The architecture did not specify how routing was to be done (the paper notes the emergence of the two-level routing hierarchy), and indeed it was a goal that different routing schemes could be deployed in different parts of the network. (This choice is a manifestation of the idea of architectural minimality—specify as little as possible in the core design, and leave as much as possible to later
implementers, so long as the high-level goals such as interoperation can be met.) So the TTL field in the header is the only support for routing. I do not know if a different decision might have allowed a different set of routing schemes.

The Internet architecture tolerates this variety of realization by design. However, it leaves the designer of a particular realization with a great deal of engineering to do. One of the major struggles of this architectural development was to understand how to give guidance to the designer of a realization, guidance which would relate the engineering of the realization to the types of service which would result. For example, the designer must answer the following sort of question. What sort of bandwidths must he in the underlying networks, if the overall service is to deliver a throughput of a certain rate? Given a certain model of possible failures within this realization, what sorts of redundancy ought to be engineered into the realization?

Most of the known network design aids did not seem helpful in answering these sorts of questions. Protocol verifiers, for example, assist in confirming that protocols meet specifications. However, these tools almost never deal with performance issues, which are essential to the idea of the type of service. Instead, they deal with the much more restricted idea of logical correctness of the protocol with respect to specification. While tools to verify logical correctness are useful, both at the specification and implementation stage, they do not help with the severe problems that often arise related to performance. A typical implementation experience is that even after logical correctness has been demonstrated, design faults are discovered that may cause a performance degradation of an order of magnitude. Exploration of this problem has led to the conclusion that the difficulty usually arises, not in the protocol itself, but in the operating system on which the protocol runs. This being the case, it is difficult to address the problem within the context of the architectural specification. However, we still strongly feel the need to give the implementer guidance. We continue to struggle with this problem today.

This paragraph reflects an issue that could have been explored more clearly. The goal of continued operation in the face of failures (resilience) motivated us to design very good mechanisms to recover from problems. These mechanisms were in fact good enough that they would also “recover” from implementation errors. They papered over the errors, and the only signal of the problem was poor performance. What is missing from the Internet, whether in the architecture or as an expectation of the second-level mechanisms, is some requirement to report when the error detection and recovery mechanisms are being triggered. But without a good architecture for network management, it is not surprising that these reporting mechanisms are missing, because it is not clear to what entity the report would go. Telling the user at the end-node is not useful, and there is no other entity defined as part of the architecture.
The other class of design aid is the simulator, which takes a particular realization and explores the service which it can deliver under a variety of loadings. No one has yet attempted to construct a simulator which takes into account the wide variability of the gateway implementation, the host implementation, and the network performance which one sees within possible Internet realizations. It is thus the case that the analysis of most Internet realizations is done on the back of an envelope. It is a comment on the goal structure of the Internet architecture that a back of the envelope analysis, if done by a sufficiently knowledgeable person, is usually sufficient. The designer of a particular Internet realization is usually less concerned with obtaining the last five percent possible in line utilization than knowing whether the desired type of service can be achieved at all given the resources at hand at the moment.

The relationship between architecture and performance is an extremely challenging one. The designers of the Internet architecture felt very strongly that it was a serious mistake to attend only to logical correctness and ignore the issue of performance. However, they experienced great difficulty in formalizing any aspect of performance constraint within the architecture. These difficulties arose both because the goal of the architecture was not to constrain performance, but to permit variability, and secondly (and perhaps more fundamentally), because there seemed to be no useful formal tools for describing performance.

From the perspective of 2013, this paragraph is very telling. For some goals such as routing, we had mechanisms (e.g. the TTL field) that we could incorporate in the architecture to support the objective. For performance, we simply did not know. (We proposed an ICMP message called Source Quench, which never proved useful and may have just been a bad idea. It is totally deprecated.) At the time this paper was written, our problems with congestion were so bad that we were at peril of failing 2013 goal 10: “It works”. Yet there is no mention of congestion and its control in this paper. Arguably, we still do not know what the architecture should specify about congestion and other aspects of performance. We seem to have some agreement on the ECN bit, but not enough enthusiasm to get the mechanism actually deployed. And there are many alternative proposals: re-ecn, XCP, RCP, etc. that would imply a different packet header. The debate seems to continue as to what to put in the packet (e.g. specify as part of the architectural interfaces) in order to allow a useful range of mechanisms to be designed to deal with congestion and other aspects of performance.

This problem was particularly aggravating because the goal of the Internet project was to produce specification documents which were to become military standards. It is a well known problem with government contracting that one cannot expect a contractor to meet any criteria which is not a part of the procurement standard. If the Internet is concerned about performance, therefore, it was mandatory that
performance requirements be put into the procurement specification. It was trivial to invent specifications which constrained the performance, for example to specify that the implementation must be capable of passing 1,000 packets a second. However, this sort of constraint could not be part of the architecture, and it was therefore up to the individual performing the procurement to recognize that these performance constraints must be added to the specification, and to specify them properly to achieve a realization which provides the required types of service. We do not have a good idea how to offer guidance in the architecture for the person performing this task.

**Datagrams**

The fundamental architectural feature of the Internet is the use of datagrams as the entity which is transported across the underlying networks. As this paper has suggested, there are several reasons why datagrams are important within the architecture. First, they eliminate the need for connection state within the intermediate switching nodes, which means that the Internet can be reconstituted after a failure without concern about state. Secondly, the datagram provides a basic building block out of which a variety of types of service can be implemented. In contrast to the virtual circuit, which usually implies a fixed type of service, the datagram provides a more elemental service which the endpoints can combine as appropriate to build the type of service needed. Third, the datagram represents the minimum network service assumption, which has permitted a wide variety of networks to be incorporated into various Internet realizations. The decision to use the datagram was an extremely successful one, which allowed the Internet to meet its most important goals very successfully.

There is a mistaken assumption often associated with datagrams, which is that the motivation for datagrams is the support of a higher level service which is essentially equivalent to the datagram. In other words, it has sometimes been suggested that the datagram is provided because the transport service which the application requires is a datagram service. In fact, this is seldom the case. While some applications in the Internet, such as simple queries of date servers or name servers, use an access method based on an unreliable datagram, most services within the Internet would like a more sophisticated transport model than simple datagram. Some services would like the reliability enhanced, some would like the delay smoothed and buffered, but almost all have some expectation more complex than a datagram. It is important to understand that the role of the datagram in this respect is as a building block, and not as a service in itself.

*This discussion of the datagram seems reasonable from the perspective of 2013, but as I said above, were I to write the paper now I would give similar treatment to some of the other design decisions we made. See the discussion at the end of the original paper.*
TCP

There were several interesting and controversial design decisions in the development of TCP, and TCP itself went through several major versions before it became a reasonably stable standard. Some of these design decisions, such as window management and the nature of the port address structure, are discussed in a series of implementation notes published as part of the TCP protocol handbook [17,18]. But again the motivation for the decision is sometimes lacking. In this section, I attempt to capture some of the early reasoning that went into parts of TCP. This section is of necessity incomplete; a complete review of the history of TCP itself would require another paper of this length.

The original ARPANET host-to-host protocol provided flow control based on both bytes and packets. This seemed overly complex, and the designers of TCP felt that only one form of regulation would be sufficient. The choice was to regulate the delivery of bytes, rather than packets. Flow control and acknowledgment in TCP is thus based on byte number rather than packet number. Indeed, in TCP there is no significance to the packetization of the data.

This decision was motivated by several considerations, some of which became irrelevant and others of which were more important than anticipated. One reason to acknowledge bytes was to permit the insertion of control information into the sequence space of the bytes, so that control as well as data could be acknowledged. That use of the sequence space was dropped, in favor of ad hoc techniques for dealing with each control message. While the original idea has appealing generality, it caused complexity in practice.

A second reason for the byte stream was to permit the TCP packet to be broken up into smaller packets if necessary in order to fit through a net with a small packet size. But this function was moved to the IP layer when IP was split from TCP, and IP was forced to invent a different method of fragmentation.

A third reason for acknowledging bytes rather than packets was to permit a number of small packets to be gathered together into one larger packet in the sending host if retransmission of the data was necessary. It was not clear if this advantage would be important; it turned out to be critical. Systems such as UNIX which have a internal communication model based on single character interactions often send many packets with one byte of data in them. (One might argue from a network perspective that this behavior is silly, but it was a reality, and a necessity for interactive remote login.) It was often observed that such a host could produce a flood of packets with one byte of data, which would arrive much faster than a slow host could process them. The result is lost packets and retransmission.

If the retransmission was of the original packets, the same problem would repeat on every retransmission, with a performance impact so intolerable as to prevent operation. But since the bytes were gathered into one packet for retransmission, the retransmission occurred in a much more effective way which permitted practical operation.
On the other hand, the acknowledgment of bytes could be seen as creating this problem in the first place. If the basis of flow control had been packets rather than bytes, then this flood might never have occurred. Control at the packet level has the effect, however, of providing a severe limit on the throughput if small packets are sent. If the receiving host specifies a number of packets to receive, without any knowledge of the number of bytes in each, the actual amount of data received could vary by a factor of 1000, depending on whether the sending host puts one or one thousand bytes in each packet.

In retrospect, the correct design decision may have been that if TCP is to provide effective support of a variety of services, both packets and bytes must be regulated, as was done in the original ARPANET protocols.

Another design decision related to the byte stream was the End-Of-Letter flag, or EOL. This has now vanished from the protocol, replaced by the push flag, or PSH. The original idea of EOL was to break the byte stream into records. It was implemented by putting data from separate records into separate packets, which was not compatible with the idea of combining packets on retransmission. So the semantics of EOL was changed to a weaker form, meaning only that the data up to this point in the stream was one or more complete application-level elements, which should occasion a flush of any internal buffering in TCP or the network. By saying "one or more" rather than "exactly one", it became possible to combine several together and preserve the goal of compacting data in reassembly. But the weaker semantics meant that various applications had to invent an ad hoc mechanism for delimiting records on top of the data stream.

Several features of TCP, including EOL and the reliable close, have turned out to be of almost no use to applications today. While TCP is not properly part of the architecture of the Internet, the story of its design and evolution provides another view into the process of trying to figure out in advance what should be in, and what should be out, of a general mechanism that is intended to last for a long time. (The goal of longevity).

In this evolution of EOL semantics, there was a little known intermediate form, which generated great debate. Depending on the buffering strategy of the host, the byte stream model of TCP can cause great problems in one improbable case. Consider a host in which the incoming data is put in a sequence of fixed size buffers. A buffer is returned to the user either when it is full, or an EOL is received. Now consider the case of the arrival of an out-of-order packet which is so far out of order to be beyond the current buffer. Now further consider that after receiving this out-of-order packet, a packet with an EOL causes the current buffer to be returned to the user only partially full. This particular sequence of actions has the effect of causing the out of order data in the next buffer to be in the wrong place, because of the empty bytes in the buffer returned to the user. Coping with this generated book-keeping problems in the host which seemed unnecessary.
To cope with this it was proposed that the EOL should "use up" all the sequence space up to the next value which was zero mod the buffer size. In other words, it was proposed that EOL should be a tool for mapping the byte stream to the buffer management of the host. This idea was not well received at the time, as it seemed much too ad hoc, and only one host seemed to have this problem\(^3\). In retrospect, it may have been the correct idea to incorporate into TCP some means of relating the sequence space and the buffer management algorithm of the host. At the time, the designers simply lacked the insight to see how that might be done in a sufficiently general manner.

**Conclusion**

In the context of its priorities, the Internet architecture has been very successful. The protocols are widely used in the commercial and military environment, and have spawned a number of similar architectures. At the same time, its success has made clear that in certain situations, the priorities of the designers do not match the needs of the actual users. More attention to such things as accounting, resource management and operation of regions with separate administrations are needed.

While the datagram has served very well in solving the most important goals of the Internet, it has not served so well when we attempt to address some of the goals which were further down the priority list. For example, the goals of resource management and accountability have proved difficult to achieve in the context of datagrams. As the previous section discussed, most datagrams are a part of some sequence of packets from source to destination, rather than isolated units at the application level. However, the gateway cannot directly see the existence of this sequence, because it is forced to deal with each packet in isolation. Therefore, resource management decisions or accounting must be done on each packet separately. Imposing the datagram model on the Internet layer has deprived that layer of an important source of information which it could use in achieving these goals.

This suggests that there may be a better building block than the datagram for the next generation of architecture. The general characteristic of this building block is that it would identify a sequence of packets traveling from the source to the destination, without assuming any particular type of service with that service. I have used the word "flow" to characterize this building block. It would be necessary for the gateways to have flow state in order to remember the nature of the flows which are passing through them, but the state information would not be critical in maintaining the desired type of service associated with the flow. Instead, that type of service would be enforced by the end points, which would periodically send messages to ensure that the proper type of service was being associated with the

\(^3\) This use of EOL was properly called "Rubber EOL," but its detractors quickly called it "rubber baby buffer bumpers" in an attempt to ridicule the idea. Credit must go to the creator of the idea, Bill Plummer, for sticking to his guns in the face of detractors saying the above to him ten times fast.
flow. In this way, the state information associated with the flow could be lost in a crash without permanent disruption of the service features being used. I call this concept "soft state," and it may very well permit us to achieve our primary goals of survivability and flexibility, while at the same time doing a better job of dealing with the issue of resource management and accountability. Exploration of alternative building blocks constitute one of the current directions for research within the DARPA Internet program.

**Acknowledgments -- A Historical Perspective**

It would be impossible to acknowledge all the contributors to the Internet project; there have literally been hundreds over the 15 years of development: designers, implementers, writers and critics. Indeed, an important topic, which probably deserves a paper in itself, is the process by which this project was managed. The participants came from universities, research laboratories and corporations, and they united (to some extent) to achieve this common goal.

The original vision for TCP came from Robert Kahn and Vinton Cerf, who saw very clearly, back in 1973, how a protocol with suitable features might be the glue that would pull together the various emerging network technologies. From their position at DARPA, they guided the project in its early days to the point where TCP and IP became standards for the DOD.

The author of this paper joined the project in the mid-70s, and took over architectural responsibility for TCP/IP in 1981. He would like to thank all those who have worked with him, and particularly those who took the time to reconstruct some of the lost history in this paper.

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A perspective from 2013

By the principle of architectural minimality, architecture does not specify how to achieve outcomes such as good security, scalable routing or good control of congestion. What a minimal architecture does is specify a small set of constraints and design decisions that allow these goals to be achieved in the overall design and realization. Good architecture does not necessarily specify how to achieve goals, it just makes them possible. And by clever design, good architecture may make difficult or impossible behaviors that are not desirable—security is essentially a negative goal.

When looking at an artifact such as the present Internet, or a design for a future Internet, this paper proposes that an analysis or evaluation should distinguish between the core architecture (the design principles and the key constraints and interfaces), the larger set of mechanisms that complete the design, and a specific realization, which is the use of these mechanisms in a particular configuration to produce a running system. At each of these steps, the evaluation should ask what that step implies for the step that follows—what becomes easy or hard, what degrees of freedom there are, and whether the different goals are actually achieved at the end, with a running system.

In the Internet design, we were successful to different degrees in achieving our objectives. Using my 2013 list as a starting point, here is how I would score the core architecture of the Internet:

Security

Early on in the design of the Internet, we settled on a view that integrity and confidentiality should be achieved using an “end-to-end” approach based on encryption. This was understood, if not perhaps clearly stated; it was more clearly stated with the design of multicast, in which any receiver could attach to a multicast stream. The end-point approach was the only way to achieve these goals given that design decision about multicast.

The end-point approach to integrity is elaborated in several of the future Internet proposals that use some sort of ID based on a hash of a key or content to allow end-points to validate each other’s identity. However, since (with the exception of NDN) these fields are not validated in the network, it is not clear if the definition of IDs is actually a mandatory part of the architectural specification, or only a recommendation about end-node behavior, which becomes mandatory if it catches on, like the DNS.

Securing the network itself, which seems to call for secure versions of routing protocols, etc., has been relegated to that second stage of mechanism design that turns the architecture into a complete implementation. This approach is probably valid, since different circumstances call for different degrees of security. But there is an open question as to whether there are architectural decisions that could make this task easier.
Availability and resilience
This view about security leaves availability as the major problem that the architecture must solve. However, in the 1980s we did not understand how to think about availability in general. We understood that packets might get lost, so we designed TCP to recover. But there is nothing in the architecture itself to help with this problem (unless you consider that at this point, the functions of TCP are essentially a part of the architecture). We understood that links and routes might fail, so we needed dynamic routing. But aside from the TTL field, the architecture did not contain any features to facilitate dynamic routing. Our intuition was that no architectural support was needed for routing, or for availability more generally.

Many designers today consider this approach inadequate. By the end-to-end argument, there may be failures that only the end-nodes can detect, since only the end-nodes can confirm correct operation. If the end-nodes are the point where failures are detected, then the end-nodes must be able to initiate corrective actions. This approach, in general, is often described using the term “user choice”. The Internet was very consistent in giving the user little choice. But several of the future Internet proposals are questioning and revisiting this approach.

Over the years, there have been many proposals for additions to the core design to improve one or another aspect of security, such as capabilities, signed source addresses, and so on. None of these seem to have caught on.

Economic viability
One way to think about economic viability is that all the actors in the ecosystem created by the architecture must have the motivation to play the role assigned to them by that architecture. In particular, if there is a class of actor that does not find an economic incentive to enter the ecosystem and invest, the design will not thrive.

This way of looking at things was roughly understood early on, but we had no tools to reason about it. In fact, the issues have really only become clear in the last decade, with ISPs (which make large capital investments) trying to find ways to increase revenues by “violating” the architecture—peeking into packets, exercising discrimination of various sorts, and so on. As well, the current debates about when interconnection (e.g. peering) should be revenue neutral and whether paid peering should be acceptable illustrate the complexity of the economic landscape.

Early on, the Internet designers realized that the architecture lacked a concept that was central to earlier forms of cost recovery (e.g. in telephone systems), the “call”. In fact, the designers were proud that the Internet lacked any sort of call setup or call indication (flow indicator) in the packets. But this lack eliminated a range of possible billing models. The telephone system has “sender pays” long-distance calls (the normal model) and “receiver-pays” calls (800 numbers). The Internet architecture explicitly did not offer any hook for this sort of function, and this decision was considered a good thing.
The billing model supported by the Internet design is a very simple one, called “bill and keep”. Each end-point attached to the Internet pays for access, and small ISPs pay bigger ISPs (e.g. what we call transit) and in the middle, where the tier 1 providers peer, no money flows.

The bill-and-keep model is very simple—it is based on volume of flow, but on nothing else, such as where the packets are going. There have been many proposals to add mechanisms to packets or state in routers to allow billing based on the location of source and destination, or the direction of the “value flow” (like the 800 number). But there have been few proposals for an architectural mechanism that would facilitate a more general set of billing models. In fact, I think there is a resistance to the design of any such mechanism at the level of architecture.

**Better management**

As I discussed in part above, the original Internet architecture did not contain any design elements intended to address the issues of network management. We received some criticism from our friends in the telephone industry about this; they said that a major part of the design of the telephone system was to address issues of management—fault detection and isolation, performance issues and the like. Many of the basic data formats used to transport voice across the digital version of the telephone system contain fields related to management, and we were asked why we had not understood that. Our basic headers (e.g. the IP packet header) did not contain any data fields that defined building blocks for network management.

In fact, I don’t think we had any idea what these might be. After the fact, creative people repurposed the TTL field to create traceroute, which has to be seen as a truly ugly but pragmatic response to a lack of any architectural clarity about management. But even today, I don’t think we have a sense of the right building blocks to make network management more effective.

If one is probing the network with a tool like traceroute, and one of the ISPs along the path is actively malicious, then they might process traceroute packets properly but disrupt normal data packets. For this reason, it might make sense to incorporate some testing/probing fields into the normal data packet, so that a malicious ISP cannot disrupt the normal data flow without also causing anomalies in the probing.

**Meet society’s needs**

This very general heading captures a range of issues such as privacy (on the one hand), lawful intercept (on the other hand), resilience of critical services, control of disruptive or illegal behavior by users, and so on. There is very little in the 1988 paper that speaks to these issues. It may not have been clear in 1988 that the way addresses are specified and used (for example) has a material influence on the balance between privacy, traffic analysis, lawful intercept and the like. These issues have now emerged as important, but I do not think we have clear ideas about how to deal with them, and in particular how to deal with them in a way that leaves a degree of subsequent flexibility to the implementation and the realization.
Longevity
From the 2013 perspective, longevity seems almost a definitional aspect of architecture—one way of viewing architecture is that it is those decisions that survive over time, and allow a series of implementations to be derived incrementally from the architecture. A specific way of saying this is that since the highest level goal for the Internet was interoperability, a successful architecture would permit interoperation in space (among a number of networks) and in time (a progression of implementations that embody new innovations.

The migration from IPv4 to IPv6 is a clear illustration of the issue—the address format is one of the most basic of the architectural interfaces defined for the Internet, and changing it is really changing the architecture. This change is proving really hard.

Support for tomorrow’s computing
The original Internet evolved in an environment of very heterogeneous machines—9 bit bytes, for example. The design deals better with some aspects of heterogeneity than others. Highly parallel computers often face performance bottlenecks sending data over the inherently serial Internet. Attempts to use parallel interfaces creates a model of parallelism that manifests end-to-end, which is a barrier to heterogeneity. But in general, the Internet has survived predictions that future machines will be unable to run the protocols either because the machines are too fast (e.g. super-computers) or two feeble (e.g. sensors). But this debate will constantly be renewed, with today’s issues being data-centers and “cloud”, Internet of Things, and the like.

Exploit tomorrow’s networking
Despite the fact that the second network hooked to the Internet after the ARPAnet was a mobile wireless network (the ARPA packet radio network) it is arguably true that the Internet is not as suited for mobile endpoints (and mobile networks) as it might be. To some extent, some second level decisions (e.g. the TCP pseudo-header) made this problem worse. But better support for mobility is a goal of some future Internet proposals.

Optical communications is the other major technology to raise challenges to the Internet architecture. One cannot do packet-level processing in the optical domain (although there have been some very clever technologies proposed), so any switching seems to imply a conversion from the optical to the electrical domain. However, this problem has been neatly sidestepped by designing complex lower-layer architectures (both optical and electrical, such as MPLS) that provide an environment of virtual links over which Internet can run. It is actually a good idea that these lower-level technologies are not a part of the Internet itself, since the functional isolation among them has allowed innovation and development at the lower layers without having to “change” IP. However, it is again an open question as to whether there are changes to IP (or the second-level mechanisms) that would be advantageous, given that the Internet protocols today run over very complex lower
level technology, with their own complex mechanisms for routing, traffic engineering, fault management, and so on.

If there were an improvement to be had in this space, it would probably not be in the data carriage itself, but in the various aspects of network management. For example, when different layers detect a link failure and all initiate recover, the different recovery algorithms may interfere with each other, since they are not connected in any way. Of course, the management area is one in which the Internet design does poorly in the first place. It is possible that a future design for an Internet might contemplate a totally different modularity for network management.

**Support tomorrow’s applications**
The designers of the Internet are perhaps justifiably proud of the wide range of applications that the architecture supports. However, as I discuss below under “fit for purpose”, applications that don’t work will over the Internet are often dismissed or ignored. Real-time process control, remote control of autonomous vehicles, advanced tele-presence, and other challenging applications are set aside as not important. The research community should be open to the consideration of what new sorts of applications might emerge (or might have emerged) if the Internet had a slightly different service model.

**Fit for purpose (it works...)**
Those of us who designed the original Internet are so pleased (and perhaps surprised) that it works as well as it does that we feel justified in turning a blind eye to the aspects that don’t work so well. If the Internet is not as reliable as the phone system, and routing takes rather long to converge after a transient, we say that after all routing is just one of those “second-level” mechanisms, and not a part of the architecture, and who said that “5 nines” is the right idea for the Internet? If management is difficult, costly, and a major cause of outages, we (at least in the research community) do not seem to view this as our problem. Security is a persistent problem, and so on.

In each of these cases, the relevant research challenge for architecture is actually very nuanced. The architecture question is not “how should we solve this problem”, but “what set of architectural design decisions would let designers of specific implementations and realizations solve these problems more easily or effectively”? A tough question, and one we don’t yet know how to think about in general.