When Values and Behavior Conflict:

Moral Pluralism and Intrapersonal Moral Hypocrisy

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Abstract

The authors review the various ways moral hypocrisy has been defined and operationalized by social psychologists, concentrating on three general types: *moral duplicity, moral double standards,* and *moral weakness*. While most approaches have treated moral hypocrisy as an interpersonal phenomenon, requiring public claims, preaching (vs. practicing), or judgments of others (vs. oneself), this paper also considers *intra*personal moral hypocrisy – that is, conflicts between values and behavior that may exist even in the absence of public pronouncements or judgments. Current attempts to understand and combat intrapersonal moral hypocrisy are aided by *moral pluralism*, the idea that there are many different moral values, which may come into conflict both between and within individuals. Examples are given to illustrate how taking into account individual differences in values can help to reduce moral hypocrisy. The authors close by considering the possibility that in a pluralistic world, reducing intrapersonal moral hypocrisy might not always be a normatively desired end goal.

Key words. Morality, moral hypocrisy, values, behavior

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In 1999, the Philip Morris tobacco company contributed $60 million to charities including domestic violence centers, workplace diversity initiatives, and Meals on Wheels. That same year, the company spent $108 million on an advertising campaign to publicize the $60 million they'd spent on charitable contributions. While most people would agree that several worthwhile charities benefited from the $60 million, the fact that Philip Morris spent so much more money advertising their beneficence was roundly parodied in the press, and held up as an example of corporate deception and moral hypocrisy by academics (Batson, Collins, & Powell, 2006; Stoll, 2002). In fact, the large sum spent by the tobacco giant to advertise its charity exemplifies one of the most common definitions of moral hypocrisy: "Morality is extolled—even enacted—not with an eye to producing a good and right outcome but in order to appear moral yet still benefit oneself" (Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997, p. 1335).

However defined, and whether applied to organizations or to individuals, it is clear that moral hypocrisy is of central importance to social and personality psychology. In fact, Monin and Merritt (2012) make the point that the entire field of social psychology could be called the science of moral hypocrisy. In this paper we review the construct of moral hypocrisy and the many ways it has been defined and operationalized in empirical psychology. While most approaches have treated moral hypocrisy as an interpersonal phenomenon, requiring public claims, preaching (vs. practicing), or judgments of others (vs. oneself), we focus on *intra*personal moral hypocrisy – that is, conflicts between values and behavior that may exist even in the

absence of public pronouncements or judgments. We review our recent and current attempts to understand intrapersonal moral hypocrisy in light of *moral pluralism* (Graham, Haidt, Koleva, Motyl, Iyer, Wojcik, & Ditto, 2013), the idea that there are many different moral values, which may come into conflict both between and within individuals. Finally, we turn to the question of how to reduce moral hypocrisy, and give examples of how taking individual differences into account can help to do so. We close by considering the possibility that in a pluralistic world, reducing intrapersonal moral hypocrisy might not always be a normatively desired end goal.

Moral Hypocrisy: The Construct With a Thousand Faces

A central tenet of modern social psychology is that people don't always do things for the reasons they profess, be this due to deliberate deception or nonconscious self-deception (Greenwald, 1980; von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). The term *moral hypocrisy* has been used by social psychologists in various ways to describe morally-relevant instances of this phenomenon. In this section we review some of the more prevalent definitions and operationalizations of moral hypocrisy, moving from interpersonal to intrapersonal conceptualizations. In order to organize this disparate literature we have adopted a broad and inclusive definition of moral hypocrisy as breaking from one's own moral standard, be that moral standard publicly stated or not. There are different levels of prototypicality in the different forms of moral hypocrisy that have been studied by social psychologists. We begin by discussing *moral duplicity*, which we see as the most prototypical form of moral hypocrisy, then move to *moral double standards*, and finally *moral weakness*, the least prototypical form of moral hypocrisy.

Moral Duplicity: Claiming Moral Motives to Others, Falsely

The case of Philip Morris spending more to advertise its good deeds than on the deeds themselves exemplifies the most prevalent psychological conceptualization of moral hypocrisy, summed up by its originator as the "motivation to appear moral yet, if possible, avoid the cost of actually being moral" (Batson, Thompson, & Chen, 2002). As such, this brand of moral hypocrisy could also be labeled "moral duplicity" or "moral deception." The hypocrisy is essentially interpersonal, as it involves deceptive public claims or displays of morality (whether they involve putting on airs of compassion, fairness, loyalty, obedience, chastity, honesty, or other moral values), with the ultimate end of appearing moral while benefitting the self. Importantly, according to this conceptualization, one of the people deceived by the moral hypocrite can be the moral hypocrite herself. In fact, research suggests that self-deception is a useful – albeit not a necessary – component of successful moral hypocrisy (Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 1999).

Monin and Merritt (2012) follow Batson and colleagues in defining hypocrisy as essentially a form of interpersonal deception, assuming a false appearance of virtue or morality by preaching one thing while doing another, or publicly admonishing others for things one actually does oneself (e.g., political and religious leaders who publicly proclaim the immorality of homosexuality, while secretly engaging in the acts they admonish): "In general, moral hypocrisy involves claiming to be moral for non-moral reasons." Monin and Merritt (2012) operationalize moral hypocrisy as bad faith or disingenuousness, and point out that while this often co-occurs with behavioral inconsistency, it is possible to have one without the other. For example, someone might genuinely state moral intentions to others but not be able to follow through on them (behavioral inconsistency without bad faith hypocrisy; see also Barden, Rucker,

& Petty, 2005); conversely, someone might publicly behave in line with their preaching, with the goal of reputation management rather than the moral ends they claim (bad faith hypocrisy without behavioral inconsistency; see also Jordan & Monin, 2008).

A combination of experimental and correlational methods have been used to provide evidence of moral hypocrisy as moral duplicity. In these studies, participants are provided with an opportunity to act selfishly without appearing selfish. The most common experimental method used to test for this form of moral hypocrisy entails participants deciding whether they will give themselves a positive consequence (for example, putting their name in a raffle) or give an anonymous partner the positive consequence instead (e.g., Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997; Batson, Thompson, & Chen, 2002). Participants are typically also told that a fair way to assign the positive consequence would be to give both one's self and the anonymous partner an equal chance to receive the positive consequence by flipping a coin. Participants are provided with a coin, but are not required to use the coin to make their decision. Whereas the use of the coin should result in about 50% of the participants assigning themselves the positive consequence, invariably the percentage is much larger. Across a host of studies, over 80% of coin-flipping participants have chosen to assign themselves the positive consequence, instead of the other participant they were randomly paired with (Batson, 2008). What's more, individual differences in justice values and moral responsibility appear to do little to buffer people from acting morally hypocritical. Although people who score high on a moral responsibility assessment are more likely to flip the coin – that is, *appear* to make the fair and moral choice – they are no less likely to assign themselves the positive consequence (Batson et al., 1997; 2002).

In combination, these results indicate widespread moral hypocrisy. When people are given the opportunity to act selfishly without the chance of their selfishness being caught, they tend to act selfishly – while maintaining the appearance of doing the moral thing. In fact, these results have been used as evidence that truly moral motivation (moral integrity, rather than moral hypocrisy) might not exist at all, or exist only very rarely (Batson, 2011).

If any truly moral motivation did exist, what factors could decrease moral hypocrisy and increase moral integrity? Self-awareness is one such factor. Batson and colleagues (1999) found that states of self-awareness (manipulated by the presence of a mirror) reduced moral hypocrisy, though only when moral standards were made salient. A more general antidote for moral duplicity could be perspective-taking. Specifically, when participants imagined the thoughts and emotions of their randomly-selected partner, they were less likely to act morally hypocritical (Batson et al., 2003). Intrinsic religious motivation may also reduce moral hypocrisy, but only when religious concepts are primed (Carpenter & Marshall, 2009).

Moral Double Standards: Judging Others vs. Judging Oneself

Honing and specifying Batson's moral duplicity form of moral hypocrisy, Valdesolo and DeSteno (2007, p. 689) proposed "an equally unsettling, and perhaps more socially relevant, type of hypocrisy… an interpersonal phenomenon whereby individuals' evaluations of their own moral transgressions differ substantially from their evaluations of the same transgressions enacted by others." Researchers operationalizing moral hypocrisy in this way are concerned with the causes and consequences of people's moral double standards. Research in this vein has revealed that people not only tend to judge the transgressions of others more harshly than their own transgressions, but they also judge the transgressions of outgroup members more harshly than the transgressions of ingroup members (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007).

Recent studies have uncovered a number of additional factors contributing to moral double standards. For instance, different emotions play different roles in the extent to which people engage in this form of moral hypocrisy: whereas anger increases the use of moral double standards, feelings of guilt decrease it (Polman & Ruttan, 2012). Research also supports the commonsense notion that power corrupts, as social power increases moral double standards – at least when this leads to personal entitlement (Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010).

Cognitive variables also play a role in the degree to which people exhibit moral double standards. Such double standards are likely to exist in part because people take their own good intentions into consideration when evaluating their own morality, more than they take others' good intentions into account when evaluating others' morality (Kruger & Gilovich, 2004). The abstract nature of moral judgments may also contribute to this form of moral hypocrisy. Specifically, abstract levels of construal produce higher amounts of moral hypocrisy than concrete levels of construal (Lammers, 2012). This may be the case because abstract thinking leads to more cognitive flexibility, which in turn results in more self-serving cognitive distortions. This cognitive flexibility then allows people to exonerate their own morally questionable behavior while still viewing others' transgressions as morally wrong.

People have additional motivation to find legitimate reasons why they did not act in a value-consistent manner due to the centrality of these values to their identity. When judging the moral or immoral behaviors of others, we often attribute value violations as diagnostic of personality (Meindl, Johnson, & Graham, 2014). In comparison, when judging our own value violations, we are motivated to attribute our failings to situational factors outside of our control (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2008). A large ecological momentary assessment study (Hofmann, Wisneski, Brandt, & Skitka, 2014) showed that even when relatively immediately reporting

moral events in daily life, people were most likely to note their own moral deeds – and the

*im*moral deeds of others (see also Graham, 2014, for discussion).

Moral Weakness: When Values and Behavior Conflict

Moral hypocrisy can also be operationalized as simple moral weakness, when people fail

to live up to their moral values. Research on the relationship between moral judgments and

behaviors suggests that people often do not live up to their moral values, regardless of what those

values are (Johnson & Graham, 2014). People often explain away their self-serving behaviors by

attributing them to upholding other values (e.g., explaining an unfair behavior that benefits the

self as altruism toward a close other who also unfairly benefits; Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2013).

Feeling as if one has been cheated by another also results in more immoral behavior by

decreasing feelings of guilt about these unethical behaviors at the "unfair" individual's expense

(Fukukawa & Ennew, 2010). Even reporting high concern and good intentions toward helping

others can make people feel less obligated to act upon those feelings (White & Plous, 1995).

Social psychology has a rich tradition of studying the causes and consequences of

morally relevant behavior-thought conflicts, particularly in the cognitive dissonance literature

(Festinger & Freedman, 1964). Just as people deal with cognitive dissonance by ignoring it,

justifying it, dismissing it, or addressing it via changes to behaviors or cognitions (Aronson,

1969), so too are these the paths toward resolving moral hypocrisy as moral weakness. Although

cognitive dissonance is usually treated as a negative affective consequence of value-behavior

conflicts, it is also an effective hypocrisy intervention. Across multiple studies (Aronson, Fried,

& Stone, 1991; Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow, & Fried, 1994) hypocrisy has been

experimentally induced by requiring participants to state their values (e.g., the importance of safe

sex) and then answer questions about their own behaviors that may violate those values (e.g.,

having sex without a condom); participants in the hypocrisy conditions were most likely to change their subsequent behaviors when confronted with their moral weakness (see Stone & Fernandez, 2008, for review).

Unlike moral duplicity and moral double standards, moral weakness is not necessarily interpersonal in nature; no public judgments, displays, or claims to morality need be involved for one's values and behavior to conflict. This operationalization is thus best able to cover intrapersonal moral hypocrisy. We contend that much of moral hypocrisy – like much of moral life – is private, so we now further focus on this intrapersonal aspect.

Current Work on Intrapersonal Moral Hypocrisy

We are currently investigating the varieties of intrapersonal moral hypocrisy in light of moral pluralism. We're particularly interested in people's subjective sense of value/behavior conflicts – what kinds of behaviors, for what kinds of people, in what kinds of places and circumstances – and in the consequences of such conflicts even when people are not consciously aware of them.

Subjective Perceptions of Moral Hypocrisy: Who, What, When, Where

To begin mapping areas of intrapersonal moral hypocrisy – that is, to find out the ways in which people had subjective impressions that their behaviors and values were in conflict – we conducted several large and simple studies online. We first asked Mechanical Turk workers the following open-ended questions in a randomized order: "What are your most important moral values?", "What are some recent examples of things that you did (or didn't do) that did not live up to your moral values?" and "What are some recent examples of things that you did (or didn't do) that made you feel guilty?"

These responses were first classified independently by three coders into categories that map onto the constructs of Moral Foundations Theory (Graham et al., 2011; 2013): Care/harm (e.g., behaviors that caused physical or emotional suffering, or failures of care such as ignoring the homeless), Fairness/cheating (behaviors that violated justice or fairness, like cheating or cutting in line), Loyalty/betrayal (behaviors that were disloyal to a group, in most cases family or sports teams), Authority/subversion (behaviors that were disrespectful, usually to elder family members or traditions), and Sanctity/degradation (behaviors violating sexual morality or religious beliefs, such as masturbation, porn use, failing to pray, or not attending church). Three additional categories emerged from reading hundreds of responses (see Hofmann et al., 2014, for a similar addition of moral categories): Honesty (in most cases lying to a friend or relative), Work Ethic (values and actions related to industriousness such as "I felt guilty for being lazy at work"), and finally Self-Betterment (e.g. general virtues related to one's character or attitude, such as "I was overly judgmental").

As shown in Figure 1, participants' self-reported "most important values" most often fell into the Honesty (mentioned in 23% of responses) and Care (22%) categories, with the majority of individuals citing values such as being honest, kind, and helpful (Koleva, Meindl, Beall, Iyer, & Graham, 2014).

Figure 1. What are your most important moral values?

When describing their everyday moral failures, people were most likely to mention violations of Honesty (20%) and Loyalty (17%), with the majority of respondents describing lying to or letting down a friend or family member (see Figure 2). The same pattern emerged for the question about sources of guilt: again, failures related to Honesty (15%) and Loyalty (25%) violations (specifically ones directed to close others such as friends and family) were the most common responses (see Figure 3).

Figure 2. What are some recent examples of things that you did (or didn't do) that did not live up to your moral values?


Figure 3. What are some recent examples of things that you did (or didn't do) that made you feel guilty?

These very basic findings (replicated with over 1,000 volunteers at YourMorals.org) lend support to Paul Bloom's (2011; 2013) argument that moral psychology has relied too much on dilemmas and situations involving strangers, and has not paid enough attention to relatives and close others (with respect to whom our moral judgments likely evolved). While most of the scales, tasks, and hypothetical scenarios created to gauge our moral nature involve interactions between strangers involving harm (e.g., trolley dilemmas) or unfairness (e.g., the prisoner's dilemma and other economic games), our results show that when asked to reflect upon their own moral failings, people most often describe violations of honesty and loyalty to relatives and close others (see also Graham, Meindl, & Beall, 2012; Meindl & Graham, 2014).

Given that people clearly consider honesty to be a very important moral trait (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Lasky & Lapsley, 2001; Smith, Smith, & Christopher, 2007; Walker & Pitts, 1999) and most people lie multiple times every day (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996), it should probably come as no surprise that honesty hypocrisy is so prevalent. But the fact that people are cognizant of this level of hypocrisy in their daily lives yet choose not to (or cannot) remedy this weakness in their character does raise questions about the causes and consequences of such value-behavior gaps.

Causes and Consequences of Intrapersonal Moral Hypocrisy

To begin to investigate the causes of intrapersonal moral hypocrisy, we assessed the degree to which moral hypocrisy scores (operationalized as the gap between self-reported moral importance and moral behavior) related to potentially relevant individual differences. Two types of individual differences were of particular interest to us – moral motivation and cognitive style. We assessed the relationship between intrapersonal moral hypocrisy and three types of moral motivation variables: moral identity centrality (the extent to which a person perceives moral

concerns to be important to his or her self-concept), personal moral motivation (the extent to which a person is motivated to act morally for internal rather than external reasons), and social moral motivation (the extent to which a person is motivated to act morally in order to maintain and/or improve their social standing). All people want to maintain high moral self-esteem and moral self-consistency, but there are individual differences in the degree to which people hold these dual desires; one way these individual differences may manifest themselves is in differences in moral identity centrality (Blasi, 1980; 2004). Consequently, moral psychologists have long suspected that moral identity centrality helps reduce intrapersonal moral hypocrisy (Blasi, 1980; Walker, 2004). In fact, Damon and Hart (1992) went so far as to suggest that "the centrality of morality to self may be the single most powerful determiner of concordance between moral judgment and conduct."

For this reason, we predicted that intrapersonal moral hypocrisy would be negatively related to moral identity centrality. Similarly, we expected *personal* moral motivation to also be negatively related to hypocrisy. On the other hand, we suspected that *social* moral motivation – the degree to which people are motivated to act morally in order to avoid social punishment or procure social rewards – would actually be positively related to moral hypocrisy. There are at least two reasons why social moral motivation might be positively related to intrapersonal moral hypocrisy. First, if someone is motivated to act morally for social reasons, they might be less likely to act morally when their behavior is anonymous. Second, if social factors motivate a person to act morally, what they perceive to be moral might shift based on their perceptions of how other people want them to act or what other people believe to be moral. Using the five-item "internalization" subscale of the Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) as a measure of moral identity centrality, and the newly created General Assessment of Moral

Motivation scale (GAMM; Meindl, Beall, & Graham, 2014) to measure personal and social

moral motivation, we found that moral identity centrality is indeed negatively related to

intrapersonal moral hypocrisy scores. We also found that personal moral motivation is negatively

related to intrapersonal moral hypocrisy, whereas social moral motivation is positively related to

moral hypocrisy. These different types of moral motivation relate to hypocrisy not only

regarding generosity and justice, but also regarding other moral domains, such as group loyalty,

authority, purity, and work ethic.

We were also interested in whether critical thinking skills – specifically dogmatic and

categorical thinking versus flexible or open-minded thinking – might relate to moral hypocrisy.

Dogmatic thinking is often interpreted as overly simplistic, "bad" thinking, and flexible thinking

as mature, "good" thinking, and in many contexts this seems intuitively correct. However, recent

research suggests that flexible, creative thinking might actually be detrimental to moral behavior

(Gino & Ariely, 2012), consistent with research suggesting that abstract construals can lead to

more moral hypocrisy (Lammers, 2012). Creative thinkers can use their creativity to concoct

justifications for self-serving immoral behaviors, which then sets off a cognitive cascade that

ends in immoral behavior. It thus stands to reason that inflexible, dogmatic thinkers would be

less likely to formulate justifications for hypocritical behaviors, which would then make it less

likely that they would be able to disengage from personal moral self-sanctions. And indeed, our

data suggest that dogmatic thinkers are less likely to perform intrapersonally hypocritical actions.

Using Individual Differences In Moral Concerns To Reduce Intrapersonal Moral

Hypocrisy

One of the key contributions of Moral Foundations Theory and other taxonomies of values (e.g., Rai & Fiske, 2011; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; Schwartz, 1992) is to empirically illustrate the idea that different individuals have different value orientations. It follows that as we have increasing knowledge of the kinds of activities that reduce moral hypocrisy, the next step is to explore the boundary conditions of these activities and determine which individuals are more or less likely to benefit. This can help us extend the practical benefits of interventions aimed at reducing moral hypocrisy in two ways. First, it allows us to target interventions toward the individuals most likely to benefit. Second, it gives us insight into how we may be able to reduce moral hypocrisy by developing character traits that make people less reactive to particular hypocrisy-inducing situations.

In our current work, we have examined two established interventions known to increase the desire to be a better person: exposure to nature and witnessing moral beauty. Previous research has established that both of these techniques lead to a desire to be a more virtuous person. For example, Weinstein, Pyrzbylski, and Ryan (2009) found that immersion in nature led individuals to be more generous in an economic game. Algoe and Haidt (2009) found that when an act of moral beauty was made salient people were more likely to express a desire to act prosocially. Based on theories that assert the primacy of emotion in moral motivation (Haidt, 2001), we predicted that both of these interventions would be most effective with individuals who had a dispositional tendency to be emotionally affected by them.

In one set of studies (Zhang, Piff, Iyer, Koleva, & Keltner, 2014), experimentally-induced exposure to more beautiful plants led individuals to be willing to volunteer more time toward a prosocial task, but only for those individuals who reported a greater ability to engage with natural beauty, as measured by a validated measure of engagement with nature (Diessner, Solom,

Frost, Parsons, & Davidson, 2008). This experimental evidence converged with a study of the general population showing a positive correlation between prosociality and a tendency to be affected emotionally by natural beauty. The implication is that interventions leveraging exposure to nature should be targeted at those who exhibit an emotional connection with nature.

In another set of studies (Diessner, Iyer, Smith, & Haidt, 2013), we examined the boundary conditions for increased moral motivation when witnessing morally beautiful acts (e.g., people caring for and helping the less fortunate). Replicating the person-situation interaction found in Zhang et. al (2014) and theories developed by Mischel and Shoda (1995), we found a similar pattern of results. Replicating numerous studies on moral elevation (e.g. Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010), individuals presented with a video showing moral beauty reported a greater desire to be a better person and do good specifically when presented with examples of moral beauty, compared to individuals in a control condition where participants were presented with non-moral excellence. However, the effect was not uniform – the experimental effect was greater for individuals who reported a greater dispositional tendency to be affected by moral beauty. Again, the implication is that witnessing morally beautiful acts (the kind ubiquitous on TV shows such as *Extreme Makeover* and *Undercover Boss*), will only affect the segment of the population that is inclined to engage with such stimuli.

Across both studies, important person-situation interactions were discovered that potentially can inform how moral motivation can be affected in the general population. For example, it may make more sense to help individuals connect with nature more emotionally before exposing them to nature, in order to increase prosocial motivation. Similarly, engagement with moral beauty can also be instilled in youth, to facilitate future moral motivation when

witnessing acts of moral beauty. We are hopeful that this research can help practitioners understand moral motivation from the person-by-situation perspective.

Implications of Moral Pluralism for Reducing Moral Hypocrisy

Despite the many different ways moral hypocrisy has been defined, operationalized, and measured by psychological scientists, nearly all these approaches have cast moral hypocrisy as a normatively bad thing, and cast the reduction of moral hypocrisy as a normatively good result to strive for. However, taking a moral-pluralistic approach allows us to see how moral values can often come into conflict – interculturally, interpersonally, and even intrapersonally – and thus allows us to see how getting people to enact their moral values might not be a normatively desired end goal for all people at all times.

In fact, given that people hold multiple moral values, and that many social interactions engage multiple moral motivations and concerns, some types of moral hypocrisy may be necessary components of everyday social life. For example, even though many of our participants reported lying as a recent behavior they felt guilty about, the actual dishonest examples provided suggest that competing moral motives were often in play. For instance, "I lied to my friend I was busy because I was too tired to hang out" appears to be at least partially driven by a desire to spare the friend's feelings, which might be hurt if one were to honestly say "I'd rather just lay in my pajamas and watch TV than hang out with you." This is akin to the concept of "white lies," minor dishonesties in the service of social convenience but also often in the service of caring for the feelings of close others (Koleva et al., 2014). In short, behaving in line with one moral value may in everyday life violate another moral value, and produce an end result even more undesirable than failing to live up to the first value.

In addition to these quotidian examples there are also much more serious reasons why reducing moral hypocrisy might not always be a good thing. For instance, while acts of corporate whistleblowing may be hypocritical with regard to the moral value of loyalty, such hypocrisy can achieve ends more aligned with the competing moral value of fairness (Waytz, Dungan, & Young, 2013). Even more seriously, research on idealistic evil (Baumeister, 1997), tribalism (Glover, 1999), and the "dark side" of moral conviction (Skitka & Mullen, 2002) all indicate that moral values can play an important role in acts of violence, terror, and even genocide. Building on this research, Graham and Haidt (2012) detailed how different moral values (even compassion and peace, paradoxically) can lead to different visions of what's sacred, corresponding visions of what's evil (whatever threatens the sacred), and different forms of idealistic violence intended to eradicate that evil (e.g. shooting abortion doctors, vengeance killings, religious crusades). In all these cases, moral hypocrisy (failing to act on these values, even when you publicly preach them) could actually save lives. If you're someone who believes that truly living your moral values entails becoming a suicide bomber, then those around you would likely prefer you remain a moral hypocrite.

Conclusion

While personality and social psychologists might agree that moral hypocrisy is central to their field, attempts to define and measure the phenomenon have varied greatly. Although most such attempts have treated moral hypocrisy as a necessarily interpersonal phenomenon – involving public claims to morality made in bad faith (*moral duplicity*), or harsher judgments for others than for oneself (*moral double standards*) – we have focused on *moral weakness*, a conflict between moral values and behavior that may be entirely private. Our investigations of

this intrapersonal moral hypocrisy reveal a plurality of value-behavior conflicts and domains of guilt. Moreover, they show that while moral psychologists tend to study moral judgment using scenarios of harms or injustices between strangers, everyday moral hypocrisy is most likely to involve failures of honesty and loyalty with relatives and close others. Taking into account the plurality of moral values – and individual differences in their relative weightings – can increase the effectiveness of interventions aimed at reducing moral hypocrisy. However, moral pluralism both between and within individuals also suggests that reducing moral hypocrisy might not always be a desired end goal for all individuals and all moral values. Future work on the varieties of moral weakness can help uncover such complexities of moral hypocrisy, and of moral life in general.

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