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This paper was presented at the 13th National
Computer Security Conference, Washington, D.C.,
Oct. 1-4, 1990. Although a bit dated, the issues
raised by this paper are still relevant.
Concerning Hackers Who Break into Computer System
By Dorothy E. Denning
Digital Equipment Corp., Systems Research Center
130 Lytton Ave., Palo Alto, CA 94301
415-853-2252, denning@src.dec.com
Abstract
A diffuse group of people often called
``hackers'' has been characterized as unethical,
irresponsible, and a serious danger to society
for actions related to breaking into computer
systems. This paper attempts to construct a
picture of hackers, their concerns, and the
discourse in which hacking takes place. My
initial finding suggest that hackers are learners
and explorers who want to help rather than cause
damage, and who often have very high standards of
behavior. My findings also suggest that the
discourse surrounding hacking belongs at the very
least to the gray areas between larger conflicts
that we are experiencing at every level of
society and business in an information age where
many are not computer literate.
These conflicts are between the idea that
information cannot be owned and the idea that it
can, and between law enforcement and the First
and Fourth Amendments. Hackers have raised
serious issues about values and practices in an
information society. Based on my findings, I
recommend that we work closely with hackers, and
suggest several actions that might be taken.
1. Introduction
The world is crisscrossed with many different
networks that are used to deliver essential
services and basic necessities -- electric power
water, fuel, food, goods, to name a few. These
networks are all publicly accessible and hence
vulnerable to attacks, and yet virtually no
attacks or disruptions actually occur.
The world of computer networking seems to be an
anomaly in the firmament of networks. Stories
about attacks, break-ins, disruptions, theft of
information, modification of files, and the like
appear frequently in the newspapers. A diffuse
group called ``hackers'' is often the target of
scorn and blame for these actions. Why are
computer networks any different from other
vulnerable public networks? Is the difference
the result of growing pains in a young field? Or
is it the reflection of deeper tensions in our
emerging information society?
There are no easy or immediate answers to these
questions. Yet it is important to our future in
a networked, information-dependent world that we
come to grips with them. I am deeply interested
in them. This paper is my report of what I have
discovered in the early stages of what promises
to be a longer investigation. I have
concentrated my attention in these early stages
on the hackers themselves. Who are they? What
do they say? What motivates them? What are
their values? What do that have to say about
public policies regarding information and
computers? What do they have to say about
computer security?
From such a profile I expect to be able to
construct a picture of the discourses in which
hacking takes place. By a discourse I mean the
invisible background of assumptions that
transcends individuals and governs our ways of
thinking, speaking, and acting. My initial
findings lead me to conclude that this discourse
belongs at the very least to the gray areas
between larger conflicts that we are experiencing
at every level of society and business, the
conflict between the idea that information cannot
be owned and the idea that it can, and the
conflict between law enforcement and the First
and Fourth Amendments.
But, enough of the philosophy. On with the
story!
2. Opening Moves
In late fall of 1989, Frank Drake (not his real
name), Editor of the now defunct cyberpunk
magazine W.O.R.M., invited me to be interviewed
for the magazine. In accepting the invitation, I
hoped that something I might say would discourage
hackers from breaking into systems. I was also
curious about the hacker culture. This seemed
like a good opportunity to learn about it.
The interview was conducted electronically. I
quickly discovered that I had much more to learn
from Drake's questions than to teach. For
example, he asked: ``Is providing computer
security for large databases that collect
information on us a real service? How do you
balance the individual's privacy vs. the
corporations?'' This question surprised me.
Nothing that I had read about hackers ever
suggested that they might care about privacy. He
also asked: ``What has [the DES] taught us about
what the government's (especially NSA's) role in
cryptography should be?'' Again, I was surprised
to discover a concern for the role of the
government in computer security. I did not know
at the time that I would later discover
considerable overlap in the issues discussed by
hackers and those of other computer professionals.
I met with Drake to discuss his questions and
views. After our meeting, we continued our
dialog electronically with me interviewing him.
This gave me the opportunity to explore his views
in greater depth. Both interviews appear in
``Computers Under Attack,'' edited by Peter
Denning [DenningP90].
My dialog with Drake increased my curiosity about
hackers. I read articles and books by or about
hackers. In addition, I had discussions with
nine hackers whom I will not mention by name.
Their ages ranged from 17 to 28.
The word ``hacker'' has taken on many different
meanings ranging from 1) ``a person who enjoys
learning the details of computer system and how
to stretch their capabilities'' to 2) ``a
malicious or inquisitive meddler who tries to
discover information by poking around.. possibly
by deceptive or illegal means ...'' [Steele83]
The hackers described in this paper satisfy both
of these definitions, although all of the hackers
I spoke with said they did not engage in or
approve of malicious acts that damage systems or
files. Thus this paper is not about malicious
hackers. Indeed, my research so far suggests
that there are very few malicious hackers.
Neither is this paper about career criminals who,
for example, defraud businesses, or about people
who use stolen credit cards to purchase goods.
The characteristics of many of the hackers I am
writing about are summed up in the words of one
of the hackers: ``A hacker is someone that
experiments with systems... [Hacking] is playing
with systems and making them do what they were
never intended to do. Breaking in and making
free calls is just a small part of that. Hacking
is also about freedom of speech and free access
to information -- being able to find out
anything. There is also the David and Goliath
side of it, the underdog vs. the system, and the
ethic of being a folk hero, albeit a minor one.''
Richard Stallman, founder of the Free Software
Foundation who call himself a hacker according to
the first sense of the word above recommends
calling security-breaking hackers ``crackers''
[Stallman84]. While this description may be more
accurate, I shall use the term ``hacker'' since
the people I am writing about call themselves
hackers and all are interested in learning about
computer and communication systems. However,
there are many people like Stallman who call
themselves hackers and do not engage in illegal
or deceptive practices; this paper is also not
about those hackers.
In what follows I will report on what I have
learned about hackers from hackers. I will
organize the discussion around the principal
domains of concerns I observed. I recommend
Meyer's thesis [Meyer89] for a more detailed
treatment of the hackers' social culture and
networks, and Meyer and Thomas [MeyerThomas90]
for an interesting interpretation of the
computer underground as a postmodernist rejection
of conventional culture that substitutes
``rational technological control of the present
for an anarchic and playful future.''
I do not pretend to know all the concerns that
hackers have, nor do I claim to have conducted a
scientific study. Rather, I hope that my own
informal study motivates others to explore the
area further. It is essential that we as
computer security professionals take into account
hackers' concerns in the design of our policies
procedures, laws regulating computer and
information access, and educational programs.
Although I speak about security-breaking hackers
as a group, their competencies, actions, and
views are not all the same. Thus, it is equally
important that our policies and programs take
into account individual differences.
In focusing on what hackers say and do, I do not
mean for a moment to set aside the concerns of
the owners and users of systems that hackers
break into, the concerns of law enforcement
personnel, or our own concerns as computer
security professionals. But I do recommend that
we work closely with hackers as well as these
other groups to design new approaches and
programs for addressing the concerns of all.
Like ham radio operators, hackers exist, and it
is in our best interest that we learn to
communicate and work with them rather than
against them.
I will suggest some actions that we might
consider taking, and I invite others to reflect
on these and suggest their own. Many of these
suggestions are from the hackers themselves;
others came from the recommendations of the ACM
Panel on Hacking [Lee86] and from colleagues.
I grouped the hackers' concerns into five
categories: access to computers and information
for learning; thrill, excitement and challenge;
ethics and avoiding damage; public image and
treatment and privacy and first amendment rights.
These are discussed in the next five subsections.
I have made an effort to present my findings as
uncritical observations. The reader should not
infer that I either approve or disapprove of
actions hackers take.
3. Access to Computers and Information for Learning
Although Levy's book ``Hackers'' [Levy84] is not
about today's security-breaking hackers, it
articulates and interprets a ``hacker ethic''
that is shared by many of these hackers. The
ethic includes two key principles that were
formulated in the early days of the AI Lab at
MIT: ``Access to computers -- and anything which
might teach you something about the way the world
works -- should be unlimited and total,'' and
``All information should be free.'' In the
context in which these principles were
formulated, the computers of interest were
research machines and the information was
software and systems information.
Since Stallman is a leading advocate of open
systems and freedom of information, especially
software, I asked him what he means by this. He
said: ``I believe that all generally useful
information should be free. By `free' I am not
referring to price, but rather to the freedom to
copy the information and to adapt it to one's own
uses.'' By ``generally useful'' he does not
include confidential information about
individuals or credit card information, for
example. He further writes: ``When information
is generally useful, redistributing it makes
humanity wealthier no matter who is distributing
and no matter who is receiving.'' Stallman has
argued strongly against user interface copyright,
claiming that it does not serve the users or
promote the evolutionary process [Stallman90].
I asked hackers whether all systems should be
accessible and all information should be free.
They said that it is OK if some systems are
closed and some information, mainly confidential
information about individuals, is not accessible.
They make a distinction between information about
security technology, e.g., the DES, and
confidential information protected by that
technology, arguing that it is the former that
should be accessible. They said that
information hoarding is inefficient and slows
down evolution of technology. They also said
that more systems should be open so that idle
resources are not wasted. One hacker said that
the high costs of communication hurts the growth
of the information economy.
These views of information sharing seem to go
back at least as far as the 17th and 18th
Centuries. Samuelson [Samuelson89] notes that
``The drafters of the Constitution, educated in
the Enlightenment tradition, shared that era's
legacy of faith in the enabling powers of
knowledge for society as well as the
individual.'' She writes that our current
copyright laws, which protect the expression of
information, but not the information itself, are
based on the belief that unfettered and
widespread dissemination of information promotes
technological progress. (Similarly for patent
laws which protect devices and processes, not the
information about them.) She cites two recent
court cases where courts reversed the historical
trend and treated information as ownable
property. She raises questions about whether in
entering the Information Age where information is
the source of greatest wealth, we have outgrown
the Enlightenment tradition and are coming to
treat information as property.
In a society where knowledge is said to be power,
Drake expressed particular concern about what he
sees as a growing information gap between the
rich and poor. He would like to see information
that is not about individuals be made public,
although it could still be owned. He likes to
think that companies would actually find it to
their advantage to share information. He noted
how IBM's disclosure of the PC allowed developers
to make more products for the computers, and how
Adobe's disclosure of their fonts helped them
compete against the Apple-Microsoft deal. He
recognizes that in our current political
framework, it is difficult to make all
information public, because complicated
structures have been built on top of an
assumption that certain information will be kept
secret. He cites our defense policy, which is
founded on secrecy for military information, as
an example.
Hackers say they want access to information and
computing and network resources in order to
learn. Both Levy [Levy84] and Landreth
[Landreth89] note that hackers have an intense,
compelling interest in computers and learning,
and many go into computers as a profession.
Some hackers break into systems in order to
learn more about how the systems work. Landreth
says these hackers want to remain undiscovered so
that they can stay on the system as long as
possible. Some of them devote most of their time
to learning how to break the locks and other
security mechanisms on systems; their background
in systems and programming varies considerably.
One hacker wrote ``A hacker sees a security hole
and takes advantage of it because it is there,
not to destroy information or steal. I think
our activities would be analogous to someone
discovering methods of acquiring information in
a library and becoming excited and perhaps
engrossed.''
We should not underestimate the effectiveness of
the networks in which hackers learn their craft.
They do research, learn about systems, work in
groups, write, and teach others. One hacker said
that he belongs to a study group with the mission
of churning out files of information and learning
as much as possible. Within the group, people
specialize, collaborate on research project,
share information and news, write articles, and
teach other about their areas of specialization.
Hackers have set up a private system of education
that engages them, teaches them to think, and
allows them to apply their knowledge in
purposeful, if not always legal, activity.
Ironically, many of our nation's classrooms have
been criticized for providing a poor learning
environment that seems to emphasize memorization
rather than thinking and reasoning. One hacker
reported that through volunteer work with a local
high school, he was trying to get students turned
on to learning.
Many hackers say that the legitimate computer
access they have through their home and school
computers do not meet their needs. One student
told me that his high school did not offer
anything beyond elementary courses in BASIC and
PASCAL, and that he was bored by these. Hans
Huebner, a hacker in Germany who goes by the name
Pengo, wrote in a note to the RISKS Forum
[Huebner89] : ``I was just interested in
computers, not in the data which has been kept on
their disks. As I was going to school at that
time, I didn't even have the money to buy [my]
own computer. Since CP/M (which was the most
sophisticate OS I could use on machines which I
had legal access to) didn't turn me on anymore,
I enjoyed the lax security of the systems I had
access to by using X.25 networks. You might
point out that I should have been patient and
wait[ed] until I could go to the university and
use their machines. Some of you might understand
that waiting was just not the thing I was keen on
in those days.''
Brian Harvey, in his position paper [Harvey86]
for the ACM Panel on Hacking, claims that the
computer medium available to students, e.g.,
BASIC and floppy disks, is inadequate for
challenging intellectual work. His
recommendation is that students be given access
to real computing power, and that they be taught
how to use that power responsibly. He describes
a program he created at a public high school in
Massachusetts during the period 1979-1982. They
installed a PDP-11/70 and let students and
teachers carry out the administration of the
system. Harvey assessed that putting the burden
of dealing with the problems of malicious users
on the students themselves was a powerful
educational force. He also noted that the
students who had the skill and interest to be
password hackers were discouraged from this
activity because they also wanted to keep the
trust of their colleagues in order that they
could acquire ``superuser'' status on the system.
Harvey also makes an interesting analogy between
teaching computing and teaching karate. In
karate instruction, students are introduce to the
real, adult community. They are given access to
a powerful, deadly weapon, and at the same time
are taught discipline and to not abuse the art.
Harvey speculates that the reason that students
do not misuse their power is that they know they
are being trusted with something important, and
they want to live up to that trust. Harvey
applied this principle when he set up the school
system.
The ACM panel endorsed Harvey's recommendation,
proposing a three-tiered computing environment
with local, district-wide, and nation-wide
networks. They recommended that computer
professionals participate in this effort as
mentors and role models. They also recommended
that outside of schools, government and industry
be encouraged to establish regional computing
centers using donated or re-cycled equipment;
that students be apprenticed to local companies
either part-time on a continuing basis or on a
periodic basis; and, following a suggestion from
Felsenstein [Felsenstein86] for a ``Hacker's
League,'' that a league analogous to the Amateur
Radio Relay League be established to make
contributed resources available for educational
purposes.
Drake said he liked these recommendations. He
said that if hackers were given access to
powerful systems through a public account system,
they would supervise themselves. He also
suggested that Computer Resource Centers be
established in low-income areas in order to help
the poor get access to information. Perhaps
hackers could help run the centers and teach the
members of the community how to use the
facilities. One of my colleagues suggested
cynically that the hackers would only use this to
teach the poor how to hack rich people's systems.
A hacker responded by saying this was ridiculous;
hackers would not teach people how to break into
systems, but rather how to use computers
effectively and not be afraid of them. In
addition, the hackers I spoke with who had given
up illegal activities said they stopped doing so
when they got engaged in other work.
Geoff Goodfellow and Richard Stallman have
reported that they have given hackers accounts on
systems that they manage, and that the hackers
have not misused the trust granted to them.
Perhaps universities could consider providing
accounts to pre-college students on the basis of
recommendations from their teachers or parents.
The students might be challenged to work on the
same homework problems assigned in courses or to
explore their own interests. Students who
strongly dislike the inflexibility of classroom
learning might excel in an environment that
allows them to learn on their own, it much the
way that hackers have done.
4. Thrill, Excitement, and Challenge
One hacker wrote that ``Hackers understand
something basic about computers, and that is that
they can be enjoyed. I know none who hack for
money, or hack to frighten the company, or hack
for anything but fun.''
In the words of another hacker, ``Hacking was the
ultimate cerebral buzz for me. I would come home
from another dull day at school, turn my computer
on, and become a member of the hacker elite. It
was a whole different world where there were no
condescending adults and you were judged only by
your talent. I would first check in to the
private Bulletin Boards where other people who
were like me would hang out, see what the news
was in the community, and trade some info with
people across the country. Then I would start
actually hacking. My brain would be going a
million miles an hour and I'd basically
completely forget about my body as I would jump
from one computer to another trying to find a
path into my target. It was the rush of working
on a puzzle coupled with the high of discovery
many magnitudes intensified. To go along with
the adrenaline rush was the illicit thrill of
doing something illegal. Every step I made could
be the one that would bring the authorities
crashing down on me. I was on the edge of
technology and exploring past it, spelunking
into electronic caves where I wasn't supposed to
be.''
The other hackers I spoke with made similar
statements about the fun and challenge of
hacking. In SPIN magazine [Dibbel90], reporter
Julian Dibbell speculated that much of the thrill
comes from the dangers associated with the
activity, writing that ``the technology just
lends itself to cloak-and-dagger drama,'' and
that ``hackers were already living in a world in
which covert action was nothing more than a game
children played.''
Eric Corley [Corley89] characterizes hacking as
an evolved form of mountain climbing. In
describing an effort to construct a list of
active mailboxes on a Voice Messaging System, he
writes ``I suppose the main reason I'm wasting my
time pushing all these buttons is simply so that
I can make a list of something that I'm not
supposed to have and be the first person to
accomplish this.'' He said that he was not
interested in obtaining an account of his own on
the system. Gordon Meyer says he found this to
be a recurring theme: ``We aren't supposed to be
able to do this, but we can'' -- so they do.
One hacker said he was now working on anti-viral
programming. He said it was almost as much fun
as breaking into systems, and that it was an
intellectual battle against the virus author.
5. Ethics and Avoiding Damage
All of the hackers I spoke with said that
malicious hacking was morally wrong. They said
that most hackers are not intentionally
malicious, and that they themselves are concerned
about causing accidental damage. When I asked
Drake about the responsibility of a person with a
PC and modem, his reply included not erasing or
modifying anyone else's data, and not causing a
legitimate user on a system any problems.
Hackers say they are outraged when other hackers
cause damage or use resources that would be
missed, even if the results are unintentional and
due to incompetence. One hacker wrote ``I have
ALWAYS strived to do NO damage, and inconvenience
as few people as possible. I NEVER, EVER, EVER
DELETE A FILE. One of the first commands I do on
a new system is disable the delete file
command.'' Some hackers say that it is unethical
to give passwords and similar security-related
information to persons who might do damage. In
the recent incident where a hacker broke into
Bell South and downloaded a text file on the
emergency 911 service, hackers say that there was
no intention to use this knowledge to break into
or sabotage the 911 system. According to
Emmanuel Goldstein [Goldstein90], the file did
not even contain information about how to break
into the 911 system.
The hackers also said that some break-ins were
unethical, e.g., breaking into hospital systems,
and that it is wrong to read confidential
information about individuals or steal classified
information. All said it was wrong to commit
fraud for personal profit.
Although we as computer security professionals
often disagree with hackers about what
constitutes damage, the ethical standards listed
sound much like our own. Where the hackers'
ethics differs from the standards adopted by most
in the computer security community is that
hackers say it is not unethical to break into
many systems, use idle computer and
communications resources, and download system
files in order to learn. Goldstein says that
hacking is not wrong: it is not the same as
stealing, and uncovers design flaws and security
deficiencies [Goldstein89].
Brian Reid speculates that a hacker's ethics may
come from not being raised properly as a
civilized member of society, and not appreciating
the rules of living in society. One hacker
responded to this with ``What does `being brought
up properly' mean? Some would say that it is
`good' to keep to yourself, mind your own
business. Other might argue that it is healthy
to explore, take risks, be curious and
discover.'' Brian Harvey [Harvey86] notes that
many hackers are adolescents, and that
adolescents are at a less developed stage of
moral development than adults, where they might
not see how the effects of their actions hurt
others. Larry Martin [Martin89] claims that
parents, teachers, the press, and others in
society are not aware of their responsibility to
contribute to instilling ethical values
associated with computer use. This could be the
consequence of the youth of the computing field;
many people are still computer illiterate and
cultural norms may be lagging behind advances in
technology and the growing dependency on that
technology by businesses and society. Hollinger
and Lanza-Kaduce speculate that the cultural
normative messages about the use and abuse of
computer technology have been driven by the
adoption of criminal laws
[HollingerLanza-Kaduce88], which have been mainly
in the last decade. They also speculate that
hacking may be encouraged during the process of
becoming computer literate. Some of my
colleagues say that hackers are irresponsible.
One hacker responded ``I think it's a strong
indication of the amount of responsibility shown
that so FEW actually DAMAGING incidents are
known.''
But we must not overlook that the differences in
ethics also reflect a difference in philosophy
about information and information handling
resources; whereas hackers advocate sharing, we
seem to be advocating ownership as property. The
differences also represent an opportunity to
examine our own ethical behavior and our
practices for information sharing and protection.
For example, one hacker wrote ``I will accept
that it is morally wrong to copy some proprietary
software, however, I think that it is morally
wrong to charge $6000 for a program that is only
around 25K long.'' Hence, I shall go into a few
of the ethical points raised by hackers more
closely. It is not a simple case of good or
mature (us) against bad or immature (hackers), or
of teaching hackers a list of rules.
Many computer professionals argue the moral
questions by analogy, e.g., see Martin [Martin89].
The analogies are then used to justify their
judgment of a hacker's actions as unethical.
Breaking into a system is compared with breaking
into a house, and downloading information and
using computer and telecommunications services is
compared with stealing tangible goods. But, say
hackers, the situations are not the same. When
someone breaks into a house, the objective is to
steal goods, which are often irreplaceable, and
property is often damaged in the process. By
contrast, when a hacker breaks into a system, the
objective is to learn and avoid causing damage.
Downloaded information is copied, not stolen, and
still exists on the original system. Moreover,
as noted earlier, information has not been
traditionally regarded as property. Dibbel
[Dibbel90] says that when the software industries
and phone companies claim losses of billions of
dollars to piracy, they are not talking about
goods that disappear from the shelves and could
have been sold.
We often say that breaking into a system implies
a lack of caring for the system's owner and
authorized users. But, one hacker says that the
ease of breaking into a system reveals a lack of
caring on the part of the system manager to
protect user and company assets, or failure on
the part of vendors to warn managers about the
vulnerabilities of their systems. He estimated
his success rate of getting in at 10-15%, and
that is without spending more than an hour on any
one target system. Another hacker says that he
sees messages from vendors notifying the
managers, but that the managers fail to take
action.
Richard Pethia of CERT (Computer Emergency
Response Team) reports that they seldom see cases
of malicious damage caused by hackers but that
the break-ins are nevertheless disruptive because
system users and administrators want to be sure
that nothing was damaged. (CERT suggests that
sites reload system software from secure backups
and change all user passwords in order to protect
against possible back doors and Trojan Horses
that might have been planted by the hacker.
Pethia also noted that prosecutors are generally
called for government sites, and are being called
for non-government sites with increasing
frequency.) Pethia says that break-ins also
generate a loss of trust in the computing
environment, and may lead to adoption of new
policies that are formulated in a panic or
management edicts that severely restrict
connectivity to outside systems. Brian Harvey
says that hackers cause damage by increasing the
amount of paranoia, which in turn leads to
tighter security controls that diminish the
quality of life for the users. Hackers respond
to these points by saying they are the scapegoats
for systems that are not adequately protected.
They say that the paranoia is generated by
ill-founded fears and media distortions (I will
return to this point later), and that security
need not be oppressive to keep hackers out; it
is mainly making sure that passwords and system
defaults are well-chosen.
Pethia says that some intruders seem to be
disruptive to prove a point, such as that the
systems are vulnerable, the security personnel
are incompetent, or ``it's not nice to say bad
things about hackers.'' In the NY Times, John
Markoff [Markoff90] wrote that the hacker who
claimed to have broken into Cliff Stoll's system
said he was upset by Stoll's portrayal of hackers
in ``The Cuckoo's Egg'' [Stoll90]. Markoff
reported that the caller said: ``He [Stoll was
going on about how he hates all hackers, and he
gave pretty much of a one-sided view of who
hackers are.''
``The Cuckoo's Egg'' captures much of the popular
stereotypes of hackers. Criminologist Jim Thomas
criticizes it for presenting a simplified view of
the world, one where everything springs from the
forces of light (us) or of darkness (hackers)
[Thomas90]. He claims that Stoll fails to see
the similarities between his own activities
(e.g., monitoring communications, ``borrowing''
monitors without authorization, shutting off
network access without warning, and lying to get
information he wants) and those of hackers. He
points out Stoll's use of pejorative words such
as ``varmint'' to describe hackers, and Stoll's
quote of a colleague: ``They're technically
skilled but ethically bankrupt programmers
without any respect for others' work -- or
privacy. They're not destroying one or two
programs. They're trying to wreck the
cooperation that builds our networks.''
[Stoll90, p. 159] Thomas writes ``at an
intellectual level, [Stoll] provides a
persuasive, but simplistic, moral imagery of the
nature of right and wrong, and provides what --
to a lay reader -- would seem a compelling
justification for more statutes and severe
penalties against the computer underground. This
is troublesome for two reasons. First, it leads
to a mentality of social control by law
enforcement during a social phase when some would
argue we are already over-controlled. Second, it
invokes a punishment model that assumes we can
stamp out behaviors to which we object if only
we apprehend and convict a sufficient number of
violators. ... There is little evidence that
punishment will in the long run reduce an given
offense, and the research of Gordon Meyer and I
suggests that criminalization may, in fact,
contribute to the growth of the computer
underground.''
6. Public Image and Treatment
Hackers express concern about their negative
public image and identity. As noted earlier,
hackers are often portrayed as being
irresponsible and immoral. One hacker said that
``government propaganda is spreading an image of
our being at best, sub-human, depraved,
criminally inclined, morally corrupt, low life.
We need to prove that the activities that we are
accused of (crashing systems, interfering with
life support equipment, robbing banks, and
jamming 911 lines) are as morally abhorrent to us
as they are to the general public.''
The public identity of an individual or group is
generated in part by the actions of the group
interacting with the standards of the community
observing those actions. What then accounts for
the difference between the hacker's public image
and what they say about themselves? One
explanation may be the different standards.
Outside the hacking community, the simple act of
breaking into systems is regarded as unethical by
many. The use of pejorative words like
``vandal'' and ``varmint'' reflect this
discrepancy in ethics. Even the word
``criminal'' carries with it connotations of
someone evil; hackers say they are not criminal
in this sense. Katie Hafner notes that Robert
Morris, who was convicted of launching the
Internet worm, was likened to a terrorist even
though the worm did not destroy data [Hafner90].
Distortions of events and references to potential
threats also create an image of persons who are
dangerous. Regarding the 911 incident where a
hacker downloaded a file from Bell South,
Goldstein reported ``Quickly, headlines screamed
that hackers had broken into the 911 system and
were interfering with emergency telephone calls
to the police. One newspaper report said there
were no indications that anyone had died or been
injured as a result of the intrusions. What a
relief. Too bad it wasn't true.'' [Goldstein90]
In fact, the hackers involved with the 911 text
file had not broken into the 911 system. The
dollar losses attributed to hacking incidents
also are often highly inflated.
Thomas and Meyer [ThomasMeyer90] say that the
rhetoric depicting hackers as a dangerous evil
contributes to a ``witch hunt'' mentality,
wherein a group is first labeled as dangerous,
and then enforcement agents are mobilized to
exercise the alleged social evil. They see the
current sweeps against hackers as part of a
reaction to a broader fear of change, rather than
to the actual crimes committed.
Hackers say they are particularly concerned that
computer security professionals and system
managers do not appear to understand hackers or
be interested in their concerns. Hackers say
that system managers treat them like enemies and
criminals, rather than as potential helpers in
their task of making their systems secure. This
may reflect managers' fears about hackers, as
well as their responsibilities to protect the
information on their systems. Stallman says that
the strangers he encounters using his account are
more likely to have a chip on their shoulder than
in the past; he attributes this to a harsh
enforcer mentality adopted by the establishment.
He says that network system managers start out
with too little trust and a hostile attitude
toward strangers that few of the strangers
deserve. One hacker said that system managers
show a lack of openness to those who want to
learn.
Stallman also says that the laws make the hacker
scared to communicate with anyone even slightly
``official,'' because that person might try to
track the hacker down and have him or her
arrested. Drake raised the issue of whether the
laws could differentiate between malicious and
nonmalicious hacking, in support of a ``kinder,
gentler'' relationship between hackers and
computer security people. In fact, many states
such as California initially passed computer
crime laws that excluded malicious hacking; it
was only later that these laws were amended to
include nonmalicious actions
[HollingerLanza-Kaduce88]. Hollinger and
Lanza-Kaduce speculate that these amendments and
other new laws were catalyzed mainly by media
events, especially the report on the ``414
hackers'' and the movie ``War Games,'' which
created a perception of hacking as extremely
dangerous, even if that perception was not based
on facts.
Hackers say they want to help system managers
make their systems more secure. They would like
managers to recognize and use their knowledge
about design flaws and the outsider threat
problem. Landreth [Landreth89] suggests ways in
which system managers can approach hackers in
order to turn them into colleagues, and
Goodfellow also suggests befriending hackers
[Goodfellow83]. John Draper (Cap'n Crunch) says
it would help if system managers and the
operators of phone companies and switches could
cooperate in tracing a hacker without bringing in
law enforcement authorities.
Drake suggests giving hackers free access in
exchange for helping with security, a suggestion
that I also heard from several hackers. Drake
says that the current attitude of treating
hackers as enemies is not very conducive to a
solution, and by belittling them, we only cause
ourselves problems.
I asked some of the hackers whether they'd be
interested in breaking into systems if the rules
of the ``game'' were changed so that instead of
being threatened by prosecution, they were
invited to leave a ``calling card'' giving their
name, phone number, and method of breaking in.
In exchange, they would get recognition and
points for each vulnerability they discovered.
Most were interested in playing; one hacker said
he would prefer monetary reward since he was
supporting himself. Any system manager
interested in trying this out could post a
welcome message inviting hackers to leave their
cards. This approach could have the advantage
of not only letting the hackers contribute to
the security of the system, but of allowing the
managers to quickly recognize the potentially
malicious hackers, since they are unlikely to
leave their cards. Perhaps if hackers are given
the opportunity to make contributions outside
the underground, this will dampen their desire
to pursue illegal activities.
Several hackers said that they would like to be
able to pursue their activities legally and for
income. They like breaking into systems, doing
research on computer security, and figuring out
how to protect against vulnerabilities. They
say they would like to be in a position where
they have permission to hack systems. Goodfellow
suggests hiring hackers to work on tiger teams
that are commissioned to locate vulnerabilities
in systems through penetration testing. Baird
Info-Systems Safeguards, Inc., a security
consulting firm, report that they have employed
hackers on several assignments [Baird87]. They
say the hackers did not violate their trust or
the trust of their clients, and performed in an
outstanding manner. Baird believes that system
vulnerabilities can be better identified by
employing people who have exploited systems.
One hacker suggested setting up a clearinghouse
that would match hackers with companies that
could use their expertise, while maintaining
anonymity of the hackers and ensuring
confidentiality of all records. Another hacker,
in describing an incident where he discovered a
privileged account without a password, said
``What I (and others) wish for is a way that
hackers can give information like this to a
responsible source, AND HAVE HACKERS GIVEN CREDIT
FOR HELPING! As it is, if someone told them that
`I'm a hacker, and I REALLY think you should
know...' they would freak out, and run screaming
to the SS [Secret Service] or the FBI.
Eventually, the person who found it would be
caught, and hauled away on some crazy charge.
If they could only just ACCEPT that the hacker
was trying to help!'' The clearinghouse could
also provide this type of service.
Hackers are also interested in security policy
issues. Drake expressed concern over how we
handle information about computer security
vulnerabilities. He argues that it is better to
make this information public than cover it up and
pretend that it does not exist, and cites the
CERT to illustrate how this approach can be
workable. Other hackers, however, argue for
restricting initial dissemination of flaws to
customers and users. Drake also expressed
concern about the role of the government,
particularly the military, in cryptography. He
argues that NSA's opinion on a cryptographic
standard should be taken with a large grain of
salt because of their code breaking role.
Some security specialists are opposed to hiring
hackers for security work, and Eugene Spafford
has urged people not to do business wit any
company that hires a convicted hacker to work
in the security area [ACM90]. He says that
``This is like having a known arsonist install a
fire alarm.'' But, the laws are such that a
person can be convicted for having done nothing
other than break into a system; no serious damage
(i.e., no ``computer arson'') is necessary. Many
of our colleagues admit to having broken into
systems in the past, e.g., Geoff Goodfellow
[Goodfellow83] and Brian Reid [Frenkel87]; Reid
is quoted as saying that because of the knowledge
he gained breaking into systems as a kid, he was
frequently called in to help catch people who
break in. Spafford says that times have changed,
and that this method of entering the field is no
longer socially acceptable, and fails to provide
adequate training in computer science and
computer engineering [Spafford89]. However, from
what I have observed, many hackers do have
considerable knowledge about telecommunications,
data security, operating systems, programming
languages, networks, and cryptography. But, I am
not challenging a policy to hire competent people
of sound character. Rather, I am challenging a
strict policy that uses economic pressure to
close a field of activity to all persons
convicted of breaking into systems. It is enough
that a company is responsible for the behavior of
its employees. Each hacker can be considered for
employment base on his or her own competency and
character. Some people have called for stricter
penalties for hackers, including prison terms, in
order to send a strong deterrent message to
hackers John Draper, who was incarcerated for his
activities in the 1970's, argues that in practice
this will only make the problem worse. He told
me that he was forced under threat to teach other
inmates his knowledge of communications systems.
He believes that prison sentences will serve only
to spread hacker's knowledge to career criminals.
He said he was never approached by criminals
outside the prison, but that inside the prison
they had control over him.
One hacker said that by clamping down on the
hobbyist underground, we will only be left with
the criminal underground. He said that without
hackers to uncover system vulnerabilities, the
holes will be left undiscovered, to be utilized
by those likely to cause real damage.
Goldstein argues that the existing penalties are
already way out of proportion to the acts
committed, and that the reason is because of
computers [Goldstein89]. He says that if Kevin
Mitnick had committed crimes similar to those he
committed but without a computer, he would have
been classified as a mischief maker and maybe
fine $100 for trespassing; instead, he was put in
jail without bail [Goldstein89]. Craig Neidorf,
a publisher and editor of the electronic
newsletter ``Phrack,'' faces up to 31 years and a
fine of $122,000 for receiving, editing, and
transmitting the downloaded text file on the 911
system [Goldstein90].
7. Privacy and the First and Fourth Amendments
The hackers I spoke with advocated privacy
protection for sensitive information about
individuals. They said they are not interested
in invading people's privacy, and that they
limited their hacking activities to acquiring
information about computer systems or how to
break into them. There are, of course, hackers
who break into systems such as the TRW credit
database. Emanuel Goldstein argues that such
invasions of privacy took place before the hacker
arrived [Harpers90]. Referring to credit
reports, government files, motor vehicle records,
and the ``megabytes of data piling up about each
of us,'' he says that thousands of people
legally can see and use this data, much of it
erroneous. He claims that the public has been
misinformed about the databases, and that hackers
have become scapegoats for the holes in the
systems. One hacker questioned the practice of
storing sensitive personal information on open
systems with dial-up access, the accrual of the
information, the methods used to acquire it, and
the purposes to which it is put. Another hacker
questioned the inclusion of religion and race in
credit records.
Drake told me that he was concerned about the
increasing amount of information about
individuals that is stored in large data banks,
and the inability of the individual to have much
control over the use of that information. He
suggests that the individual might be co-owner of
information collected about him or her, with
control over the use of that information. He
also says that an individual should be free to
withhold personal information, of course paying
the consequences of doing so (e.g., not getting a
drivers license or credit card). (In fact, all
Federal Government forms are required to contain
a Privacy Act Statement that states how the
information being collected will be used and, in
some cases, giving the option of withholding the
information.)
Goldstein has also challenged the practices of
law enforcement agencies in their attempt to
crack down on hackers [Goldstein90]. He said
that all incoming and outgoing electronic mail
used by ``Phrack'' was monitored before the
newsletter was shutdown by authorities. ``Had a
printed magazine been shut down in this fashion
after having all of their mail opened and read,
even the most thick-headed sensationalist media
types would have caught on: hey, isn't that a
violation of the First Amendment?'' He also
cites the shutdown of several bulletin boards
as part of Operation Sun Devil, and quotes the
administrator of the bulletin board Zygot as
saying ``Should I start reading my users' mail
to make sure they aren't saying anything
naughty? Should I snoop through all the files
to make sure everyone is being good? This whole
affair is rather chilling.'' The administrator
for the public system The Point wrote ``Today,
there is no law or precedent which affords me
... the same legal rights that other common
carriers have against prosecution should some
other party (you) use my property (The Point)
for illegal activities. That worries me ...''
About 40 personal computer systems and 23,000
data disks were seized under Operation Sun Devil,
a two-year investigation involving the FBI,
Secret Service, and other federal and local law
enforcement officials. In addition, the Secret
Service acknowledges that its agents, acting as
legitimate users, had secretly monitored
computer bulletin boards [Markoff90a]. Markoff
reports that California Representative Don
Edwards, industry leader Mitchell Kapor, and
civil liberties advocates are alarmed by these
government actions, saying that they challenge
freedom of speech under the First Amendment and
protection against searches and seizures under
the Fourth Amendment Markoff asks: ``Will fear
of hackers bring oppression?''
John Barlow writes ``The Secret Service may
actually have done service for those of us who
love liberty. They have provided us with a
devil. And devils, among their other galvanizing
virtues, are just great for clarifying the issues
and putting iron in you spine.'' [Barlow90] Some
of the questions that Barlow says need to be
addressed include ``What are data and what is
free speech? How does one treat property which
has no physical form and can be infinitely
reproduced? Is a computer the same as a printing
press?' Barlow urges those of us who understand
the technology to address these questions, lest
the answers be given to us by law makers and law
enforcers who do not. Barlow and Kapor are
constituting the Computer Liberty Foundation to
``raise and disburse funds for education,
lobbying, and litigation in the areas relating to
digital speech and the extension of the
Constitution into Cyberspace.''
8. Conclusion
Hackers say that it is our social responsibility
to share information, and that it is information
hoarding and disinformation that are the crimes.
This ethic of resource and information sharing
contrast sharply with computer security policies
that are based on authorization and ``need to
know.'' This discrepancy raises an interesting
question: Does the hacker ethic reflects a
growing force in society that stands for greater
sharing of resources and information -- a
reaffirmation of basic values in our constitution
and laws? It is important that we examine the
differences between the standards of hackers,
systems managers, users, and the public. These
differences may represent breakdowns in current
practices, and may present new opportunities
to design better policies and mechanisms for
making computer resource and information more
widely available.
The sentiment for greater information sharing is
not restricted to hackers. In the best seller
``Thriving on Chaos,'' Tom Peters [Peters87]
writes about sharing within organizations:
``Information hoarding, especially by politically
motivated, power-seeking staffs, has been
commonplace throughout American industry, service
and manufacturing alike. It will be an
impossible millstone around the neck of
tomorrow's organizations. Sharing is a must.''
Peters argues that information flow and sharing
is fundamental to innovation and competitiveness.
On a broader scale, Peter Drucker [Drucker89]
says that the ``control of information by
government is no longer possible. Indeed,
information is now transnational. Like money, it
has no `fatherland.' ''
Nor is the sentiment restricted to people outside
the computer security field. Harry DeMaio
[DeMaio89] says that our natural urge is to share
information, and that we are suspicious of
organizations an individuals who are secretive.
He says that information is exchanged out of
``want to know'' and mutual accommodation rather
than ``need to know.'' If this is so, then some
of our security policies are out of step with the
way people work. Peter Denning [DenningP89] says
that information sharing will be widespread in
the emerging worldwide networks of computers and
that we need to focus on ``immune systems'' that
protect against mistakes in our designs and
recover from damage.
I began my investigation of hackers with the
question: who are they and what is their culture
and discourse? My investigation uncovered some
of their concerns, which provided the
organizational structure to this paper, and
several suggestions for new actions that might be
taken. My investigation also opened up a broader
question: What are the clashing discourses that
the hackers stand at the battle lines of? Is it
owning or restricting information vs. sharing
information -- a tension between an age-old
tradition of controlling information as property
and the Enlightenment tradition of sharing and
disseminating information? Is it controlling
access based on ``need to know,'' as determined
by the information provider, vs. ``want to
know,'' as determined by the person desiring
access? Is it law enforcement vs. freedoms
granted under the First and Fourth Amendments?
The answers to these questions, as well as those
raised by Barlow on the nature of information
and free speech, are important because they tell
us whether our policies and practices serve us
as well as they might. The issue is not simply
hackers vs. system managers or law enforcers; it
is a much larger question about values and
practices in an information society.
Acknowledgment
I am deeply grateful to Peter Denning, Frank
Drake, Nathan Estey, Katie Hafner, Brian Harvey,
Steve Lipner, Teresa Lunt, Larry Martin, Gordon
Meyer, Donn Parker, Morgan Schweers, Richard
Stallman, and Alex for their comments on earlier
versions of this paper and helpful discussions;
to Richard Stallman for putting me in contact
with hackers; John Draper, Geoff Goodfellow,
Brian Reid, Eugene Spafford, and the hackers for
helpful discussions; and Richard Pethia for a
summary of some of his experiences at CERT. The
opinions expressed here, however, are my own and
do not necessarily represent those of the people
mentioned above or of Digital Equipment
Corporation.
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