Abstract:
The
present article argues that bargaining over how the gains from cooperation
in the WTO should be shared between governments constitutes a major
obstacle to multilateral liberalization. Since each government is
uncertain about how other governments evaluate possible WTO agreements
and their best alternatives to a negotiated agreement, it has an
incentive to engage in aggressive gain claiming, hoping to shape
the resulting agreement in its own favor. However, aggressive gain
claiming may result in delay and reduced ambition of an agreement,
it may damage states' systemic interest in the effective and stable
functioning of the WTO, and it may provoke peer pressure. How governments
frame these benefits and costs and how they coordinate their negotiating
positions in bargaining coalitions also shapes their gain claiming
strategies. The hypotheses about the determinants of gain claiming
submitted in this article are based on a series of interviews conducted
with members of national delegations and WTO employees, as well as
on a survey of national delegations.
