image001             Daniel Carvalho

                       Assistant Professor of Finance

                       University of Southern California
                       Marshall School of Business

                        Contact Information
                        3670 Trousdale Parkway
                        Bridge Hall 308
                        Los Angeles, CA 90089-0804
                        Telephone: (213) 740-7677


Curriculum Vitae


Ph.D., M.A., Economics, Harvard University

M.S., Economics, Catholic University - Rio (PUC-Rio)

B.S., Mathematics, Catholic University - Rio (PUC-Rio)



The Real Effects of Government-Owned Banks, Journal of Finance, forthcoming

Abstract: Government ownership of banks is widespread around the world. Using plant-level data for Brazilian manufacturing firms, this paper provides evidence that government control over banks leads to significant political influence over the real decisions of firms. I find that firms eligible for government bank lending expand employment in politically attractive regions near elections. These expansions are associated with additional (favorable) borrowing from government banks. Also, the expansions are persistent, take place just before elections, only before competitive elections, and are associated with lower future employment growth by firms in other regions. I find no effects for firms that are ineligible for government bank lending. The analysis suggests that politicians in Brazil use bank lending to shift employment towards politically attractive regions and away from unattractive regions, creating a direct link between the political process and firms’ real behavior.


Financing Constraints and the Amplification of Aggregate Downturns, revise and resubmit at the Review of Financial Studies

Abstract: This paper shows that during industry downturns, firms experience significantly greater valuation losses when their industry peers’ long-term debt is maturing at the time of the shocks. Across a range of tests, the analysis addresses the endogenous determination of peer debt maturity structure. Overall, the evidence suggests that the negative externalities financially constrained firms impose on their industry peers can significantly amplify the effects of industry downturns. The evidence also provides support for the view that these amplification effects are driven by the adverse impact that financially constrained firms have on the balance sheets of their industry peers.


Lending Relationships and the Effect of Banks Distress: Evidence from the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis (joint with Miguel Ferreira and Pedro Matos), Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming

Abstract: We study the role of lending relationships in the transmission of bank distress to nonfinancial firms using the 2007-2008 financial crisis and a sample of publicly traded firms from 34 countries. We examine the effect of both bank-specific shocks (announcements of bank asset write-downs) and systemic shocks (the failure of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers) that produced heterogeneous effects across banks. We find that bank distress is associated with equity valuation losses to borrower firms that have lending relationships with banks. The effect is concentrated in firms with the strongest lending relationships, with the greatest information asymmetry problems, and with the weakest financial position at the time of the shock. Additionally, the effect of relationship bank distress is not offset by borrowers’ access to public debt markets. Overall, our findings suggest that the strength of firms’ lending ties with banks is important to explain differences across firms in the effects of bank distress.


Financing Constraints, Growth Opportunities and Firm Volatility

Abstract: This paper provides evidence that relaxing firms’ financing constraints lead to significant increases in their equity volatility. This issue is studied by examining the impact of persistent shocks to the value of firms’ real estate holdings with an instrumental variables approach. The analysis addresses the concern that these shocks might matter through other channels such as the volatility of real estate prices or the price of capital. The evidence suggests that relaxing firms’ financing constraints increases their equity volatility by allowing firms to take more advantage of idiosyncratic shocks to growth opportunities. The implications of these findings are discussed.