Contracts, Organizations and Institutions - Course material
- Course notes (not a substitute for attending class):
- Introduction
- Topic 1 - Adverse selection (see also the general theory)
- Topic 2 - Price discrimination
- Topic 3 - Auctions (see also some extra notes)
- Topic 4 - Regulation
- Topic 5 - Signaling
- Topic 6 - Moral Hazard
- In-class problem sets: Booklet (to be solved in class)
- Guidelines for in-class presentation and term paper: Guidelines
- Review topics to prepare for first in-class examination: Overview of concepts, how to solve an adverse selection problem, how to solve an auction problem.
- Extra problem to prepare for first in-class examination, and solution.
- Review topics to prepare for second in-class examination: Overview of concepts, , how to solve a signaling problem, how to solve a moral hazard problem.
- Extra problem to prepare for second in-class examination, and solution.
- Example of presentation based on Holmstrom B., ``Managerial incentive problems: a dynamic perspective’’, Review of Economic Studies, 66, 169-182 (1999). Here is an example of handout (yours should be shorter, as it is not supposed to be class material).
- Schedule of presentations TBA.
- Toolkit to estimate your grade.
Contracts, Organizations and Institutions - Articles
-
Articles are available through
USC libraries.
- Aghion P. and Tirole J., 1997, "Formal and real authority in organizations", Journal of Political Economy, 105(1), 1-29.
- Bhattacharya S., Glazer J. and M. Sappington, 1990, "Sharing productive knowledge in internally financed R&D contests", Journal of Industrial Economics, 39, 187-208.
- Cremer J., 1986, "Cooperation in ongoing organizations", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101(1), 33-50.
- Cremer J., 1995, "Arm's length relationships", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(2), 275-295.
- Cremer, J. and Khalil, F. , 1992, "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract", American Economic Review, 82(3), 566-78.
- Cremer, J. ; Khalil, F. ; Rochet, J-C., 1998, "Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered", Journal of Economic Theory, 81(1), 163-200.
- Dewatripont M, 1989, "Renegotiation and information revelation over time: the case of optimal labor contracts", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 589-619.
- Dewatripont M. and Tirole J., 1999, "Advocates", Journal of Political Economy, 107(1), 1-39.
- Holmstrom B. and Milgrom P., 1994, "The firm as an incentive system", American Economic Review, 84(4), 972-991.
- Kofman F. and J. Lawarree, 1993, "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency Econometrica", 61(3), 629-56.
- Laffont, J.J. and J. Tirole (1988), "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts", Econometrica, 56, 1153-1175.
- Laffont J.J., 1996, "Industrial policy and politics", International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14(1), 1-27.
- Laffont J.J and D. Martimort, 1999, "separation of regulators against collusive behavior", Rand Journal of Economics, 30, 232-262.
- Lewis T. and Sappington D., 1993, "Choosing workers qualifications: no experience necessary?", International Economic Review, 34(3), 479-502.
- Lewis T. and Sappington D., 1997, "Penalizing success in dynamic incentive contracts: no good deed goes unpunished?", RAND Journal of Economics, 28(2), 346-358.
- Lewis T. and Sappington D., 1997, "Information management in incentive problems", Journal of Political Economy, 105(4), 796-821.
- Milgrom P., 1988, "Employment contracts, influence activities, and efficient organization design", Journal of Political Economy, 96(1), 42-60.
- Milgrom P. and Roberts J., 1986, "Relying on the information of interested parties", RAND Journal of Economics, 17(1), 18-32.
- Mookherjee D. and I. Png, 1989, "Optimal auditing, insurance and redistribution", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 399-415.
- Riordan M. and Sappington D., 1989, "Second sourcing", RAND Journal of Economics, 20(1), 41-58.
- Rotemberg J. and Saloner G., 1994, "Benefits of narrow business strategies", American Economic Review, 84(5), 1330-1349.